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This thesis is developed in order to tackle the issue of information flow in
logic programming. The contributions of this thesis can be split into three mains
parts:
• Information flow in logic programming: we propose a theoretical foun-
dation of what could be an information flow in logic programming. Several
information flow definitions (based on success/failure, substitution answers,
bisimulation between resolution trees of goals) are stated and compared.
Decision procedures are given for each definition and complexity is studied
for specific classes of logic programs.
• Bisimulation of logic goals: We introduce the concept of bisimulation
between Datalog goals: two Datalog goals are bisimilar with respect to
a given Datalog program when their SLD-trees, considered as relational
structures, are bisimilar. We address the problem of deciding whether two
given goals are bisimilar with respect to given programs. When the given
programs are hierarchical or restricted, this problem is decidable in 2EXP-
TIME.
• Preventive inference control for deductive databases: We propose
a secure and a precise security mechanism for deductive databases based
on the notion of information flow in logic programming.
Keywords: Logic programming, Information flow, Datalog, Equivalence of goals,
Bisimulation, Decision method, Computational complexity, Security mechanisms,




Cette the`se est de´veloppe´e dans le but d’aborder la question du flux de
l’information en programmation logique. Les contributions de cette the`se peuvent
eˆtre divise´es en trois parties:
• Flux de l’information en programmation logique: Nous proposons
une base the´orique de ce que pourrait eˆtre un flux de l’information en
programmation logique. Plusieurs de´finitions de flux d’information (base´es
sur la re´ussite / e´chec, les substitutions re´ponses, bisimulation entre les
arbres de re´solution des buts logiques) sont e´value´es et compare´es. Des
proble`mes de de´cision sont donne´s pour chaque de´finition et la complexite´
est e´tudie´e pour certaines cate´gories de programmes logiques.
• Bisimulation de buts logiques: Nous introduisons la notion de bisimu-
lation entre les buts Datalog: deux buts Datalog sont bisimilaires par rap-
port a` un programme Datalog donne´ lorsque leurs SLD-arbres, conside´re´s
comme des structures relationnelles, sont bisimilaires. Nous abordons le
proble`me de de´cider si deux buts donne´s sont bisimilaires a` l’e´gard d’un pro-
gramme donne´. Lorsque les programmes sont hie´rarchiques ou restricted,
ce proble`me est de´cidable en 2EXPTIME.
• Controˆle pre´ventif de l’infe´rence dans les bases de donne´es de´ductives:
Nous proposons un me´canisme de se´curite´ suˆr et pre´cis pour les bases de
donne´es de´ductives base´ sur la notion de flux de l’information dans la pro-
grammation logique.
Mots-cle´s: Programmation logique, Flux de l’information, Datalog, Equiva-
lence de buts, Bisimulation, Me´thodes de de´cision, Complexite´, Me´canisme de






In this chapter, we position our work and outline the contents of this thesis.
We explain our methodology, which is to apply the notion of information flow
for security systems in a logic programming setting, and we point out the main
influences. We also list the main results of this thesis.
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1.1 Motivation
The theory of deductive Databases is well studied especially by seeing the
emergence of efficient and easy to use systems that support queries, reasoning,
and application development on databases through declarative logic-based
languages.
Building on solid theoretical foundations, the field has benefited in the recent
years of important advances.
The earliest work in the 70s focused on establishing the theoretical foundations
for the field (a review on the impacts that this work had on other disciplines of
computing and database area can be found in [32]).
In the 80s, significant system-oriented developments took place in two fields
very close to deductive databases, causing a limit on the system implementa-
tions of this latter idea. The first field was relational databases, where systems
featuring logic-based query languages of good performance, but limited expres-
sive power, were becoming very successful in the commercial world. The second
field is Logic Programming, where successive generations of Prolog systems were
demonstrating performance and effectiveness in a number of symbolic applica-
tions, ranging from compiler writing to expert systems.
Suddenly, a renewed interest in deductive database systems came about by
realizing that the rule based reasoning of logic, combined with the capability of
database systems of managing and efficiently storing and retrieving large amounts
of information could provide the basis on which to build the next-generation
of knowledge base systems. Consequently, several works focused on coupling
for example Prolog systems with relational databases [15, 42, 47], leading to a
multitude of commercial systems that support this scheme.
This progress is demonstrated by the completion of prototype systems offer-
ing such levels of generality, performance and robustness that they support well
complex application development. Thus, it became easy to learn about algo-
rithms and architectures for building powerful deductive database systems, and
to understand the programming environments and paradigms they are conducive
to.
Thus, several application areas have been identified where these systems
are particularly effective, including areas well beyond the domain of traditional
database applications. One of these application is the need to maintain security
in these databases. In multi-user databases, where different users are allowed to
access different pieces of data, mechanisms must be in place where all users can
access data that they are allowed to access, unless doing so would violate security.
Several works focused on this issue. For example, Bonatti et al. [10] developed
two models of interaction between the user and the database called ”yes-no” di-
alogs, and ”yes-no-don’t know” dialogs. Briefly, both dialog frameworks allow
the database to lie to the user.
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Thus, our aim in this thesis, is to provide a model of interaction in deductive
databases that preserves the database security while minimizing the number of
denials answers.
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1.2 Methodology
In order to fulfill our aim, we used logic programming setting to represent
deductive databases. We adapted the notions of information flow for imperative
programming to first-order logic programming. The main difficulty in adapting
these definitions is that variables in logic programs behave differently from vari-
ables in conventional programming languages. They stand for an unspecified but
single entity rather than for a store location in memory. For this, we were forced
to propose new definitions that fit with logic programming scheme. Once done, a
natural question arose whether it is decidable to decide of the existence of such a
flow in logic programs. Unfortunately, this question is undecidable in the general
setting. This led us to consider several types of logic programs for which the
existence of the flow became decidable. Even by considering these types of logic
programs, we were not able to answer another question that concerns if two logic
goals are bisimilar. For this, we were forced to deal with SLD-trees with infinite
branches. We were rescued by using loop checking techniques. These techniques
detect some repetition in the SLD-derivations. We used these techniques jointly
with our adapted definition of information flow to decide if two goals are bisimilar.
We studies this for some type of logic programs, as this question is undecidable
in the general setting. Lastly, in order to present a secure and precise mechanism
for protecting deductive databases, we extended our definitions of flow and pre-
sented the definitions of confidentiality policies, secure and precise mechanisms
in a logic programming context.
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1.3 Results
Below, we list the main contributions of the thesis:
• Information flow in logic programming: we propose three definitions
of information flows in logic programs. These definitions correspond to
what can be observed by the user when a query ← G(x, y) is run on a logic
program P . We consider first that the user only sees whether her queries
succeed or fail. In this respect, we say information flows from x to y in G
when there exists constants a, b such that P ∪{← G(a, y)} succeeds whereas
P ∪{← G(b, y)} fails. Then, we assume that the user has also access to the
sets of substitution answers computed by the interpreter with respect to
her queries. As a result, in this case, there is a flow of information from x
to y in G if there are constants a, b such that the set of substitution answers
of P ∪ {← G(a, y)} and P ∪ {← G(b, y)} are different. Lastly, we suppose
that the user, in addition to the substitution answers, also observes the
SLD-refutation trees produced by the interpreter. If the SLD- trees of the
queries P ∪{← G(a, y)} and P ∪{← G(a, y)} can be distinguished (i.e. non
bisimilar in our context) in one way or another by the user, then we will
say that information flows from x to y in G.
• Undecidability / decidability of the flow in logic programming: For
a logic program P and a two variables goal← G(x, y), determining whether
there is a flow of information from x to y relatively to the three definitions
of the flow is undecidable in the general setting. The problem became
decidable in EXPTIME for Datalog programs relatively to the definitions
of flow based on success/failure and substitution answers, and the same
problem is in ∆2P for binary hierarchical Datalog programs relatively to
the definition of flow based on success/failure.
• Bisimulation of logic goals: A natural question to ask was to decide
if two goals in logic programs are bisimilar. We showed that this decision
problem is undecidable for Prolog programs and it became decidable in
2EXPTIME for hierarchical and restricted Datalog logic programs.
• Preventive inference control for deductive databases: We propose
a secure and a precise security mechanism for deductive databases based
on the notion of information flow in logic programming and its extension
to the notion of levels. A formal proof is given, showing that the security
mechanism proposed is secure.
Some material from this thesis has been published in referred conferences and
journals. The notion of information flow in logic programming has been described
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in [JIAF 2011], and the result about bisimulation have been published in [JeLIA
2012].
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1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
In chapter 2, we present the basic components for data security. We explore
security policies by talking about confidentiality, noninterference, nondeducibility
and integrity policies. We describe some security mechanism implementations,
namely, access control, information flow and inference control.
In chapter 3, we describe the relevant background material, including an overview
of first-order logic programming. We present also loop checking concept and show
soundness and completeness results for some loop checking techniques. We end
with an overview of control flow and dependence analysis in logic programming.
In chapter 4, we give three definitions of information flow in logic programming
based respectively, on success/failure, substitution answers and bisimulation. We
explore the links between these definitions and prove the non-transitivity of the
flow. We show the undecidability of the existence of a flow relatively for a general
logic program and a goal. We give complexity and decidability results for other
restricted types of logic programs.
In chapter 5, we prove first undecidability of logic goals bisimulation for Pro-
log programs, and later decidability of bisimulation of goals for hierarchical and
restricted Datalog logic programs.
In chapter 6, we go further beyond the definitions of information flow and we
present the notion of level of indistinguishability of the flow. We apply this
notion to prevent illicit inferences for information systems by presenting a secure
and precise security mechanism.





Data security is the science and study of methods of protecting data in com-
puter and communication systems from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
One of the aspects of data security is the control of information flow in the sys-
tem. In some sense, an information flow should describe controls that regulate
the dissemination of information. These controls are needed to prevent programs
from leaking confidential data, or from disseminating classified data to users with
lower security clearances.
We begin with basic security-related aspects in section 2.1, namely the con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability conditions. While confidentiality fo-
cuses on preventing disclosure of information to unauthorized users, integrity
means that data cannot be modified undetectably. Availability addresses the
fact that the information must be available when it is needed. Section 2.2 dis-
cusses security policies that identify the threats and define the requirements
for ensuring a secure system. We review the major security policies, namely, con-
fidentiality and integrity policies respectively in subsections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.
Section 2.2.2 presents confidentiality policies. These policies, as their noun
suggests, emphasize the protection of confidentiality, as, the Bell-LaPadula
Model, noninterference and nondeducibility. Integrity policies, which
focuses on the incorruptibility of the data, are mentioned in section 2.2.3.
Another aspect of confidentiality is to ensure that no high-level information
is visible, or can be deduced, by a low-level process. Implementation of security
is discussed in section 2.3, which can be done through cryptography and/or by
sharing rights and information. We will focus in section 2.3 on this latter
mechanism by presenting briefly in subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3 access control
15
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mechanism and inference control mechanism respectively. Section 2.3.2
will be devoted to information flow checking mechanisms for imperative
programming. For this, we begin by exposing the theory of information flow in
imperative programming. We discuss compiler and execution based mechanisms
that determine if an information flow in an imperative program could violate a
given information flow policy. We will end the section with a concrete example
on how to control information flows in practice.
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2.1 Basic Components
Data Security is based on three major aspects: confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. The interpretations of these aspects vary according to the
contexts in which they arise.
• Confidentiality represents the dissimulation of information (data / re-
sources and its existence). The importance of this aspect arises from
the need to keep information secret in sensitive fields such as government
and industry. For example, all types of institutions keep personnel records
secret.
The concealment of the existence of data, which is sometimes more revealing
than the data itself, is considered too as an aspect of confidentiality. For
example, knowing the exact squandering amount in a government is less
important than knowing that such practice occurred.
Another important aspect of confidentiality is resource hiding. Some or-
ganizations, for example, using equipment without authorization, may not
wish to conceal their configuration publicly, as they will be faced legal
charges.
Different mechanisms support confidentiality:
– Access control mechanisms: One of the access control mechanisms is
cryptography. Cryptography scrambles data to make it incompre-
hensible. Nevertheless, as a cryptographic key is needed to retrieve
the original data from the scrambled one, the cryptographic key itself
becomes another datum to be protected.
– System-dependent mechanisms: These mechanisms prevent processes
from illicitly accessing information. However, they can protect the
secrecy of data more completely than cryptography, but when the
controls fail or are bypassed, the protected data can be read.
• Integrity prevents unauthorized changes of data or resources. It includes
data integrity (the content of the information) and origin integrity (the
source of the data, often called authentication). For example, a local news-
paper may print information obtained from Wikileaks but attribute it to
the wrong source. The information is printed as received (preserving data
integrity), but its source is incorrect (corrupting origin integrity).
Mainly, two mechanisms support integrity:
– Prevention mechanisms: it seek to maintain the integrity of the
data by:
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∗ blocking any unauthorized attempts to change the data
(the case where a user tries to change data which she has no
authority to change; circumvented by the use of adequate authen-
tication and access controls) or
∗ any attempts to change the data in unauthorized ways
(the case where a user authorized to make certain changes in the
data tries to change the data in other ways. Preventing this at-
tempt requires very different controls).
– Detection mechanisms: it simply report that the data’s integrity is
no longer trustworthy, by analyzing for example: the system events,
or if the constraints on data are still holding.
• Availability refers to the ability to use the information or resource desired.
This means that the computing systems used to store and process the in-
formation, the security controls used to protect it, and the communication
channels used to access it must be functioning correctly. The aspect of avail-
ability that is relevant to security is that someone may deliberately arrange
to deny access to data or to a service by making it unavailable. It is worth
noting that attempts to block availability (called denial of service attacks)
can be the most difficult to detect, because the analyst must determine if
the unusual access patterns are attributable to deliberate manipulation of
resources or of environment.
As we have stated, confidentiality checks if the data is compromised or not,
while integrity, except that it checks the data correctness and trustworthiness, it
deals also with the origin of the data, and how it was protected. Thus, evaluating
integrity is often very difficult because it relies on assumptions about the source
of the data. Formally, to state what is and what is not allowed in data security,
security policies were introduced.
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2.2 Security Policies
A security policy defines what secure means for a system or a set of systems.
Security policies can be informal or highly mathematical in nature. In fact, poli-
cies may be presented mathematically, as a list of allowed (secure) and disallowed
(nonsecure) states. In practice, policies are rarely so precise; they normally de-
scribe in natural language what users and staff are allowed to do. The ambiguity
inherent in such a description leads to states that are not classified as allowed or
disallowed.
2.2.1 Foundations of Security Policies
We consider a computer system to be a finite-state automaton with a set
of transition functions that change state. Then:
Definition 2.2.1 (Security policy). A security policy is a statement (usually
written in natural language) that partitions the states of the system into a set of
secure/authorized states and a set of nonsecure/unauthorized states.
A security policy sets the context in which we can define a secure system.
What is secure under one policy may not be secure under a different policy.
More precisely:
Definition 2.2.2 (Secure system). A secure system is a system that, ini-
tially, is in an authorized state and cannot be in any unauthorized state after one
or several transitions.
Consider the finite-state machine in Figure 2.1. It consists of four states and
five transitions. The security policy partitions the states into a set of authorized
states A = {s1, s2} and a set of unauthorized states UA = {s3, s4}. This system
is not secure, because regardless of which authorized state it starts in, it can enter
an unauthorized state. However, if the edge from s1 to s3 were not present, the
system would be secure, because it could not enter an unauthorized state from
an authorized state.
Definition 2.2.3 (Breach of security). A breach of security occurs when a
system enters an unauthorized state.
A security policy considers all relevant aspects of confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. With respect to confidentiality, it identifies those states in
which information leaks to those not authorized to receive it. This includes
the illicit transmission of information, called information flow . Also, the policy
must handle dynamic changes of authorization, so it includes a temporal element.
For example, a contractor working for a company may be authorized to access
proprietary information during the lifetime of a nondisclosure agreement, but
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Figure 2.1: A finite-state machine. In this example, the authorized states are s1
and s2.
when that nondisclosure agreement expires, the contractor can no longer access
that information. This aspect of the security policy is often called a confidentiality
policy.
With respect to integrity, a security policy identifies authorized ways in
which information may be altered and entities authorized to alter it. Autho-
rization may derive from a variety of relationships, and external influences may
constrain it; for example, in many transactions, a principle called separation of
duties forbids an entity from completing the transaction on its own. Those parts
of the security policy that describe the conditions and manner in which data can
be altered are called the integrity policy.
With respect to availability, a security policy describes what services must
be provided. It may present parameters within which the services will be accessi-
ble (for example, that a browser may download Web pages but not Java applets).
It may require a level of service (for example, that a server will provide authen-
tication data within 1 minute of the request being made). This relates directly
to issues of quality of service.
The statement of a security policy may formally state the desired properties
of the system. If the system is to be provably secure, the formal statement will
allow the designers and implementers to prove that those desired properties hold.
If a formal proof is unnecessary or infeasible, analysts can test that the desired
properties hold for some set of inputs.
In practice, a less formal type of security policy defines the set of authorized
states. Typically, the security policy assumes that the reader understands the
context in which the policy is issued - in particular, the laws, organizational
policies, and other environmental factors. The security policy then describes
conduct, actions, and authorizations defining ”authorized users” and ”authorized
use.”
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A security policy defines what information is to be protected; it has a non-
procedural form. For example, a security policy might state that a user is not
to obtain ”top secret” information. In contrast, a protection mechanism defines
how information is to be protected; it has a procedural form. For example, a
protection mechanism might check each operation performed by a user.
As a second example, consider that a university has a non-cheating policy
stating that no student may copy another student’s homework. One mechanism
is the file access controls; if the second student had set permissions to prevent
the first student from reading the file containing her homework, the first student
could not have copied that file.
In computer security, a distinction is made between policy and mechanism.
Recall that a security policy is a statement of what is, and what is not, allowed.
Mechanisms can be nontechnical, such as requiring proof of identity before chang-
ing a password; in fact, policies often require some procedural mechanisms that
technology cannot enforce.
In the remainder of this section, we will present briefly confidentiality, in-
tegrity, noninterference and nondeducibility policies, but before this, we
need to recall some basic notions concerning lattices.
Lattices
A lattice is a mathematical construction built on the notion of a group. First,
we review some basic terms. Then we discuss lattices.
Basics
For a set S, a relation R is any subset of S×S. For convenience, if (a, b) ∈ R,
we write aRb.
For example, let S = {1, 2, 3}. Then the relation less than or equal to (written
≤) is defined by the set R = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 3)}. We write 1
≤ 1 and 2 ≤ 3 for convenience, because (1, 2) ∈ R and (2, 3) ∈ R, but not 3 ≤ 2,
because (3, 2) 6∈ R.
The following definitions describe properties of relations.
Definition 2.2.4. A relation R defined over a set S is reflexive if aRa for all
a ∈ S.
Definition 2.2.5. A relation R defined over a set S is antisymmetric if aRb and
bRa imply a = b for all a, b ∈ S.
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Definition 2.2.6. A relation R defined over a set S is transitive if aRb and bRc
imply aRc for all a, b, c ∈ S.
For example, consider the set of complex numbers C. For any a ∈ C, define
aR as the real component and aI as the imaginary component (that is, a =
aR+aIi). Let a ≤ b if and only if aR ≤ bR and aI ≤ bI . This relation is reflexive,
antisymmetric, and transitive.
A partial ordering occurs when a relation orders some, but not all, elements
of a set. Such a set and relation are often called a poset. If the relation imposes
an ordering among all elements, it is a total ordering.
For example, the relation less than or equal to, as defined in the usual sense,
imposes a total ordering on the set of integers, because, given any two integers,
one will be less than or equal to the other. However, the relation in the preceding
example imposes a partial ordering on the set C. Specifically, the numbers 1 + 4i
and 2 + 3i are not related under that relation (because 1 ≤ 2 but 4 6≤ 3).
Under a partial ordering (and a total ordering), we define the upper bound
of two elements to be any element that follows both in the relation.
Definition 2.2.7. For two elements a, b ∈ S, if there exists a u ∈ S such that
aRu and bRu, then u is an upper bound of a and b.
A pair of elements may have many upper bounds. The one closest to the two
elements is the least upper bound.
Definition 2.2.8. Let U be the set of upper bounds of a and b. Let u ∈ U be an
element such that there is no t ∈ U for which tRu. Then u is the least upper
bound of a and b (written lub(a, b) or a
⊗
b).
Lower bounds, and greatest lower bounds, are defined similarly.
Definition 2.2.9. For two elements a, b ∈ S, if there exists an l ∈ S such that
lRa and lRb, then l is a lower bound of a and b.
Definition 2.2.10. Let L be the set of lower bounds of a and b. Let l ∈ L be
an element such that there is no m ∈ L for which lRm. Then l is the greatest
lower bound of a and b (written glb(a, b) or a
⊕
b).
For example, consider the subset of the set of complex numbers for which the
real and imaginary parts are integers from 0 to 10, inclusive, and the relation
defined in the second example in this appendix. The set of upper bounds for
1 + 9i and 9 + 3i is {9 + 9i, 9 + 10i, 10 + 9i, 10 + 10i}. The least upper bound of
1 + 9i and 9 + 3i is 9 + 9i. The set of lower bounds is {1 + 1i, 1 + 0i, 0 + 0i}. The
greatest lower bound is 1 + 1i.
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Lattices
A lattice is the combination of a set of elements S and a relation R meeting
the following criteria.
1. R is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive on the elements of S.
2. For every s, t ∈ S, there exists a greatest lower bound.
3. For every s, t ∈ S, there exists a least upper bound.
For example, the set {0, 1, 2} forms a lattice under the relation ”less than or
equal to” (≤). By the laws of arithmetic, the relation is reflexive, antisymmetric,
and transitive. The greatest lower bound of any two integers is the smaller,
and the least upper bound is the larger. Back to the example of the set of
complex numbers. Let a ≤ b if and only if aR ≤ bR and aI ≤ bI . This set
and relation define a lattice, because, as it shown before, the relation is reflexive,
antisymmetric, and transitive and any pair of elements a, b have a least upper
bound and a greatest lower bound.
2.2.2 Confidentiality Policies
The main aim of a confidentiality policy is to prevent the unauthorized dis-
closure of confidential information. Confidentiality policies are also called infor-
mation flow policies. For example, the navy must keep confidential the date
on which a troop ship will sail. If the date is changed, the redundancy in the sys-
tems and paperwork should catch that change. But if the enemy knows the date
of sailing, the ship could be sunk. Because of extensive redundancy in military
communications channels, availability is also less of a problem.
The Bell-LaPadula Model
The simplest type of confidentiality classification is a set of security clear-
ances/security classes arranged in a linear (total) ordering (see example 2.1).
These clearances represent sensitivity levels. The higher the security clearance,
the more sensitive the information (and the greater the need to keep it confiden-
tial). A subject has a security clearance. The goal of the Bell-LaPadula security
model [4, 46] is to prevent read access to objects at a security classification higher
than the subject’s clearance.
Example 2.1 Security Clearances - security classification
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We consider the following confidentiality classification, security levels and
clearances. At the left is the basic confidentiality classification system. The four
security levels are arranged with the most sensitive at the top and the least sen-
sitive at the bottom. In the middle are individuals grouped by their security
clearance. At the right is a set of documents grouped by their security levels.
TOP SECRET (TS) Tome Personnel Files
| | |
SECRET (S) Smith E-Mail Files
| | |
CONFIDENTIAL (C) Carol Activity Log Files
| | |
UNCLASSIFIED (UC) Uriel Telephone List Files
From this figure, one can read and deduce the following:
• Carol’s security clearance is C (CONFIDENTIAL).
• Tome’s security clearance is TS (TOP SECRET).
• The security classification of the object ”E-mail files” is S (SECRET).
• The security classification of the object ”Telephone list files” is UC (UN-
CLASSIFIED).
• Carol cannot read personnel files.
• Tome can read the activity log files.
• Tome (with a security clearance of TS) cannot write to the activity log files
(with a security classification of C) and thus she cannot copy the content of
the personnel files into the activity log files and thus neither Carol can read
the personnel files.
The Bell-LaPadula Model forbids reading of higher-level objects (called the
simple security condition) and writing to lower-level objects (called the *-property).
However, writing can take many forms. For example, suppose two users are shar-
ing a single system. The users are separated, each one having a virtual machine,
and they cannot communicate directly with one another. However, the CPU is
shared on the basis of load. If user Abby (cleared for SECRET) runs a CPU-
intensive program, and user Bob (cleared for CONFIDENTIAL) does not, Abby’s
program will dominate the CPU. This provides a covert channel through which
Abby and Bob can communicate. They agree on a time interval and a starting
time (say, beginning at noon, with intervals of 1 minute). To transmit a 1-bit,
Abby runs his program in the interval; to transmit a 0-bit, Abby does not. Every
minute, Bob tries to execute a program, and if the program runs, then Abby’s
program does not have the CPU and the bit is 0; if the program does not run in
that interval, Bob’s program has the CPU and the transmitted bit is 1. Although
not ”writing” in the traditional sense, information is flowing from Abby to Bob
in violation of the Bell-LaPadula Model’s constraints.
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This example demonstrates the difficulty of separating policy from mech-
anism. In the abstract, the CPU is transmitting information from one user to
another. This violates the *-property, but it is not writing in any traditional sense
of the word, because no operation that alters bits on the disk has occurred. So,
either the model is insufficient for preventing Bob and Abby from communicat-
ing, or the system is improperly abstracted and a more comprehensive definition
of ”write” is needed. This is one problem, and in what follows, exploring it will
lead to the notions of noninterference and nondeducibility.
Noninterference
The previous example suggests an alternative view of security phrased in
terms of interference. A system is secure if groups of subjects cannot interfere
with one another. In the same example, the ”interference” would be Abby’s
interfering with Bob’s acquiring the CPU for her process. Goguen and Meseguer
[35] used this approach to define security policies. A security policy, based on
noninterference, would describe states in which forbidden interferences do not
occur.
Nondeducibility
Goguen and Meseguer [35] characterize security in terms of state transitions.
If state transitions caused by high-level commands interfere with a sequence of
transitions caused by low-level commands, then the system is not noninterference-
secure. But their definition skirts the intent of what a secure system is to provide.
The point of security, in the Bell-LaPadula sense, is to restrict the flow of infor-
mation from a high-level entity to a low-level entity. That is, given a set of
low-level outputs, no low-level subject should be able to deduce anything about
the high-level outputs. Sutherland [68] reconsidered this issue in these terms.
Consider a system as a ”black box” with two sets of inputs, one classified
High and the other Low. It also has two outputs, again, one High and the other
Low.
If an observer cleared only for Low can take a sequence of Low inputs and Low
outputs, and from them deduce information about the High inputs or outputs,
then information has leaked from High to Low.
2.2.3 Integrity Policies
As much of the companies and firms are more concerned with accuracy than
with disclosure, in the sense that a company can function correctly even if its
confidential data is released, integrity policies, as their name suggests, focus on
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integrity rather than on confidentiality. Three major integrity security policies
were proposed in the literature, namely, the Biba [6], Lipner [49] and Clark-
Wilson [19] integrity models.
Integrity policies take into account concepts like the separation of duty, the




Implementation of data security can be achieved through several means:
cryptography mechanism by the principle of cryptosystems, key management,
ciphering techniques and authentication; and mechanisms based on the sharing
of rights and information. In the remainder of this section, we will be con-
cerned only by the second type of mechanisms. We will talk briefly about access
control mechanisms, information flow and inference control mechanisms.
2.3.1 Access control
In this section, we present the notion of protection system. In fact, a
protection system describes the conditions under which a system is secure. Recall
that the state of a system is the collection of the current values of all memory
locations, all secondary storage, and all registers and other components of the
system. The subset of this collection that deals with protection is the protection
state of the system.
For example, the access control matrix [26, 36, 45] is the most precise tool
that can describe the current protection state. It can express any expressible
security policy. It characterizes the rights of each subject (active entity, such as
a process) with respect to every other entity.
Briefly, the set of all protected entities is called the set of objects O. The
set of subjects S is the set of active objects, such as processes and users. In the
access control matrix model, the relationship between these entities is captured
by a matrix A with rights drawn from a set of rights R in each entry a[s, o],
where s ∈ S, o ∈ O, and a[s, o] ⊆ R. The subject s has the set of rights a[s, o]
over the object o. The set of protection states of the system is represented by
the triple (S,O,A). For example, the figure 2.2 shows the protection state of a
system. The system has two processes and two files and the rights are read, write
or append. Process 1 can read or write file 1 and can read file 2; process 2 can
append to file 1 and read file 2.
file 1 file 2
Process 1 read, write read
Process 2 append read
Figure 2.2: An access control matrix
We should note that the access control matrix mechanism in computer se-
curity is not used in practice because of space requirements (most systems have
thousands of objects and could have thousands of subjects too).
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2.3.2 Information Flow
A security policy, as it was discussed earlier in this thesis, regulates infor-
mation flows in a system. It is one of the system jobs to ensure that these
informations flows do not violate the constraints of the security policy. In this
section, we will review the major mechanisms proposed in the literature for im-
perative programming to check information flows, namely, the compile-time
mechanisms and the runtime mechanisms. We will end this section by giving an
example on how to control information flows in practice.
Let us recall that confidentiality policies (i.e. information flow policies) de-
fine the authorized paths along which information can flow. Previously in Sec-
tions 2.2.2, we reviewed several models of information flow, namely the Bell-
LaPadula Model, nondeducibility and noninterference models. Each model as-
sociates a label, representing a security class with information and with entities
containing that information. Each model has rules about the conditions under
which information can move throughout the system.
In the following, for an object in the system (an object may be a logical
structure such as a file, record, or program variable, or it may be a physical
structure such as a memory location, or a user), we shall write x for both the
name and the value of x, and x for its security class. We will use the notation
x y to mean that information can flow from an element of class x to an element
of class y. A policy is represented by a set of such statements.
Compiler-Based Mechanisms
The mechanisms described in this section follow those developed in [24, 25].
The aim of compiler-based mechanisms is to check that information flows through-
out a program are authorized, by determining if flows could violate a given infor-
mation flow policy. Note that this determination is not precise (because secure
paths of information flow could be marked as violating the policy), but it is secure
(no unauthorized path along which information may flow will be undetected).
Definition 2.3.1 (Certification of statements). A set of statements is certified
with respect to an information flow policy if the information flow within that set
of statements does not violate the policy.
Example 2.2 Certification of statements
Consider the following if then else statement, where x, y, a and b are vari-
ables:
if x = 1 then
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.... y := a;
else
.... y := b;
Obviously, information flows from: x and a to y or from x and b to y.
Suppose now that the policy states that: a  y, b  y, and x  y, then the
information flow is secure.
In the following:
• x : integer class{A,B}
states that x is an integer variable and that data from security classes A
and B may flow into x. Note that security classes are viewed as a lattice,
and thus x’s class must be at least the least upper bound of classes A and
B (i.e. lub{A,B} x).
• Low and High are two special classes representing the greatest lower bound
and least upper bound, respectively, of the lattice.
• All constants of the programming language are of class Low.
• Information can be passed into or out of a procedure (i.e. a set of instruc-
tions that performs a specific task) through parameters (input is, output
os and input/output ios parameters ).
• is : type class{is} (the class of an input parameter is the class of the actual
argument)
• os : type class{i1, · · · , ik, io1, · · · , iok} (the class of an output parameter is
the class of the input and output arguments because information can flow
from any input parameter to any output parameter)
• ios : type class{i1, · · · , ik, io1, · · · , iok}
• For an element a[i] in an array, information flows from a[i] and from i.
Thus, the class involved is lub{a[i], i}. As for information flowing into a[i],
it affects only the value in a[i], and the class involved is a[i].
Next, we will review several types of program statements and their certifica-
tion mechanism in imperative programming.
Assignment Statements
Consider an assignment statement of the following form: y := f(x1, · · · , xn)
where y and x1, · · · , xn are variables and f is some function of those variables.
Information flows from each of the xi’s to y. Hence, the requirement for the
information flow to be secure is lub{x1, · · · , xn} y.
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Compound Statements






where each of the Si’s is a statement. If the information flow in each of the
statements is secure, then the information flow in the compound statement is
secure.
Conditional Statements
Consider a conditional statement of the form:





where x1, · · · , xn are variables and f is some (Boolean) function of those variables.
One of the two statements S1 or S2 may be executed. This depends on the value
of f (consequently, on the values of the variables x1, · · · , xn). Thus, information
must be able to flow from those variables to any targets of assignments in S1 and
S2. This is possible if and only if the lowest class of the targets dominates the
highest class of the variables x1, · · · , xn. Thus, in order for the information flow
to be secure: S1 and S2 must be secure and lub{x1, · · · , xn}  glb{y| y is the
target of an assignment in S1 and S2}.
Iterative Statements
Consider an iterative statement of the form:
while f(x1, · · · , xn) do
S;
where x1, · · · , xn are variables and f is some (boolean) function of those variables.
Note that an iterative statement contains implicitly a conditional statement, so
the requirements for information flow to be secure for a conditional statement
apply here. Nevertheless, secure information flow also requires that the loop
terminate. In fact, if the program never leaves the iterative statement, statements
after the loop will never be executed. In this case, information has flowed from
the variables x1, · · · , xn by the absence of execution. Hence, secure information
flow also requires that the loop terminate. For the information flow to be secure:
the iterative statement must terminates, S must be secure and lub{x1, · · · , xn} 
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glb{y| y is the target of an assignment in S}.
Procedure Calls
Consider a procedure call of the form:




where each of the ij ’s is an input parameter and each of the oj ’s is an input/output
parameter. Obviously, S must be secure, but in order to achieve this, relationships
between input and output parameters must be captured too. Let x1, · · · , xm and
y1, · · · , yn be the actual input and input/output parameters, respectively. For
the information flow to be secure: S must be secure and for j = 1, · · · ,m and
k = 1, · · · , n, if ij  ok then xj  yk and for j = 1, · · · , n and k = 1, · · · ,m, if
oj  ok then yj  yk
Example 2.3 Examples of flow certification in imperative programming
We will give examples of program certification for the different program state-
ments previously presented:
• The requirement for the statement x := y+z; to be secure is that lub{y, z} 
x.
• The requirement for the compound statement
S1 x := y + z;
S2 y := x ∗ z;
to be secure is that lub{y, z} x for S1 and lub{x, z} y for S2.
• The requirement for the conditional statement
if x+ y < z then
.... S1 a := b;
else
.... S2 y := x ∗ z;
to be secure is that b, a for S1 and lub{x, z} y for S2, and lub{x, y, z} 
glb{a, y}.
Exceptions and infinite loops can cause information to flow as shown in the
following two cases:
• Consider the following procedure, which copies the (approximate) value of
x to y.[1][1] From Denning [269], p. 306.
proc copy(x : int class{x}; var y : int class Low);
var sum : int class{x}; z : int class Low;
begin
.... z := 0;
.... sum := 0;
.... y := 0;
.... while z = 0 do begin
.......... sum := sum+ x;
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.......... y := y + 1;
.... end
end
When sum overflows, a trap occurs. If the trap is not handled, the procedure
exits. The value of x is MAXINT/y, where MAXINT is the largest integer
representable as an int on the system. At no point, however, is the flow
relationship x y checked.
• The following procedure copies data from x to y. It assumes that x and y
are either 0 or 1.
proc copy(x : int 0..1 class {x}; var y : int 0..1 class Low);
begin
.... y := 0;
.... while x = 0 do
.......... (∗nothing∗);
.... y := 1;
end
If x is 0 initially, the procedure does not terminate. If x is 1, it does termi-
nate, with y being 1. At no time is there an explicit flow from x to y.
Execution-Based Mechanisms
Before talking about execution-based mechanisms, it is time to define what
we mean by implicit information flow.
Definition 2.3.2 (Implicit information flows). An implicit flow of infor-
mation occurs when information flows from x to y without an explicit assignment
of the form y := f(x), where f(x) is an arithmetic expression with the variable
x.
As for execution-based mechanism, its aim is to prevent information flows that
violate the policy. For explicit flows, and before the execution of the assignment
y = f(x1, · · · , xn), the execution-based mechanism verifies that lub(x1, · · · , xn) 
y. Thus, in the case where the condition is true, the assignment proceeds; other-
wise, it fails. As for checking implicit flows, it is a bit more complicated because
sometimes, statements may be incorrectly certified as complying with the confi-
dentiality policy. For example, let x and y be two variables. The requirement
for certification for a particular statement y op x is that x y. The conditional
statement:
if x = 1 then
.... y := a;
causes a flow from x to y. For the case where, x 6= 1, x = High and y = Low,
the implicit flow would not be checked.
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In order to deal with implicit flows, Fenton [30] proposed an abstract machine
call the Data Mark Machine.
Fenton’s Data Mark Machine
Fenton’s Data Mark Machine [30] handles, in fact, implicit flows at execution
time. To each variable in his machine, he associates a security class (or as he
calls it a tag). In order to treat implicit flows as explicit flows, Fenton included
a tag for the program counter (PC - is a processor register that indicates where
a computer is in its program sequence. PC is incremented after fetching an
instruction, and holds the memory address of the next instruction that would
be executed.) since branches are considered as assignments to the PC. Fenton
defined the semantics of the Data Mark Machine. In the following:
• skip means that the instruction is not executed,
• push(x, x) means to push the variable x and its security class x onto the
program stack (the program stack is the memory set aside as scratch space
for a thread of execution),
• pop(x, x) means to pop the top value and security class off the program
stack and assign them to x and x, respectively.
Fenton defined five instructions that a sufficient computer needs only. The
relationships between execution of the instructions and the classes of the variables
are depicted in table 2.1.
Instruction Execution
1 x := x+ 1 if PC  x then x := x+ 1; else skip
2 if x = 0 if x = 0
then goto n then {push(PC,PC); PC = lub(PC, x); PC := n; }
else x := x− 1 else {if PC  x then{x := x− 1; } else skip}
3 if ′ x = 0 if x = 0
then goto n then {if x PC then{PC := n; } else skip}
else x := x− 1 else {if PC  x then{x := x− 1; } else skip}
4 return pop(PC,PC);
5 halt if program stack empty then halt execution else skip
Table 2.1: Fenton’s Data Mark Machine
In the second instruction for example, Fenton pushed the PC because it cap-
tures information about the variable x, whereas in the third instruction, the PC
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is in a higher security class than the conditional variable x, so adding informa-
tion from x to the PC does not change the PC’s security class. As for the halt
instruction, the program stack should be empty to ensure that the user cannot
obtain information by looking at the program stack after the program has halted.
Example 2.4 Fenton’s Data Mark Machine
Consider the following program, in which x initially contains 0 or 1 (borrowed
from [24], Figure 5.7, p. 290)
1. if x = 0 then goto 4 else x := x− 1
2. if z = 0 then goto 6 else z := z − 1
3. halt
4. z := z + 1
5. return
6. y := y + 1
7. return
This program copies the value of x to y. Suppose that initially x = 1. The
following table shows the contents of memory, the security class of the PC at each
step, and the corresponding certification check.
x y z PC PC stack certification check
1 0 0 1 Low -
0 0 0 2 Low - Low  x
0 0 0 6 x (3, Low)
0 1 0 7 x (3, Low) PC  y
0 1 0 3 Low -
In addition, Fenton’s machine handles errors (i.e. error messages informing
the user of the failure of the certification check at some step) by ignoring them.
The problem with reporting of errors is that a user with lower clearance than the
information causing the error can deduce the information from knowing that there
has been an error.
In fact, in the example 2.4, the classes of the variables are fixed. But Fenton’s
machine alters the class of the PC as the program runs. This suggests a notion of
dynamic classes. For example, after executing the assignment y := f(x1, · · · , xn),
y’s class is changed to lub(x1, · · · , xn). The next example shows that implicit
flows complicate matters.
Example 2.5 Implicit flows handling in Fenton’s Data Mark Machine
Consider the following program (borrowed from Denning [269], Figure 5.5, p.
285). proc copy(x : integer class{x}; var y : integer class{y});
var z : integer class variable{Low};
begin
1. y := 0;
2. z := 0;
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3. if x = 0 then z := 1;
4. if z = 0 then y := 1;
end;
Let the class of z, z be variable and initialized to Low, and let flows be certified
whenever anything is assigned to y. Suppose also that y < x.
• Statement 1 sets y to 0 and checks that Low  y.
• Statement 2 sets z to 0 and z to Low.
• If x = 0; statement 3 changes z to 1 and z to lub(Low, x) = x, and the
fourth statement is skipped. Hence, y is set to 0 on exit.
• If x = 1; statement 3 is skipped and the fourth statement assigns 1 to y and
checks that lub(Low, z) = Low  z. Hence, y is set to 1 on exit.
Thus, an information flow occurred from x to y even though y < x. The
program violates the policy but is nevertheless certified.
However, using Fenton’s Data Mark Machine, one could detect this violation
as it shown in the following:
x y z PC PC stack certification check
1 0 0 1 Low -
1 0 0 2 Low - Low  y
1 0 0 3 Low - Low  z
1 0 0 4 x (4, Low)
1 0 0 - x (4, Low) x y
Example of Information Flow Controls
We present in this subsection a practical example of information flow con-
trol: a mail guard application for electronic mail moving between a classified
network and an unclassified one follows. The goal is to prevent the illicit flow of
information from one system unit to another.
Secure Network Server Mail Guard
The Secure Network Server Mail Guard (SNSMG) [66] is a process that
analyzes (by blocking or deleting messages when necessary) the traffic between
two networks. Consider two networks, N1 and N2. Let N1 has data that are
classified SECRET only, and N2 only public ones. The authorities controlling
the SECRET network need to allow electronic mail to go to the public network,
as they do not want SECRET information to be dissimulated. The SNSMG
works as follows: first, it receives a message from one network; then, it applies
several filters (that depend on the source address, destination address, sender,
recipient, and/or contents of the message) to the message.
In fact, the SNSMG deals with two kind of different message transfer agents
(MTA). One is reserved for the SECRET network, and the other one for the public
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one. Suppose that the messages output from the SECRET network’s MTA have
type a, and messages output from the filters have a different type, type b; then
the public network MTA will accept inputs messages of type b only and reject
any messages of any other type.
Finally, we recall that confidentiality, one of the security interests, demand
not only to control the messages in the system but also to control of flow




We say that an observer can achieve an information gain if the observer, by
observing a message, can convert his a priori knowledge into strictly increased
a posteriori knowledge. The computational capabilities and the available
computational resources of the observer decide whether this gain can be achieved
or not.
Figure 2.3: A general perspective of messages, inferences, information and knowl-
edge, and the impact of an observers computational capabilities and resources.
Figure 2.3 (borrowed from Biskup [7] p. 68) resumes the previous idea. It
also distinguishes between observing a message and gaining information.
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As noted by Biskup [7], the difference between observing a message and gain-
ing information might depend on various circumstances:
• The observer selects a framework for reasoning as the pertinent com-
municative context.
• The observer interprets an observation within the selected framework, and
thereby assigns a meaning to the observation.
• The observer has some a priori knowledge related to the meaning of the
observation.
• The observer employs a declarative notion of logical implication that is
applicable to the selected framework, and thus he can potentially reason
about the implicational closure of his a priori knowledge and the added
meaning of the observation.
• The observer computationally infers implications, and evaluates actual
inferences concerning novelty.
• The observer treats the newly inferred implications as the information
gained from his observation.
• The observer revises his previous knowledge in order to reflect the recent
gain, thereby getting a posteriori knowledge.
We should note here that, the knowledge of the observer determines those
worlds that he sees as possible, but all of them remain indistinguishable to him.
Furthermore, it is possible that, after an observation, the a priori knowledge
and the a posteriori knowledge might be identical, or it is possible that the a
posteriori knowledge determines exactly one possible world (the observer has
learned a property expressible in the selected framework). In figure 2.3 on page 37,
an observed message is seen as a syntactic object, while its assigned meaning is
treated as a semantic object. This semantic object combined with the current
knowledge of the observer might contain some information about possibly other
semantic objects. To enforce confidentiality, the designated receiver should be
provided with appropriate (a priori) knowledge beforehand in order to enable
him to actually gain the pertinent information, whereas other unauthorized
observers should be prevented from achieving this goal, by a lack of appropriate
knowledge or sufficient computational capabilities and resources.
Furthermore, in some applications, the interest of an observer might be di-
rected toward some specific properties of the semantic items rather than on their
identity. In this case, all objects that share the same properties can be seen as
equivalent and, accordingly, the observers goal might only be a gain of informa-
tion about the equivalence class of the hidden semantic object.
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As stated in the previous section, inference control:
• enforces a specific security interest (mostly confidentiality)
• targets a specific participant of a computing system
• targets suspected threats
• controls the information gain options of the participant.
In the next sections, we will focus on the preventive aspects of inference
control.
In general, inference control cannot force threatening participants to ignore
observations or to not infer logic implications and thus to achieve some infor-
mation gain. Thus, it is the duty of the inference control to ensure that the
accessible observations (even to a malicious omnipotent observer) are not harm-
ful. This can be achieved by dynamic monitoring or static verification.
• Dynamic monitoring inspects each event and checks if any harmful in-
ferences can be observed by the participant. Dynamic monitoring keeps
track of the actual history of previous observations in order to block any
critical observation.
• Static verification analyzes globally, and in advance, all the possible
observable events by the participant. Static verification inspects thus all the
possible events to check whether it exists any harmful inferences and thus
blocking critical observations right from the beginning, without further
monitoring at runtime.
Note that both dynamic monitoring and static verification need a specification
of the security requirements, i.e., a security policy that captures the pertinent
notion of harmfulness.
Furthermore, computationally, both approaches necessitates an algorithmic
treatment of implication problems that might be, in general, computationally
unsolvable and thus can only be approximated at best. An approximation
that might cause more blockings than it is needed. A blocking can be deployed
in the form of making harmful observations invisible, or to substitute them by
harmless ones, or even more to totally suppress them.
Note that when the observer is notified of a blocking, either explicitly or
implicitly by some reasoning, the recognition of a blocking might constitute also
harmful information too.
For explicitly notified refusal, the observer can, in some cases, determine the
reason for the refusal, and consequently, find the hidden event.
40 CHAPTER 2. DATA SECURITY
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we begun by making a review of the basic components of a
secure system, namely confidentiality, integrity and availability. Formally, these
components are represented by security policies, which define ”security” for a
system or site. A policy may be formal, in which case ambiguities arise either
from the use of natural languages or from the failure to cover specific areas.
Formal mathematical models of policies enable analysts to deduce a rigorous
definition of ”security” but do little to improve the average user’s understanding
of what ”security” means for a site. The average user is not mathematically
sophisticated enough to read and interpret the mathematics.
Policies themselves make assumptions about the way systems, software, hardware,
and people behave. At a lower level, security mechanisms and procedures also
make such assumptions.
The influence of the Bell-LaPadula Model permeates all policy modeling in
computer security. It was the first mathematical model to capture attributes of
a real system in its rules. It formed the basis for several standards, including the
Department of Defense’s Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria . Even
in controversy, the model spurred further studies in the foundations of computer
security. Confidentiality models may be viewed as models constraining the way
information moves about a system. The notions of noninterference and nonde-
ducibility provide an alternative view that in some ways matches reality better
than the Bell-LaPadula Model. It asserts that a strict separation of subjects re-
quires that all channels, not merely those designed to transmit information, must
be closed.
Implementing security policies can be achieved through cryptography or by
regulating the dissemination of information. Several mechanisms exist in the
literature to control this dissemination, namely, access mechanisms and inference
mechanisms. In this thesis, we will be interested in this theory of information
flow and how to detect and / or prevent (i.e. to control) inferences and we will
try to adapt it to logic programming.
Chapter 3
Logic Programming
In this chapter, we examine first-order logic programming in section 3.1
and review the important processes of substitutions in section 3.1.1 and unifi-
cation in section 3.1.2 and SLD-resolution, SLD-trees in section 3.1.3, since
they provide the foundations upon which later chapters are built. Meanwhile,
problems of SLD-resolutions is then exposed in section 3.1.4, revealing the fact
that, sometimes, the search for an SLD-refutation can result in non-termination.
A non-termination due to the presence of loops.
Section 3.2 is devoted to loop checking techniques in logic programming.
After presenting basic concepts on loop checking in section 3.2.1, several loop
checking techniques are exposed in sections 3.2.2 – 3.2.7. Soundness and com-
pleteness of the presented loop checking techniques is also discussed. Notes on
efficient loop checks are given in section 3.2.9.
After exposing the notion of information flow in security systems for impera-
tive programs in section 2.3.2 of the chapter 2, it was tempting to check whether
this kind of flows exists in logic programming. In section 3.3, we will expose
briefly, control flow analysis and data/dependence analysis, highlighting
the fact that the information flow notion presented in chapter 2 is not covered
by those analysis in logic programming.
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3.1 First-Order Logic Programming Language
In this section, we review the aspects of first-order logic programming that will
be used pervasively in subsequent chapters: the structure of terms, substitutions,
unification, and SLD-resolution. We restrict our attention to definite programs
only, (i.e. those free of negated literals, the extension to include negative literals
in definite programs can be found in [50]). The material contained in this section
is standard from the literature and further details can be found in [40, 50], for
example.
3.1.1 Terms, Programs, Goals, and Substitutions
Let us begin by defining the structure of terms and programs in first-order
logic languages.
Definition 3.1.1 (Terms and literals). Let X be a set of variables and Ω
a set of constant/function symbols. The terms (or literals) of the programming
language are defined inductively by the grammar TΩ(X) = x|f(t1, · · · , tn) where
x ∈ X, f ∈ Ω, and t1, · · · , tn ∈ TΩ(X) for n ≥ 0. In the case where n = 0, we
write f rather than f(). A ground term is a term not containing a variable.
Definition 3.1.2 (Herbrand universe). Let L be a first order language. The
Herbrand universe UL for L is the set of all ground terms, which can be formed
out of the constant symbols and function symbols appearing in L.
Definition 3.1.3 (Definite clauses and programs). A definite clause, or
just clause, is a formula A ← B1, · · · , Bn, for n ≥ 0. The literal A is called
the head of the clause and the outermost constant in A is called a predicate
symbol. When the literal A is equal for example to p(t1, · · · , tn), where p is a
predicate symbol and t1, · · · , tn are terms, A is referred to as p-literal. A clause
with a p-literal as its head is said to be a p-clause. The subset of all p-clauses
of a program is called the procedure/predicate definition for p. The literals
B1, · · · , Bn form the body of the clause. When n = 0, we write the clause as
A← and refer to it as a fact. Finally, a program is a set of clauses.
Definition 3.1.4 (Goal clauses). A goal clause, also known as a query or
just a goal, is a formula ← B1, · · · , Bn where B1, · · · , Bn are literals, for n ≥ 0.
When n = 0, we write the goal as  and refer to it as the empty clause.
The operational framework of a first-order logic language requires a procedure
to determine whether or not a query succeeds with respect to a given program.
The resulting proof procedure must match literals in a goal with clauses in a
program and apply the technique of choosing only those values for the variables
of a literal when an appropriate value becomes apparent. In other words, logic
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variables are ‘place holders’ until the proof procedure can determine suitable
values for them. Substitutions bind variables to terms and can be considered as
functions, as defined next.
Definition 3.1.5 (Substitutions). Let X and Y be sets of variables. A substi-
tution φ : X → TΩ(Y ) is a total function mapping variables to terms. For X =
{x1, · · · , xn} and n ≥ 0, we represent φ using the notation {x1 7→ s1, · · · , xn 7→
sn} where variables xi map to terms si, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (For brevity, we will
ignore pairs of the form xi 7→ xi, simply assuming their existence.) The set Y is
given by ∪ni=1 vars si, where the function vars : TΩ(Y )→ PY takes a term and
returns the set of variables contained in that term.
The result of a computation in a logic language is a substitution generated by
the matching process mentioned above. The proof procedure uses these substitu-
tions to systematically replace variables in a term by other terms. The instance
of a term under a substitution is obtained according to the definition below.
Definition 3.1.6 (Application of substitutions). Given φ = {x1 7→ s1, · · · ,
xn 7→ sn} : X → TΩ(Y ), we define a function [φ] : TΩ(X)→ TΩ(Y ) (pronounced
”apply φ”) that determines the instance of a term t under φ” as follows:
t[φ]
{
φx if t = x ∈ X
f(t1[φ], · · · , tn[φ]) if t = f(t1, · · · , tn)
That is, when φ is applied to a variable, that variable gets replaced by whatever
φ maps it to and when φ is applied to a composite term, φ is applied to each
subterm.
Substitutions obey several important algebraic properties that aid the con-
struction of the desired proof procedure. In particular, we can define the com-
position of two substitutions; given two substitutions σ : X → TΩ(Y ) and
φ : Y → TΩ(Z), there exists another substitution φ ◦ σ : X → TΩ(Z), called
the composition of σ and φ, such that the identity (φ ◦ σ)x = (σx)[φ]) holds.
Furthermore, it is easy to prove that t[φ ◦σ] = t[σ][φ] for all terms t and that the
composition of substitutions is associative.
The identity substitution ι : X → TΩ(X) maps each variable to itself and is
defined simply as ιx = x. The substitution ι is the unit of composition since
ι ◦ φ = φ = φ ◦ ι.
3.1.2 Unification
The matching of literals in a goal with clauses in a program is the key com-
ponent of the proof procedure used to determine whether a goal is a logical con-
sequence of a program. The matching process is known as unification [58] and
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unifying two terms produces a substitution such that the terms become identical
after applying this substitution over them. Moreover, the substitution created by
the unification algorithm is the ’most general’ one possible in the sense that all
other unifiers are an instance of it. Most general unifiers prevent the generation
of useless instances of literals in the proof procedure and help keep the search
space that a computer must examine as small as possible.
Definition 3.1.7 (Most general unifiers). Let D = {(s1, t1), · · · , (sn, tn)}
be a set of pairs of terms from TΩ(X), for n ≥ 1, and φ : X → TΩ(Y ) be a
substitution. We say that φ unifies, or is a unifier of, D if si[φ] = ti[φ], for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Moreover, we call φ a most general unifier if, for every other
unifier ψ : X → TΩ(Y ) of D, there exists a substitution σ : Y → TΩ(Y ), such
that ψ = σ ◦ φ. The most general unifier φ of two terms is unique up to the
renaming of the variables in Y .
An algorithm that determines the most general unifier of two terms is given
in Figure 3.1 on page 45. By a slight abuse of notation, we understand the
application of a substitution over a set D of pairs of terms by defining D[φ] =
{(s[φ], t[φ])|(s, t) ∈ D}.
The gist of the algorithm is that ok=false if the terms u and v are not unifiable,
otherwise ok=true. In the latter case, we let φ be a unifier of u and v; moreover,
we write ψ = σ◦φ, for ψ some other unifier of the disagreement set D and σ some
substitution. Therefore, φ accumulates the most general unifier of u and v as the
computation progresses whilst D represents the disagreement set containing those
parts of u and v pending unification. The invariant maintained by the algorithm,
which is used in a proof of the correctness of unify, is as follows.
Proposition 3.1.1. The invariant of the while loop in the unification algorithm,
illustrated in Figure 3.1 on page 45, is as follows:
1. If u and v have a unifier then ok = true.
2. If ok = true then some substitution ψ unifies u and v if and only if there
exists a substitution σ such that ψ = σ ◦ φ and φ unifies D.
The function unify, therefore, returns either ’Nothing’, signaling that the
disagreement pair is not unifiable, or ’Just φ’ where φ is the most general unifier
of the terms u and v as established by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1.1. If two terms u and v have a unifier, then they have a most general
unifier. Moreover, the function unify u v determines this fact.
Example 3.1 Unification
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unify(u, v)
begin
D ← {(u, v)};
φ← ι;
ok ←true;
while ok and D 6= {} do
let D′ ∪ {(s, t)} = D
if s = x = t then
D ← D′;
else
if s = x 6∈ t then
D ← D′[x 7→ t];
φ← {x 7→ t} ◦ φ;
else
if t = x 6∈ s then
D ← D′[x 7→ s];
φ← {x 7→ s} ◦ φ;
else
if s = f(t1, · · · , tn) and t = f(s1, · · · , sn) then







Figure 3.1: The unification algorithm for two terms u and v.
Let us now step through an example unification of two terms. Consider the
computation of unify f(a, g(X), Y ) f(Y, g(h(Z)), V ). After the first iteration of
the while loop in the algorithm of Figure 3.1 on page 45, we obtain the disagree-
ment set D1 = {(a, Y ), (g(X), g(h(Z))), (Y, V )}.
On the next iteration of the loop, we can select any disagreement pair from D1;
suppose we select (Y, V ). The unification of this pair produces the single substi-
tution φ1 = {Y 7→ V } and we apply this over the remaining pairs in D1 to form
the new disagreement set D2 = {(a, V ), (g(X), g(h(Z)))}
Suppose we select (a, V ) at the subsequent unification step. The resulting sub-
stitution is φ2 = {V 7→ a} which we apply over D2 to obtain the new set
D3 = {(g(X), g(h(Z)))}.
There is only one pair to choose at the next unification step which results in the
formation of the set D4 = {(X,h(Z))}.
The final unification step produces the substitution φ3 = {X 7→ h(Z)} and the
empty disagreement set. Therefore, the most general unifier of the two terms
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f(a, g(X), Y ) and f(Y, g(h(Z)), V ) is φ = φ3 ◦ φ2 ◦ φ1. The application of φ over
both terms produces the unified term f(a, g(h(Z)), a).
In this section, we have reviewed an algorithm to calculate the most general
unifier for two terms if it exists. What we now require is a proof procedure to
check whether a goal is a logical consequence of a program. The systematic search
for the proof of a goal, with respect to a given program, is centered around the
process of resolution and we discuss this in the following subsection.
3.1.3 SLD-Resolution
In this section, the computational strategy of resolution is reviewed. Logic
programming languages, like Prolog, use a particularly simple form of resolu-
tion, called SLD-resolution (Selected literal using Linear resolution for Definite
clauses), that allows a programmer to write efficient programs. The drawback of
using SLD-resolution, as we shall see shortly, is that the search for a proof of a
goal can often fail to terminate even for logically simple queries. Consequently,
the declarative nature of Prolog programs is often severely restricted.
Resolution is called an ’inference rule’ because it derives information about a
goal and a program. A choice exists of how to perform resolution; for example,
individual clauses in the program could be selected to match with literals in a
goal or, alternatively, program clauses could be matched together to form new
clauses to resolve a goal with.
The former of these methods, called linear resolution, involves resolving a
literal in the goal with a clause taken from the program, producing a new goal
which we continue to resolve in the same manner, and forms the basis of resolution
for languages like Prolog. The soundness and completeness of resolution are
proved, for example, by Apt & van Emden [2] where ’soundness’ means that
each derived resolvent is a logical consequence of the program and ’completeness’
means that all such consequences of the program may be derived by resolution.
Linear resolution itself allows various choices at each resolution step during
the proof of a goal: if a goal has more than one literal, any literal from the goal
may be selected for resolution and, moreover, any program clause may be chosen
to resolve with the selected literal. The method of selecting program clauses is
called the search strategy and the method of selecting the goal literal is called
the computation rule (or selection strategy). It is, however, well known that
any applicable program clause or goal literal may be selected and still retain the
aforementioned soundness and completeness properties of resolution [2, 40, 50,
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67]. With this in mind, both the search strategy and the computation rule can
be fixed in advance to allow the systematic search for proofs of a goal. The proof
of a goal can be visualized in the form of a tree structure, with each node labeled
with a goal and each branch representing the result of a resolution step. Given
the myriad of choices possible in a resolution, it is not difficult to imagine that
this tree can quickly become enormous. From the point of view of systematically
searching for a proof of a goal, a priority is to reduce the size of search space that
a machine must examine before successfully finding an answer. One resolution-
based method of searching for proofs that restricts the size of a search tree is called
SLD-resolution, adopting linear resolution and a predetermined computation
rule and search strategy. We now give a few definitions to formalize the use of
SLD-resolution for searching for a proof of a query with respect to some program.
Definition 3.1.8 (SLD-resolution). Let C = A← B1, · · · , Bm, for m ≥ 0, be
a definite clause, and G =← A1, · · · , An, for n ≥ 1, a goal such that A1 and A
are unifiable with most general unifier φ. Then the SLD-resolvent of C and G
is the goal G0 = (← B1, · · · , Bm, A2, · · · , An)[φ]. The substitution φ is called the
substitution of the SLD-resolution.
A sequence of SLD-resolutions forms an SLD-derivation where the selected
literal, the substitution of the SLD-resolution, and the program clause used to
resolve with, are recorded for each resolution step.
Definition 3.1.9 (SLD-derivation). For a program P and a goal G, an SLD-
derivation of P ∪{G} is a (possibly infinite) sequence of triples (G1, C1, φ1), · · · ,
(Gn, Cn, φn), for n ≥ 1 (denoted also G1 ⇒C1,φ1⇒ · · · ⇒Cn,φn Gn), where Cn
denotes a ’variant’ of a definite clause in P , Gn is a goal (we distinguish G1 = G),
and φn is a substitution. Moreover, for 1 ≤ i < n, Gi+1 is derived from Gi and
Ci via substitution φi by an SLD-resolution.
A variant clause C is identical to its corresponding program clause except
that all variables in C are renamed to avoid clashes with variables in the current
derivation. The basic method of searching for a proof of a goal G =← A1, · · · , An
with respect to a program P involves repeatedly resolving the literals in G with
relevant clauses from P until the process either fails or derives the empty clause
. This process, called refutation, utilizes SLD-resolution and the unification
algorithm presented earlier to determine the most general values of any free vari-
ables in G. The definition of this process, called SLD-refutation, is as follows.
Definition 3.1.10 (SLD-refutation). For a program P and a goal G, an SLD-
refutation of G is an SLD-derivation for P ∪ {G} starting at G and ending
with Gn = , for n ≥ 1. If the substitutions of the SLD-resolutions in the
derivation are φ1, · · · , φn then the substitution answer of the refutation is
φ = φn ◦ · · · ◦ φ1.
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The search tree formed from an SLD-resolution is commonly known as an
SLD-tree, and we define them as follows.
Definition 3.1.11 (SLD-trees). Let P be a program and G a goal. An SLD-
tree for P ∪ {G} is a (possibly infinite) tree with each node labeled with a goal
and each branch labeled with a substitution so that the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. The root node of the tree is G.
2. Let G′ =← A1, · · · , An, for n ≥ 1, be a node in the tree. For each program
clause A← B1, · · · , Bm, for m ≥ 0, such that A1 and A are unifiable with
most general unifier φ, the node has a child← (B1, · · · , Bm, A2, · · · , An)[φ].
We label the arc connecting G′ to a child with the substitution of the SLD-
resolution and we call A1 the selected literal.
3. Nodes labeled with the empty goal  have no children.
Each sequence of nodes in an SLD-tree is clearly either an SLD-refutation or an
SLD-derivation.
The shape of the SLD-tree generated for a query depends on the particular
computation rule employed in the SLD-resolution; indeed, the choice of rule can
have a tremendous influence on the size of the corresponding SLD-tree. Nev-
ertheless, every SLD-tree is essentially the same with respect to the refutations
it contains. In other words, every SLD-tree contains the same number of refu-
tations, irrespective of the computation rule used in the resolution steps. This
result is a reformulation of the completeness of SLD-resolution.
In this thesis, we have only considered the resolution of definite programs, i.e.,
those free of negation. The essential alteration is the use of a safe computation
rule [50] which selects a negative literal in a goal only when it is ground (variable
free) to ensure its resolution cannot result in an unsound answer substitution. In
addition, we will be interested in the following types of logic programs: Datalog,
hierarchical, restricted, nvi and svo logic programs.
In many respects, Datalog is a simplified version of Prolog. Any Datalog
program must satisfy the following condition: each variable which occurs in the
head of a clause must also occur in the body of the same clause.
Clark [20] and Shepherdson [64] introduced the notion of hierarchical pro-
grams which is motivated by database theory. In fact, they were looking for logic
programs that satisfies certain syntactic conditions with respect to the occurrence
of positive / negative literals. When considering negative literals, such programs
are called stratified and when considering only positive literals, these programs
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are called hierarchical. Formally, a Datalog program P is said to be hierarchi-
cal iff there exists a mapping l associating a nonnegative integer l(p) to every
predicate symbol p occurring in P and such that for all clauses A0 ← A1, · · · , An
in P , if each Ai is a literal of the form pi(t1, · · · , tki) then l(p0) > l(p1), · · · , l(pn).
The dependency graph of a Datalog program P is the graph (N,E) where N
is the set of all predicate symbols occurring in P and E is the adjacency relation
defined on N as follows: pEq iff P contains a clause A0 ← A1, · · · , An such that
A0 is a literal of the form p(· · · ) and for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai is a literal of the
form q(· · · ). Let E∗ be the reflexive transitive closure of E.
A Datalog program P is said to be restricted iff for all clauses A0 ←
A1, · · · , An in P and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, if A0 is of the form p(· · · ) and
Ai is of the form q(· · · ), then not qE∗p.
A program P is nonvariable introducing (in short nvi) if for every clause
A← B1, · · · , Bn in P , every variable that occurs in B1, · · · , Bn occurs also in A.
A program P is single variable occurrence (in short svo) if for every clause
A← B1, · · · , Bn in P , no variable in B1, · · · , Bn occurs more than once.
Restricted, nonvariable introducing and single variable occurrence
logic programs were introduced by Bol et al. [9]. These programs generate cor-
related SLD-resolvents, in such a way, that some SLD-resolvents can be equal or
that, an SLD-resolvent can be a variant of some other SLD-resolvent.
Now that we have reviewed the important aspects of SLD-resolution, we can
expose its problems.
3.1.4 The Problem of SLD-Resolution
The resolution strategy adopted by Prolog exhibits unfortunately intrinsic
deficiencies when executing relational programs and we discuss them in the re-
mainder of this section.
Most implementations of logic programming languages, whose computational
model is based on SLD-resolution, employ a left-to-right (or depth-first) computa-
tion rule. So, for the goal← A1, · · · , An, the leftmost literal A1 is always selected
at each resolution step and any introduced literals take its place. However, the
search for an SLD-refutation can sometimes be substantially more difficult, often
resulting in non-termination, when using a left-to-right computation rule than
some other one. The following example demonstrates this phenomenon.
Example 3.2 SLD-resolution, SLD-tree
Consider the following program P :
C1 : p(x, z)← q(x, y), p(y, z);
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C2 : p(x, y)← r(x, y);
C3 : r(b, b)←;
C4 : q(a, a)←;
C5 : p(a, b)←
Furthermore, consider the following goal G: ← p(a, u).
← p(a, u)




C4, {v 7→ a}
C1, {x 7→ a, z 7→ u}
← r(a, u)
failure
C2, {x 7→ a, y 7→ u}

success
C5, {u 7→ b}
Figure 3.2: SLD-tree which illustrates the problem with left-to-right computation rule and
depth-first search
In the SLD-tree resulting from the resolution of the goal G using the left-to-
right computation rule of Prolog (i.e. selection rule that selects the leftmost atom
in the clause and tries the clauses given by their order in the program), depicted
in figure 3.2, the leftmost branch is infinite. Thus, a depth-first search will never
find the success branch. In figure 3.2, The selected atoms are underlined and the
success, failure and infinite branches are shown.
In fact, the use of a left-to-right computation rule means that SLD-resolution
can be incomplete, in a practical sense, when searching for a proof of a goal. De-
spite the limitations of the left-to-right computation rule, it remains predominant
in logic programming owing almost entirely to the ease of its implementation and
the fact that programmers can write more efficient programs once educated about
the order of evaluation.
Thus, one can try to detect any infinite branch in an SLD-tree. Unfortunately,
this problem is obviously undecidable, as the logic programming has the full power
of recursion theory. However, several heuristics were proposed in the literature
to avoid this nontermination:
• Poole & Goebel [59] proposed to apply some reformulation techniques on
the original specification of the program. However, the resulting program
may be different from the original one, in the sense that it works for some
subsets of the possible queries covered by the original one; also, it can
reintroduce recursion. Smith et al. [65] pointed the difficulty to do such
reformulations.
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• Apt et al. [1], Bol et al. [9], Bol [8], Smith et al. [65], Van Gelder [33], Vieille
[72], Besnard [5], Convington [21], Sahlin [60], Brough & Walker [12], Shen
[62] proposed to modify the computation mechanism by adding a capability
of pruning. Thus, at some point, the interpreter is forced to stop its search
through a certain part of the SLD-tree. These mechanisms are called loop
check mechanisms, as they are based on excluding some kinds of repetition
in the SLD-derivations.
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3.2 Loop Check
The main purpose of a loop check is to reduce the search space for top-down
interpreters in order to obtain a finite search-space. Mainly, two different forms
of loop check were considered in the literature:
• Vieille [72] proposed that the decision on whether a node in a tree should
be pruned must depend on the whole portion of the considered SLD-tree
previously traversed (the technique proposed is based on reusing answers
for previously solved subgoals).
• Bol et al. [9], Shen [62], Shen et al. [63] proposed that the pruning of a node
in an SLD-tree must depend only on its ancestors (from the root node of
the SLD-derivation up to this node). In what follows, we will be concerned
only with this type of pruning techniques.
In this section, we review the basic concepts concerning loop checking and the
proposals in this approach.
3.2.1 Basic Concepts
The aim of a loop check is to prune every infinite SLD-tree to a finite subtree
of it containing the root. The following definitions were introduced by Bol et al.
For further motivations, examples and proofs, refer to [9].
Definition 3.2.1. For two substitutions σ and τ , we write σ 6 τ when σ is
more general than τ and for two expressions E and F , we write E 6 F when
F is an instance of E. We then say that F is less general than E.
Definition 3.2.2 (Variant of an SLD-derivation). A variant of an SLD-
derivation D is an SLD-derivation D′ that is the same as D up to variable re-
naming.
In the previous definition, a variant D′ of an SLD-derivation D means that
in every derivation step in D′, atoms in the same positions are selected and same
program clauses are used. Thus, D′ may differ from D in the renaming that is
applied to the program clauses.
Definition 3.2.3 (Subderivation - subderivation free). Let P be a logic
program, G a goal, and L be a set of SLD-derivations of P ∪ {G}. Define:
RemSub(L) = {D ∈ L|L does not contain a proper subderivation of D}.
L is subderivation free if L = RemSub(L).
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Definition 3.2.4 (Simple loop check). A (simple) loop check is a com-
putable set L of finite SLD-derivations such that L is closed under variants and
is subderivation free.
Definition 3.2.5 (Pruned SLD-tree). Let P be a program, G a goal, T the
SLD-tree of P ∪ {G}, and L a loop check. By applying L to T , we obtain a
new SLD-tree fL(P ∪ {G}) which consists of T with all the nodes in {G’ | the
SLD-derivation from the goal G to G’ is in L} pruned. By pruning a node from
an SLD-tree, we mean removing all its descendants.
One of the most important property when using loop checks is not to loose
successful results or any individual solution. Furthermore, as the purpose of a
loop check is to reduce an ”infinite” search space into a finite one, the second
important property is thus to prune every infinite derivation. In order to justify
this, Bol et al. [9] introduced the following notions:
Definition 3.2.6 (Soundness and completeness). 1. A loop check L is
weakly sound if the following condition holds: for every program P , goal
G, and SLD-tree T of P ∪ {G}, if T contains a successful branch, then
fL(P ∪ {G}) contains a successful branch.
2. A loop check L is sound if for every program P and goal G, and SLD-tree T
of P ∪ {G}: if T contains a successful branch with a computed answer sub-
stitution σ, then fL(P ∪{G}) contains a successful branch with a computed
answer substitution σ′ such that G[σ′] 6 G[σ].
3. A loop check L is complete if every infinite SLD-derivation is pruned by
L. (Put another way, a loop check L is complete if for any program P and
goal G, fL(P ∪ {G}) is finite.)
An ideal loop check would be both weakly sound and complete. Unfortunately,
since logic programs have the full power of the recursive theory, there is no
loop check that is both weakly sound and complete even for function-free logic
programs [9].
In the remainder of this section, several simple loop checks are recalled from
[5, 9, 12, 21] . Soundness and completeness of these loop checks are then studied
and this for several types of logic programs.
In chapter 5, and in order to show if two goals are bisimilar, we will be
interested exclusively in loop checks that are only sound and complete. For
a better understanding of loop checking techniques, we will begin by exposing
some basic loop checks; i.e. basic in the sense that the reduction of the search
space is based on a simple condition. We will show that these basic loop checks
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are not sound and complete. We will continue by investigating some complex
but sound and complete loop checks, for which the conditions imposed are more
difficult to fulfill, necessitating sometimes the imposition of some restrictions on
the syntax of the clauses in the logic program.
3.2.2 Loop Check Based on the Repeated Application of Clauses
As a first approach/attempt, Brough & Walker [12] proposed to prune SLD-
derivations whenever a clause is used more than once to resolve a goal.
Definition 3.2.7 (Loop check based on the repeated application of
clauses). This loop check prunes a derivation as soon as it detects that a clause
was already used to resolve an earlier subgoal.
Loop check 1=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk) such that for some
i, 0 ≤ i < k, Ci = Ck}).
Example 3.3 Application of Loop check 1 over an infinite derivation
Consider the following logic program P :
C1 : p← p
and let G be the goal ← p.
Obviously (as shown in figure 3.3), the SLD-tree corresponding to the goal ← p is
infinite. By applying Loop check 1, the SLD-tree is pruned and thus one can get
a finite SLD-tree.












Figure 3.3: SLD-tree and its associated pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 1 for
P ∪ {G}
Loop check 1, based on a very simple condition, is too restrictive because it
can discards all success paths of a search space. In this sense:
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Theorem 3.2.1 (Soundness and completeness of Loop check 1). 1. Loop
check 1 is not sound w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog, restricted,
nvi, svo and general logic programs.
2. Loop check 1 is complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog,
restricted, nvi, svo and general logic programs.
Proof. (Soundness) To prove that Loop check 1 is not sound, it suffices to con-
sider this example.
Let P be the following Datalog / restricted / nvi / svo logic program:
C1 : p(x, y)← q(x, y);
C2 : q(x, y)← p(y, x);
C3 : q(b, a)←;
and let G be the following goal ← p(a, b).
The corresponding SLD-tree and its associated pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 1
are depicted in figure 3.4.









C2, {x 7→ b, y 7→ a}
C1, {x 7→ b, y 7→ a}
C2, {x 7→ a, y 7→ b}




C2, {x 7→ a, y 7→ b}
C1, {x 7→ a, y 7→ b}
Figure 3.4: SLD-tree and its associated pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 1 for
P ∪ {G}
As one can see, Loop check 1 pruned successful derivations (here all the
successful ones) and thus it is not sound.
(Completeness) As to prove that Loop check 1 is complete, one can rely on
the definition of logic programs, stating that a logic program is composed of a
finite set of clauses. Thus, there is a predefined number n of different clauses in
a logic program. Consequently, the depth of each branch in fL(P ∪ {G}) would
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not exceeds n. This proves that fL(P ∪ {G}) is finite and thus Loop check 1 is
complete.
3.2.3 Loop Check Based on Repeated Goals
As a second approach/attempt, Brough & Walker [12] proposed to prune
SLD-derivations whenever a subgoal is equal to one of its ancestors goals.
Definition 3.2.8 (Loop check based on the repeated goals). This loop
check prunes a derivation as soon as it detects that a goal is its own subgoal.
Loop check 2=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk) such that for some
i, 0 ≤ i < k, Gk = Gi}).
Example 3.4 Application of Loop check 2 over an infinite derivation
Consider the following logic program P :
C1 : p(x)← p(a)
and let G be the goal ← p(a).
As shown in figure 3.5 on page 56, the SLD-tree of the goal← p(a) is infinite. But,
by applying Loop check 2, the SLD-tree is pruned due to the recursive occurrences
of the subgoal ← p(a).






C1, {x 7→ a}
C1, {x 7→ a}
C1, {x 7→ a}
← p(a)
← p(a)
C1, {x 7→ a}
Figure 3.5: SLD-tree and its associated pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 2 for
P ∪ {G}
Loop check 2 is not very satisfactory because it does not prune all infinite
paths as shown next.
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Theorem 3.2.2 (Soundness and completeness of Loop check 2). 1. Loop
check 2 is sound w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog, restricted,
nvi, svo and general logic programs.
2. Loop check 2 is not complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog,
restricted, nvi, svo and general logic programs.
Proof. (Soundness) Let P be a program, G0 a goal and T an SLD-tree of P∪{G0}.
Suppose that T contains a successful branch D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1 G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒Ci−1,θi−1
Gi−1 ⇒Ci,θi Gi ⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk ⇒ · · · ⇒Cm,θm ) and suppose that D is
pruned at Gk (i.e. there exists an i such that Gk = Gi). Knowing that Gk = Gi,
the SLD-derivation D1 = (Gi ⇒ · · · ⇒Cm,θm ) exists. In order to show the
soundness of this loop check, we use induction on m, by showing that fL(T )
contains a successful branch D′ shorter than D. Let D2 be the derivation formed
by the concatenation of the initial part of D (till the ith derivation) and D1:
D2 = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1 G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒Ci−1,θi−1 Gi−1 ⇒Ci,θi Gi ⇒ · · · ⇒Cm,θm ).
By the independence of the selection rule, T contains a branch D3 such that
|D3| = |D2| < |D|. By the induction hypothesis, fL(T ) contains a successful
branch D3 shorter than D.
(Completeness) To prove that Loop check 2 is not complete for Datalog,
restricted, svo and general logic programs, let us consider the following program:
C1 : p(x)← q(x), p(z);
C2 : q(a)←;
and let G be the following goal ← p(a).
The corresponding SLD-tree, depicted in figure 3.6, is the same as its associated
pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 2, since in the derivation, there is no subgoals
that are equal to one of its ancestors goals.
As Loop check 2 can not prune all infinite derivations, Loop check 2 is not
complete for Datalog, restricted, svo and general logic programs.
For nvi logic programs, one can consider the following program:
C1 : p(x)← p(x), p(x);
and the following goal G =← p(x).
Figure 3.7 shows the SLD-tree. As the size of the resolvent goals increases with
each derivation step, no equal subgoals will be generated and thus Loop check 2
will not prune this SLD-tree.







C2, {z 7→ a}
C1, {x 7→ z}
C2, ι
C1, {x 7→ a}
Figure 3.6: SLD-tree for P ∪ {G}
← p(u)
← p(u), p(u)
← p(u), p(u), p(u)
...
C1, {x 7→ u}
C1, {x 7→ u}
Figure 3.7: SLD-tree for P ∪ {G}
3.2.4 Loop Check Based on Repeated Goals and Repeated Applica-
tions of Clauses
As a third approach/attempt, Brough & Walker [12] proposed to prune SLD-
derivations whenever a subgoal is equal to one of its ancestors goals and the
clauses used to resolve the subgoals are the same as the one used to resolve the
ancestors goals.
Definition 3.2.9 (Loop check based on the repeated goals and repeated
applications of clauses). This loop check prunes a derivation as soon as it
detects that a goal is its own subgoal and that the clause used to resolve this goal
was already used to resolve an earlier subgoal.
Loop check 3=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk) such that for some
i, 0 ≤ i < k,
3.2. LOOP CHECK 59
• Gk = Gi
• Ck = Ci
}).
Example 3.5 Application of Loop check 3 over an infinite derivation
As an example, one can reconsider the same logic program P and goal G as in
example 3.4. The corresponding pruned SLD-tree of the goal G remains the same,
because, the subgoal ← p(a) is recursively resolved by the same clause C1.
Seeing that Loop check 3 is less restrictive than Loop check 2, the major
problem of its incompleteness remains unsolvable.
Theorem 3.2.3 (Soundness and completeness of Loop check 3). 1. Loop
check 3 is sound w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog, restricted,
nvi, svo and general logic programs.
2. Loop check 3 is not complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog,
restricted, nvi, svo and general logic programs.
Proof. (Soundness) Seeing that Loop check 3 prunes less derivations than Loop check 2,
Loop check 3 is sound for Datalog, restricted, nvi, svo and general logic programs.
(Completeness) To prove that Loop check 3 is not complete, it suffices to
reproduce the same incompleteness proof of Loop check 2.
3.2.5 Loop Check Based on Repeated Atoms through Syntactic Vari-
ants
According to Convington [21], infinite loops arise mainly from three relations:
• biconditional relations of the form:
p(x)← q(x);
q(x)← p(x)
• symmetrical relations of the form:
p(x, y)← p(y, x)
• transitive relations of the form:
p(x, z)← p(x, y), p(y, z)
Convington’s proposed to prune SLD-derivations whenever an atom in a sub-
goal is a variant of an atom in one of its ancestors goals.
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Definition 3.2.10 (Loop check based on the repeated atoms through
syntactic variants). This loop check prunes a derivation as soon as it detects
that an atom in a goal is a variant of an atom in some ancestors subgoals.
Loop check 4=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk) such that for some
i, 0 ≤ i < k, where Gi = Ai1 , · · · , Ain and Gk = Ak1 , · · · , Akm, there exists
1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ l ≤ m and a substitution τ , such that: Akl = Aij [τ ]}).
Example 3.6 Application of Loop check 4 over an infinite derivation
Consider the following logic program P :
C1 : p(x, y)← p(y, x)
and let G be the goal ← p(a, z).
As shown in figure 3.8 on page 60, the SLD-tree of the goal ← p(a, z) is infinite.
But, by applying Loop check 4, the SLD-tree is pruned because one can see that
the atom p(a, z) (i.e. for the atom p(z, a)) is a variant of some ancestors atoms.






C1, {x 7→ a, y 7→ z}
C1, {x 7→ z, y 7→ a}




C1, {x 7→ z, y 7→ a}
C1, {x 7→ a, y 7→ z}
Figure 3.8: SLD-tree and its associated pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 4 for
P ∪ {G}
The scope of Loop check 4 is rather limited because the three relations of
biconditionality, symmetry and transitivity can be circumvented as shown in the
next Theorem.
Theorem 3.2.4 (Soundness and completeness of Loop check 4). 1. Loop
check 4 is not sound w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog, restricted,
nvi, svo and general logic programs.
2. Loop check 4 is complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog,
restricted, nvi and svo logic programs.
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3. Loop check 4 is not complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for general
logic programs.
Proof. (Soundness) To prove that Loop check 4 is not sound for Datalog, re-
stricted, nvi, svo and general logic programs; let us consider the following propo-
sitional logic program:
C1 : p← q, r;
C2 : r ← q, s;
C3 : q ←;
C4 : s←
and let G be the following goal ← p.
The corresponding SLD-tree and its associated pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 4
are depicted in figure 3.9.

















Figure 3.9: SLD-tree and its associated pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 4 for
P ∪ {G}
As one can see, Loop check 4 pruned successful derivations (here the successful
one) and thus it is not sound. In fact, the atom r in the subgoal ← r is a variant
of the atom r in the subgoal ← q, r since r = r[ι].
(Completeness) Let P be a function-free program, G a top goal and D an
infinite SLD-derivation of P ∪ {G}. As P contains finite program clauses, finite
predicate symbols, and finite set of constants; there must be an infinite set of
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atoms, and two goals Gi and Gj in which an atom in Gj is a variant of an atom
in Gi.
(Completeness) To prove that Loop check 4 is not complete for general logic
programs, it suffices to consider the following program:
C1 : p(x)← p(f(x))
and the following goal G =← p(f(a)).
Figure 3.10 shows the SLD-tree (resp. the pruned SLD-tree) using Loop check 4.
All the generated goals in the derivation are not variant of any of the ancestors





C1, {x 7→ f(f(a))}
C1, {x 7→ f(a)}
Figure 3.10: SLD-tree for P ∪ {G}
We have exposed four basic loop checking techniques that are sometimes
sound but not complete or not sound but complete. We will move now and show
some complex loop checks which are sound and complete but for some specific
types of logic programs.
3.2.6 Loop Check Based on Equal Goals
Bol et al. [9] proposed to prune infinite SLD-derivations of the form (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒
· · · ) whenever there occur two goals Gi and Gj (0 ≤ i < j) such that Gj is a
variant of Gi.
Definition 3.2.11 (Loop check based on equal goals). This loop check
prunes a derivation as soon as it detects that a goal is a variant of an ances-
tor goal.
Loop check 5=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk), such that for
some i, 0 ≤ i < k, there exists a substitution τ , such that: Gk = Gi[τ ]}).
Example 3.7 Application of Loop check 5 over an infinite derivation
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Consider the following logic program P :
C1 : p(a, a)←;
C2 : p(x, z)← p(x, y);
C3 : q(b)←
and let G be the goal ← p(u, v), q(v).
SLD-tree of P ∪ {G}
← p(u, v), q(v)
← q(a)




C3, {v 7→ b}




C3, {v 7→ b}
C1, {u 7→ a,w2 7→ a}
← p(u,w3), q(v)
...
C1, {u 7→ a,w2 7→ a}
C2, {x 7→ u, z 7→ w1}
C2, {x 7→ u, z 7→ v}
Pruned SLD-tree of P ∪ {G}
← p(u, v), q(v)
← q(a)




C3, {v 7→ b}
C1, {u 7→ a,w1 7→ a}
← p(u,w2), q(v)
C2, {x 7→ u, z 7→ w1}
C2, {x 7→ u, z 7→ v}
Figure 3.11: SLD-tree and its associated pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 5 for
P ∪ {G}
As shown in figure 3.11 on page 63, the SLD-tree of the goal ← p(a, z) is
infinite. By applying Loop check 5 to the SLD-tree of P ∪ {G}, one can consider
the subgoal ← p(u,w2), q(v) which is a variant of the goal ← p(u,w1), q(v) and
thus prunes the infinite branch at ← p(u,w2), q(v).
Even with a loop check based on equal goals, soundness and completeness
were compromised even for Datalog program. Nevertheless, for restricted Datalog
64 CHAPTER 3. LOGIC PROGRAMMING
programs, i.e. a type of logic programs proposed by Bol et al. [9] allowing some
restricted type of recursiveness, soundness and completeness is guaranteed.
Theorem 3.2.5 (Soundness and completeness of Loop check 5). 1. Loop
check 5 is not sound w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog, nvi, svo
and general logic programs.
2. Loop check 5 is sound w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for restricted logic
programs.
3. Loop check 5 is complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for restricted logic
programs.
4. Loop check 5 is not complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog,
nvi, svo and general logic programs.
Proof. (Soundness) To check that Loop check 5 is not sound w.r.t. the leftmost
selection rule for Datalog, svo and general logic programs, it suffices to refer to
the Example 5.4 given by Bol et al. in [9].
(Soundness) To check that Loop check 5 is not sound w.r.t. the leftmost
selection rule for nvi logic programs, consider the following program:
C1 : p(u, v)← p(0, v), r(u, v);
C2 : p(0, u)←;
C3 : q(1)←;
C4 : r(u, v)← q(u), p(v, v)
and the following goal G =← p(x, y).
Figure 3.12 shows the SLD-tree using Loop check 5. The corresponding
pruned SLD-tree is the same except for the leftmost branch where a pruning
occurs at the resolvent goal ← p(y, y). In fact, the goal ← p(y, y) is a variant
of the top goal ← p(x, y) (see that p(y, y) = p(x, y)[{x 7→ y}]). Thus, the only
successful branch will be pruned and consequently, Loop check 5 is not sound for
nvi logic programs.
(Completeness) To check that Loop check 5 is complete w.r.t. the leftmost
selection rule for restricted logic programs, consult the Corollary 4.19 presented
in Bol et al. [9].
(Completeness) To prove that Loop check 5 is not complete w.r.t. the left-
most selection rule for Datalog nvi, svo and general logic programs, it suffices to
consider the following program:
C1 : p(x)← p(x), p(x)
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← p(x, y)
← p(0, y), r(x, y)
← r(x, y)
← q(x), p(y, y)
← p(y, y)

C2, {y 7→ 0}
← p(0, y), r(y, y)
C1, {u 7→ y, v 7→ y}
C3, {x 7→ 1}
C4, {u 7→ x, v 7→ y}
C2, {u 7→ y}
← p(0, y), r(0, y), r(x, y)
← r(0, y), r(x, y)
← q(0), p(y, y), r(x, y)
C2, {u 7→ 0, v 7→ y}
C2, {u 7→ y}
...
C1, {· · · }
C1, {u 7→ x, v 7→ y}
Figure 3.12: SLD-tree - pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 5 for P ∪ {G}
and the following goal G =← p(x).
Figure 3.7 shows the SLD-tree of P ∪ {G}. The size of the generated goals
in the single branch increases with each derivation step and thus a subgoal will
never be equal (or variant equal) to any of its ancestor goals. Consequently,
Loop check 5 is not complete.
3.2.7 Loop Check Based on Subsumed Goals
Subsumption loop check proposed by Bol et al. [9] prunes infinite SLD-
derivations of the form (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ) whenever there occur two goals Gi
and Gj (0 ≤ i < j) such that Gj is a variant of some ancestor goal Gi.
Definition 3.2.12 (Loop check based on equal goals). This loop check
prunes a derivation as soon as it detects that a goal is a general variant of an
ancestor goal.
Loop check 6=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk), such that for
some i, 0 ≤ i < k, there exists a substitution τ , such that: Gk ⊇ Gi[τ ]}).
Example 3.8 Application of Loop check 6 over an infinite derivation
Consider the following logic program P :
C1 : p(a)←;
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C2 : p(x)← p(a), q(x)
and let G be the goal ← p(x).
SLD-tree of P ∪ {G}
← p(u)





← p(a), q(a), q(u)
...
C2, {x 7→ a}
C2, {x 7→ u}
Pruned SLD-tree of P ∪ {G}
← p(u)

C1, {u 7→ a}
← p(a), q(u)
C2, {x 7→ u}
Figure 3.13: SLD-tree and its associated pruned SLD-tree using Loop check 7 for
P ∪ {G}
Figure 3.13 on page 66 shows the SLD-tree and the pruned SLD-tree of the
goal ← p(x). By applying Loop check 6 to the SLD-tree of P ∪ {G}, one can
consider the subgoal ← p(a), q(u) which contains the atom p(a), an instance of
p(u) and thus prunes the infinite branch at ← p(a), q(u). Not that ← q(u) is a
failure goal.
Loop check 6 is not as restrictive as Loop check 5 in the sense that equality is
substituted by inclusion. So soundness and completeness results for Loop check 5
hold for Loop check 6. It is shown also that these results hold for nvi and svo
logic programs.
Theorem 3.2.6 (Soundness and completeness of Loop check 6). 1. Loop
check 6 is not sound w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog and gen-
eral logic programs.
2. Loop check 6 is sound w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for restricted, nvi
and svo logic programs.
3. Loop check 6 is complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog,
restricted, nvi and svo logic programs.
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4. Loop check 6 is not complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for general
logic programs.
Proof. (Soundness) To check that Loop check 6 is not sound w.r.t. the leftmost
selection rule for Datalog and general logic programs, one can check Example
5.4 given by Bol et al. in [9].
(Soundness) To check that Loop check 6 is sound w.r.t. the leftmost selection
rule for restricted, nvi and svo logic programs, interested readers can refer to the
Corollary 5.8 presented in Bol et al. [9].
(Completeness) Let P be a Datalog function-free program, G a top goal and
D an infinite SLD-derivation of P ∪ {G}. As P contains finite program clauses,
finite predicate symbols, and finite set of constants; there must be an infinite
set of atoms, and two goals Gi and Gj such that Gj subsumes Gi. This proves
that Loop check 6 is complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog logic
programs.
(Completeness) To check that Loop check 6 is complete w.r.t. the leftmost
selection rule for restricted, nvi and svo logic programs, you can refer to the
corollary 5.9, 5.18 and 5.20 presented in Bol et al. [9].
(Completeness) To prove that Loop check 6 is not complete w.r.t. the leftmost
selection rule for general logic programs, it suffices to reproduce the incomplete-
ness proof of Loop check 4 for general logic programs.
3.2.8 Loop Check Based on Contextual Approach
Besnard [5] mentioned that the existence of a refutation of → p(x), q(y) does
not imply the existence of a refutation of → p(x), q(x). He suggested to keep
track of the links between the variables in atoms and those in the rest of the goal.
Thus, Besnard proposed to prune SLD-derivations whenever a goal Gk occurs
that contains an instance A[τ ] of an atom A that occurred in an earlier goal Gi.
But when a variable occurs both inside and outside of A in Gi, the derivation is
not pruned if this link has been altered. Such a variable x in Gi is substituted by
xθi+1 · · · θk when Gk is reached. Therefore τ and θi+1 · · · θk should agree on x.
Definition 3.2.13 (Loop check based on contextual approach). Loop check
7=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk), such that for some i and
j, 0 ≤ i ≤ j < k, there is a substitution τ , such that for some atom A in Gi:
A[τ ] appears in Gk as the result of resolving A[θi+1] · · · [θj ] in Gj and for every
variable x that occurs both inside and outside of A in Gi, xθi+1 · · · θk = xτ}).
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Example 3.9 Application of Loop check 7 over an infinite derivation
Reconsider the logic program of the example 3.7 on page 63.But, by applying
Loop check 7, the SLD-tree is pruned (at the same place as Loop check 5 pruned
the SLD-tree) because firstly, one can see that the atom p(u,w2) in the subgoal
← p(u,w2), q(v) is a variant of p(u,w1) in the goal ← p(u,w1), q(v), and secondly,
that by replacing p(u,w1) by p(u,w2) in ← p(u,w1), q(v), yields ← p(u,w2), q(v)
which is an instance of ← p(u,w1), q(v).
In fact, Besnard, seeing that the existence of a refutation of ← A(y), B(x)
does not imply the existence of a refutation of ← A(x), B(x), wanted to keep
track of the links between the variables in the atom and those of the rest of the
goal. By tracking the same variable and thus the same atom, the condition of
detecting some repeated subgoals is now stronger, in such a way that soundness
is now guaranteed for restricted, nvi and svo logic programs.
Theorem 3.2.7 (Soundness and completeness of Loop check 7). 1. Loop
check 7 is sound w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for restricted, nvi and
svo logic programs.
2. Loop check 7 is complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for Datalog,
restricted, nvi and svo logic programs.
3. Loop check 7 is not complete w.r.t. the leftmost selection rule for general
logic programs.
Proof. (Soundness) To check that Loop check 7 is sound w.r.t. the leftmost
selection rule for restricted, nvi and svo logic programs, refer to the Corollary
6.7 presented in Bol et al. [9].
(Completeness) Similar proof as for Datalog programs for Loop check 6.
(Completeness) To check that Loop check 7 is complete w.r.t. the leftmost
selection rule for restricted, nvi and svo logic programs, refer to the Corollary
6.12 and Corollary 6.14 presented in Bol et al. [9].
(Completeness) To prove that Loop check 7 is not complete w.r.t. the leftmost
selection rule for general logic programs, it suffices to reproduce the incomplete-
ness proof of Loop check 4 for general logic programs.
3.2.9 Notes on Efficient Loop Checks
All the loop checks presented in the previous subsections compare the derived
goals in the derivation and prune it until a sufficiently similar goal is encountered.
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Theoretically, a subgoal is usually compared with every previous goal in the
derivation. In practice, such loop checks are too expensive since a loop check can
perform 12 |D||D − 1| comparisons for a finite SLD-derivation D.
Two attempts were proposed in the literature to reduce the number of com-
parisons by a loop check:
1. The tortoise-and-hare technique: Van Gelder [33] proposed to compare
every goal Gk to one previous goal, namely the goal halfway the derivation
Gk/2. It is shown that the tortoise-and-hare technique preserves the sound-
ness of the loop check but not its completeness.
2. The selected technique: Bol [8] proposed not just to select the goal
halfway the derivation to compare it to Gk but to make an infinite selection
of goals and compare each of the goals to Gk. It is shown that the selected
technique preserves the soundness of the loop check and its completeness
(for specific kind of loop checks and logic programs).
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3.3 ”Flows” In Logic Programming
Generally, in logic programs, the concept of input and output arguments does
not exist. We also say that logic programs are not directed, in the sense that a
logic program may be run in either a forward or a backward direction. More-
over, the unifications of subgoals (i.e. the control flow) in logic programs can
proceed in two directions: continuing after a success and backtracking after a
failure. Thus, in order to generate efficient executable code of logic programs,
researchers studied intensively various dependencies in logic programs like mode
information [23, 53, 70, 73], mode inference [13, 22, 54] and data depen-
dencies [17, 18, 27]. While mode information is used primarily for the good
understanding of the logic program, data dependency information can be used
for various source-level optimizing transformations and to improve backtracking
behavior. In the next, we will present data flow and control flow analysis briefly
for logic programming, highlighting the fact that the notion of information flow
in security systems previously presented in chapter 2 is not covered by those
analysis for logic programs.
3.3.1 Control Flow Analysis
Control flow in logic programs refers to the order in which a goal is evaluated.
These control flows are not so obvious as in imperative programs. This is due to
the fact that the control flows are hidden in logic programs, which is in turn a
result from the declarative nature of these programs. The semantics of Prolog, for
example, implies several types of backtracking (caused by the failure of subgoal
matching and by the requirement for multi-answers for one single goal), and
searching for a subgoal to which control is transferred after backtracking. To
describe these control flows explicitly, control flow graphs were proposed. A
control flow graph (in short CFG) is a quadruple < s, e, V,E >, where (V,E) is
a directed graph, S ∈ V is the unique start node and e ∈ V the unique end node,
such that there is a path from s to every node in V and there is a path from any
node in V to e. Constructing the CFG is done incrementally by adding nodes
and arcs to the graph. The following example shows a logic program along with
its corresponding control flow graph representation (interested reader can refer to
[51] for algorithms on how to generate control flow graph representations). Note
that, in this representation, the node s is p (the upper right one) and the node e
is F .
Example 3.10 Flowgraph representation of a logic program
Let P the following logic program:
C1 : p(a, y)← q(a, y);
C2 : p(x, y)← q(x, z), p(z, y);
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C3 : q(x, y)←
The corresponding flowgraph representation of the predicate definition p is as
follows:
pstart q T1
p q p T2
F
This flowgraph represents how a goal← p(x, y) could be evaluated by showing
the different predicates invocation and all the possible paths between them.
3.3.2 Data Flow Analysis / Dependence analysis
A data dependency in logic programs exists when a clause is referring to a vari-
able/argument in the same clause definition or in the head of some other clause
definition.
To refer to an argument in a program P , Boye et al. [11] give each argument
of P a unique label called argument position.
Definition 3.3.1 (Argument position). if c is a clause of the form a0 ← a1, · · · , an,
the position of the kth argument of the jth literal is uniquely defined in the pro-
gram P by the tuple < c, j, p, k >, where p is the predicate symbol of the jth literal
of c. By convention, the fictive position < c, i, p, 0 > denotes the ith literal of the
clause c of which the predicate symbol is p.
Example 3.11 Examples of argument position in logic program
Let c be the following clause:
c : p(x, y)← r(x, z), q(z, y)
The position of the argument z in the body literal q(z, y) is < c, 2, q, 1 >.
The position of the argument y in the head literal p(x, y) is < c, 0, p, 2 >.
The position of the body literal r(x, y) is < c, 1, r, 0 >.
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Unification of positions is defined as follows:
Definition 3.3.2 (Unification of positions). Let α and β be the positions of two
arguments a and b such that α =< c1, j, p, k > and β =< c2, 0, p, k > where
j 6= 0.
unify(α, β) iff there exists a renaming substitution θ such that a[θ] has no variable
in common with b and there exists a substitution σ such that a[θ][σ] = b[σ]
Many works have been carried on data dependency analysis. The purpose of
this section is neither to expose in details any analysis nor to compare existing
algorithms. We only recall the definitions of Boye et al. [11] concerning internal
and external data dependencies and program dependency graph.
Predicate arguments in a logic program, can be annotated by the user either
as inherited(↓) or synthesized(↑) or unannotated() (Boye et al. [11] was
inspired by attribute grammar theory). Intuitively, data is brought in to a clause
through the input positions, and sent out through the output positions.
Definition 3.3.3 (Input and Output positions). < c, j, q, k > is called an input
position if:
* the annotation of the kth argument of q is ↓ and aj is the head atom of c, or
* the annotation of the kth argument of q is ↑ and aj is a body atom of c.
Let I(c) denote the input positions of the clause c.
< c, j, q, k > is called an output position if:
* the annotation of the kth argument of q is ↑ and aj is the head atom of c, or
* the annotation of the kth argument of q is ↓ and aj is a body atom of c.
Let O(c) denote the output positions of the clause c.
In logic program, information is passed in two ways: either within a clause
(between two positions sharing a variable), or between two clauses (through
unification). If an annotation for the program is known, the direction, in which
the information is passed, became also known: from input positions to output
positions within a clause, and from output positions to input positions at unifi-
cation.
Definition 3.3.4 (Internal Data Dependency). For a clause c, and two positions
α and β such that α ∈ I(c) and β ∈ O(c), the internal data dependence relation
→i is defined as follows:
α→i β iff α and β have at least one common variable.
Definition 3.3.5 (External Data Dependency). For two clauses c, d, and two
positions α =< c, j, q, k > and β =< d, 0, q, k > such that unify(α, β) holds, the
external data dependence relation →e is defined as follows:
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α→e β iff α ∈ O(c) and β ∈ I(c), and
β →e α iff α ∈ I(c) and β ∈ O(c).
The data dependency relation → is equal to →i ∪ →e. The transitive closure
is denoted by →∗. The program dependency graph →p is equal to the union
of all the internal and external data dependencies in the program, denoted by⋃→i ∪⋃→e.
Example 3.12 Program dependency graph
Let P the following logic program:
C1 : p(x, y)← q(x, z), p(z, y);
C2 : q(x, z)← q(z, x);
C3 : q(b, a)←;
C4 : p(a, b)←
The corresponding dependency graph is as follows:
p(x, y)
q(x, z), p(z, y)
q(x, z)
q(z, x)
Dependence analysis in logic programs determines, for instance, whether or
not it is safe to reorder program clauses or furthermore to parallelize the program
[17, 18, 73].
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3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we examined first-order logic programming by reviewing the
notions of substitutions, unification, SLD-resolution, SLD-trees and the problems
of SLD-resolutions. Limitation due to the presence of loops that can causes the
search for an SLD-refutation result in non-termination.
Thus, we have exposed several loop checking techniques and discussed its
soundness and completeness. Table 3.1 on page 75 summarizes this results, where
7 in the sound column means that the loop check is not sound and 7 in the
complete column means that the loop check is not complete. 3 in the sound
column means that the loop check is sound and 3 in the complete column means
that the loop check is complete.
Flows in logic programming, like control flow analysis and data/dependence
analysis are then exposed, highlighting the fact that the information flow notion
presented in chapter 2 is not covered by those analysis in logic programming.
Thus, in the next chapter, we will try to adapt the notion of information flow
in security systems to logic programming. We will propose three definitions of
information flows in logic programs. Definitions that correspond to what can
be observed by a user when a query ← G(x, y) is run on a logic program P .
Implications between these definitions are discussed and complexity results are











Datalog Restricted Nvi, Svo General logic program
Sound Complete Sound Complete Sound Complete Sound Complete
Loop check 1 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Loop check 2 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7
Loop check 3 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7
Loop check 4 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Loop check 5 7 7 3 3 7 7 7 7
Loop check 6 7 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
Loop check 7 ? 3 3 3 3 3 ? 7
Table 3.1: Soundness and completeness of Loop check 1 to Loop check 7 for Datalog, restricted, nvi, svo and general logic programs

Chapter 4
Information Flow in Logic
Programming
As stated earlier, data security is the science and study of methods of protect-
ing data in computer and communication systems from unauthorized disclosure
and modification by controlling information flow in the system. In some sense,
an information flow should describe controls that regulate the dissemination of
information. These controls are needed to prevent programs from leaking con-
fidential data, or from disseminating classified data to users with lower security
clearances.
The theory of information flow in security systems is well defined for impera-
tive programming. Different models of information flow were proposed, namely,
the Bell-LaPadula Model [3], nondeducibility and noninterference [34] models.
Each model has rules about the conditions under which information can be trans-
fered throughout the system.
Several studies [24] addressed information flow in security systems for imper-
ative programming, but none were concerned to bring answers of what could be
an information flow in security systems for logic programming.
In this chapter, we propose three definitions of information flows in Datalog
logic programs. These definitions correspond to what can be observed by the
user when a query ← G(x, y) is run on a logic program P .
Firstly, we consider that the user only sees whether her queries succeed or
fail. In this respect, we say information flows from x to y in G when there exists
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constants a, b such that ← G(a, y) succeeds whereas ← G(b, y) fails.
Secondly, we assume that the user has also access to the sets of substitution
answers computed by the interpreter with respect to her queries. As a result, in
this case, there is a flow of information from x to y in G if there are constants
a, b such that the substitution answers of ← G(a, y) and ← G(b, y) are different.
Thirdly, we suppose that the user, in addition to the substitution answers,
also observes the SLD-refutation trees produced by the interpreter. If the SLD-
trees of the queries ← G(a, y) and ← G(b, y) can be distinguished in one way or
another by the user, then we will say that information flows from x to y in G. Of
course, it remains to properly define what ”distinguished” means in our setting.
Following a traditional view in program semantics, we will base distinguishability
of SLD-refutation trees on the notion of bisimilarity.
In sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, several definitions of information flow in logic
programming are proposed relatively for a Datalog logic program P and a goal
← G(x, y) of arity 2, (which stipulates the existence of a flow from the variable
x to the variable y in the goal ← G(x, y)). The implications between these
definitions are then studied in section 4.4. Decision procedures are then given in
section 4.7 for each of the previous definitions and computational issues studied
for some types of logic programs.
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As the theory of information flow is well studied for imperative programming,
it is tempting to see what could be an information flow in logic programming,
especially given the fact that there are no notions of assignment, or variable of a
program. In fact, variables in logic programs behave differently from variables in
conventional programming languages. They stand for an unspecified but single
entity rather than for a store location in memory.
The following three definitions for information flow in logic programming are
based on the following principle. The information flow that occurs when the user
asks a goal to logic programs depends mainly on what parts of the computation
the user sees. In the first definition, the user only sees whether goals succeed
or fail. In the second definition, the user has access to the set of substitution
answers computed by the program. In the third definition, the user obtains the
shape of the computation trees produced by the program.
It is now time to present our three definitions of information flows in logic
programs.
4.1 Information Flow based on Success / Failure
Let P be a Datalog logic program, and G(x, y) be a two variables goal. We
shall say that there is a flow from x to y in G(x, y) with respect to successes
and failures in P (in symbols x
SF−→
P
G y) iff there exists a, b ∈ UL(P ) such that
P ∪{G(a, y)} succeeds and P ∪{G(b, y)} fails. This intuitively means that when
the user only sees the outputs of computations in terms of successes and failures,
there exists two different a, b ∈ UL(P ) such that this user can distinguish (without
seeing what concerns a, b) between the output for P ∪ {G(a, y)} and the output
for P ∪ {G(b, y)}.
Example 4.1 Example of an information flow in logic programming
based on success and failure
Let P1 be the following program:
C1 : murderer(angel, billy)←;
C2 : murderer(george, bob)←
and let G1(x, y) be the following goal: ← murderer(x, y)
Since P1 ∪ {G1(angel, y)} succeeds and P1 ∪ {G1(bob, y)} fails, then x SF−→
P1
G1 y.
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4.2 Information Flow based on Substitution Answers
Let P be a Datalog logic program, and G(x, y) be a two variables goal. We
shall say that there is a flow from x to y in G(x, y) with respect to substitution
answers in P (in symbols x
SA−→
P
G y) iff there exists a, b ∈ UL(P ) such that Θ(P ∪
{G(a, y)}) 6= Θ(P ∪{G(b, y)}). Roughly speaking, in this definition, the user only
sees the outputs of computations in terms of substitution answers. As a result,
there is a flow if this user can distinguish (without seeing what is about a, b) the
output of P ∪ {G(a, y)} and the output of P ∪ {G(b, y)}.
Example 4.2 Example of an information flow in logic programming
based on substitution answers
Let P2 be the following program:
C1 : murderer(angel, billy)←;
C2 : murderer(george, bob)←
and let G2(x, y) be the following goal: ← murderer(x, y)
Since Θ(P2 ∪ {G2(angel, y)}) = {y 7→ billy} and Θ(P2 ∪ {G2(bob, y)}) = ∅, then
x
SA−→P2G2 y.
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4.3 Information Flow based on Bisimulation
Our third definition of flow is based on the notion of bisimulation between
goals. Quite simply, a bisimulation is a binary relation between goals such that
related goals have ”equivalent” SLD-trees.
4.3.1 Bisimulation Definition
Let P be a Datalog program. A binary relation Z between goals is said to
be a P-bisimulation iff it satisfies the following conditions; for all Datalog goals
F1, G1 such that F1ZG1:
• F1 =  iff G1 =  ,
• For each SLD-resolvent F2 of F1 (i.e. F2 ∈ succP (F1)) and a clause in P ,
there exists a resolvent G2 of G1 (i.e. G2 ∈ succP (G1)) and a clause in P
such that F2ZG2,
• For each SLD-resolvent G2 of G1 (i.e. G2 ∈ succP (G1)) and a clause in P ,
there exists a resolvent F2 of F1 (i.e. F2 ∈ succP (F1))and a clause in P
such that F2ZG2.
Above, succP (G) denotes the set of all goals obtained from a goal G by means of
a resolution step in the program P .
Proposition 4.3.1. The identity relation Id between goals is a P−bisimulation.
Proof. Let Z be a P − bisimulation and G a goal. Suppose that not{GZG}.
We will denote the right goal G in GZG by Gright and the left goal by Gleft.
If Gleft = , then, for sure Gright =  and thus, the first condition of the
bisimulation holds. Let G′left be a successor of Gleft. Eventually, Gright will
have a successor G′right (which is equal to G
′
left). With a similar reasoning, we
can prove the third condition of the bisimulation. Thus, a contradiction, and
GZG.
Proposition 4.3.2. If Z is a P−bisimulation, then Z−1 is also a P−bisimulation.
Proof. We define the converse Z−1 by Z−1 = {(H,G)/GZH}. Let Z be a P −
bisimulation. Suppose that GZH, let us prove that not{HZG}. Suppose that
G = , as GZH, then H = . Thus the first condition holds for bisimulation.
Let G′ be a successor of G. Since GZH, then, there exists a successor H ′ of
H such that G′ZH ′. In addition, if I ′ is a successor of H, then there exists a
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successor J ′ of G such that J ′ZI ′. Thus, the second and third conditions hold
for the bisimulation. A contradiction that leads to the fact that HZG.
Proposition 4.3.3. If Z1, Z2 are two P − bisimulations, then the compo-
sition Z1 ◦ Z2 defined by Z1 ◦ Z2 = {(G,H)/∃I,GZ1I and IZ2H} is also a
P − bisimulation.
Proof. Suppose that (G,H) ∈ Z1 ◦ Z2. Then there exists I such that GZ1I and
IZ2H. Since GZ1I, G =  iff I = , and as IZ1H, then I =  iff H = .
Thus, G =  iff H = . Now, let G′ be a successor of G. Since GZ1I, then
there exists I ′ successor of I such that G′Z1I ′. Since IZ2H, then, there exists
H ′ successor of H such that I ′Z2H ′. Thus, (G′, H ′) ∈ Z1 ◦ Z2. With a similar
reasoning, if H ′ is a successor of H, we can find a G′ successor of G such that
(G′, H ′) ∈ Z1 ◦ Z2.
Proposition 4.3.4. Let (Zi)i∈I be a family of P − bisimulations, then ∪
i∈I
Zi is
also a P − bisimulation .
As all P-bisimulations are closed under taking arbitrary unions, as shown by
the proposition 4.3.4, one can show that:
Proposition 4.3.5. There exists a maximal P-bisimulation, namely the binary
relation ZPmax between goals defined as follows: F1ZPmaxG1 iff there exists a P-
bisimulation Z such that F1ZG1.
It follows immediately that:
Proposition 4.3.6. ZPmax is an equivalence relation on the set of all goals.
Proof. By propositions 4.3.1 – 4.3.3.
Example 4.3 Example of bisimulation betweens logic goals
Let P be the following program:
C1 : p(a, y)← q(y);
C2 : p(b, y)← r(y);
C3 : p(b, y)← s(y)
and let G,H be respectively the following goals ← p(a, y) and ← p(b, y)
Let Z be the binary relation between goals such that:
← p(a, y) Z ← p(b, y),
← q(y) Z ← r(y),
← q(y) Z ← s(y).









Obviously, Z is a P-bisimulation. Since F Z G, then F ZPmax G.
4.3.2 Flow Definition
Let P be a logic program, and G(x, y) be a two variables goal. We shall
say that there is a flow from x to y in G(x, y) with respect to the bisimulation
in P (in symbols x
BI−→
P
G y) iff there exists a, b ∈ UL(P ) such that not{P ∪
{G(a, y)}ZPmaxP ∪ {G(b, y)}}. In this definition, there is a flow if the user, by
only seeing the outputs of computations in terms of bisimulation between goals,
can distinguish (without looking at a, b) the output of P ∪ {G(a, y)} and the
output of P ∪ {G(b, y)}.
Example 4.4 Example of an information flow in logic programming
based on bisimulation
Let P3 be the following program:
C1 : p(x, a)←;
C2 : p(a, b)← q(a)
and let G3(x, y) be the goal: ← p(x, y).
Let us prove not{P3∪{← p(a, y)}ZP3maxP3∪{← p(b, y)}}. Suppose that P3∪{←
p(a, y)}ZP3maxP3 ∪ {← p(b, y)}. Since ← q(a) ∈ succP3(← p(a, y)), then there
should be G3 ∈ succP3(← p(b, y)) such that P3 ∪ {← q(a)}ZP3maxP3 ∪ {G3}. The
problem is that the only goal in succP3(← p(b, y)) is the empty goal, which cannot
be bisimilar to ← q(a). Hence, not{P3 ∪ {← p(a, y)}ZP3maxP3 ∪ {← p(b, y)}}.
Therefore x
BI−→P3G3 y.
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4.4 Links Between the Different Types of Information
Flow
The existence of a flow with respect to substitution answers does not entail
the existence of a flow with respect to successes and failures. To see this, it
suffices to consider the following example.
Example 4.5 Example of an information flow in logic programming
where the existence of a flow with respect to substitution answers does
not entail the existence of a flow with respect to successes and failures
Let P be the following program:
C1 : love(angel, bob)←;
C2 : love(x, carl)←
and let G(x, y) be the goal: ← love(x, y).
Since Θ(P ∪ {G(angel, y)}) = {y 7→ bob, y 7→ carl} and Θ(P ∪ {G(bob, y)}) =






However, one can establish the following result.








Proof. Suppose that x
SF−→
P
G y, then there exists a, b ∈ UL(P ) such that P ∪
{G(a, y)} succeeds and P ∪ {G(b, y)} fails. Therefore, Θ(P ∪ {G(a, y)}) 6= ∅ and
Θ(P ∪ {G(b, y)}) = ∅. Consequently, x SA−→
P
G y.
The existence of a flow with respect to bisimulation does not entail the exis-
tence of a flow with respect to successes and failures. The next example explains
why.
Example 4.6 Example of an information flow in logic programming
where the existence of a flow with respect to bisimulation does not
entail the existence of a flow with respect to successes and failures
Let P3 and G3 be the program and goal considered in example 4.4. We know
that x
BI−→P3G3 y. Nevertheless, since all the goals of the form G3(a, y), with a ∈
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Nevertheless, it is worth noting at this point the following.








Proof. Suppose that x
SF−→
P
G y. Thus, there exists a, b ∈ UL(P ) such that P ∪
{G(a, y)} succeeds and P ∪ {G(b, y)} fails. Suppose that P ∪ {G(a, y)}ZPmaxP ∪
{G(b, y)}. Since P ∪ {G(a, y)} succeeds, then there exists an SLD-refutation
G0 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gn of G(a, y) in P . That is to say, G0 = G(a, y), Gn =  and Gi is
a successor of Gi−1 in P for i = 1 · · ·n.
Since P ∪ {G(a, y)}ZPmaxP ∪ {G(b, y)} in P , thus P ∪ {G(b, y)} succeeds: a con-
tradiction. Thus, not{P ∪ {G(a, y)}ZPmaxP ∪ {G(b, y)}} and x BI−→
P
G y.
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4.5 Information Flow over Goals with Arity > 2
We now generalize the previous definitions by considering goals with arity
higher than two. Firstly, we consider information flows between two variables.
Secondly, we consider information flows between two sets of variables.
The generalization of the previous three definitions to goals with arity higher
than two and by only considering information flows between two variables leads
us to the following three definitions:





G(x1,··· ,xk,··· ,xm,··· ,xp) xm iff
∃a, a′ ∈ UL(P ), a 6= a′
∃c1, · · · , ck−1, ck+1, · · · , cm−1, cm+1, · · · , cp ∈ UL(P ) such that
P ∪ {G(c1, · · · , ck−1, a, ck+1, · · · , cm−1, xm, cm+1, · · · , cp)} succeeds
and
P ∪ {G(c1, · · · , ck−1, a′, ck+1, · · · , cm−1, xm, cm+1, · · · , cp)} fails





G(x1,··· ,xk,··· ,xm,··· ,xp) xm iff
∃a, a′ ∈ UL(P ), a 6= a′
∃c1, · · · , ck−1, ck+1, · · · , cm−1, cm+1, · · · , cp ∈ UL(P ) such that
Θ[P ∪ {G(c1, · · · , ck−1, a, ck+1, · · · , cm−1, xm, cm+1, · · · , cp)}]
6=
Θ[P ∪ {G(c1, · · · , ck−1, a′, ck+1, · · · , cm−1, xm, cm+1, · · · , cp)}]





G(x1,··· ,xk,··· ,xm,··· ,xp) xm iff
∃a, a′ ∈ UL(P ), a 6= a′
∃c1, · · · , ck−1, ck+1, · · · , cm−1, cm+1, · · · , cp ∈ UL(P ) such that
not{P ∪ {G(c1, · · · , ck−1, a, ck+1, · · · , cm−1, xm, cm+1, · · · , cp)}
Zmax
P ∪ {G(c1, · · · , ck−1, a′, ck+1, · · · , cm−1, xm, cm+1, · · · , cp)}}
The idea behind the previous definitions is that in order to see if there is
a flow from xk to xm, one can try to instantiate the p − 2 other variables to
some constants and to find two constants a, a′ for which the instantiations of the
variable xk by a or a
′ leads to a success and failure for the first definition, or
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different substitutions answers for the second definition or two different shapes
of resolution trees for the third definition.
By considering x1 = x, xm = y and p = 2, we find again the same information
flow definitions for goals of arity two. In addition, with this generalization, the
results of lemma 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 are also preserved.
Now we will generalize the previous notions to cover information flows from
a set of variables to a set of variables. For this, we will proceed in 2 steps: first
we give a definition of the information flow from a set of variables to a single
variable, and then we generalize it from a set of variables to a set of variables.
1. Information flow from a set of variables to a single variable
For a program P and a goal G(x1, · · · , xk, xl, xm, · · · , xn), we say that
there is a flow from {x1, · · · , xk} to xl iff one can instantiate the variables
{xm, · · · , xn} by some constants and instantiate the variables {x1, · · · , xk}
in two different manners and thus lead to a success and failure / different
substitution answers / non bisimilar goals.
Definition 4.5.4 (Information flow definition from a set of variables to a
single variable relatively to the definition of success / failure). .
{x1, · · · , xk} SF−→
P
G(x1,··· ,xk,xl,xm,··· ,xn) xl iff
∃cm, · · · , cn ∈ UL(P ), ∃a1, · · · , ak,∃a′1, · · · , a′k ∈ UL(P ) such that
(a1, · · · , ak) 6= (a′1, · · · , a′k) and
P ∪ {G(a1, · · · , ak, xl, cm, · · · , cn)} succeeds and
P ∪ {G(a′1, · · · , a′k, xl, cm, · · · , cn)} fails.
Definition 4.5.5 (Information flow definition from a set of variables to a
single variable relatively to the definition of substitution answers). .
{x1, · · · , xk} SA−→
P
G(x1,··· ,xk,xl,xm,··· ,xn) xl iff
∃cm, · · · , cn ∈ UL(P ), ∃a1, · · · , ak,∃a′1, · · · , a′k ∈ UL(P ) such that
(a1, · · · , ak) 6= (a′1, · · · , a′k) and
Θ[P ∪ {G(a1, · · · , ak, xl, cm, · · · , cn)}]
6=
Θ[P ∪ {G(a′1, · · · , a′k, xl, cm, · · · , cn)}].
Definition 4.5.6 (Information flow definition from a set of variables to a
single variable relatively to the definition of bisimulation). .
{x1, · · · , xk} BI−→
P
G(x1,··· ,xk,xl,xm,··· ,xn) xl iff
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∃cm, · · · , cn ∈ UL(P ),∃a1, · · · , ak, ∃a′1, · · · , a′k ∈ UL(P ) such that
(a1, · · · , ak) 6= (a′1, · · · , a′k) and
not {P ∪ {G(a1, · · · , ak, xl, cm, · · · , cn)}
Zmax
P ∪ {G(a′1, · · · , a′k, xl, cm, · · · , cn)}}.
2. Generalization of the previous definition of information flow from
a set of variables to a set of variables
For a program P and a goal G(x1, · · · , xk, xl, · · · , xm−1, xm, · · · , xn), we
say that there is a flow from {x1, · · · , xk} to {xl, · · · , xm−1} iff there is a
flow from {x1, · · · , xk} to every variable in {xl, · · · , xm−1}.
Definition 4.5.7 (Information flow definition from a set of variables to a
set of variables relatively to the definition of success / failure). .
{x1, · · · , xk} SF−→
P
G(x1,··· ,xk,xl,··· ,xm−1,xm,··· ,xn) {xl, · · · , xm−1} iff
∀j = l, · · · ,m− 1, {x1, · · · , xk} SF−→
P
G(x1,··· ,xk,xl,··· ,xm−1,xm,··· ,xn) xj
Definition 4.5.8 (Information flow definition from a set of variables to a
set of variables relatively to the definition of substitution answers). .
{x1, · · · , xk} SA−→
P
G(x1,··· ,xk,xl,··· ,xm−1,xm,··· ,xn) {xl, · · · , xm−1} iff
∀j = l, · · · ,m− 1, {x1, · · · , xk} SA−→
P
G(x1,··· ,xk,xl,··· ,xm−1,xm,··· ,xn) xj
Definition 4.5.9 (Information flow definition from a set of variables to a
set of variables relatively to the definition of bisimulation). .
{x1, · · · , xk} BI−→
P
G(x1,··· ,xk,xl,··· ,xm−1,xm,··· ,xn) {xl, · · · , xm−1} iff
∀j = l, · · · ,m− 1, {x1, · · · , xk} BI−→
P
G(x1,··· ,xk,xl,··· ,xm−1,xm,··· ,xn) xj
A similar remark applies here too, by considering k = 1, and l = m − 1, we
find again the same definitions of information flows between single variables.
Example 4.7 Example of an information flow in logic programming over
goals with arity > 2
Let P be the following program, representing facts in a virtual game:
C1 : p(john, kim, fire, earth, battle1)←;
C2 : p(john, kim, fire, water, battle2)←;
C3 : p(kim, romeo, earth, fire, battle1)←;
C4 : p(kim, romeo,water, fire, battle2)←
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The fact C1 in the previous program can be read as follows: kim will give
john the power of earth only if john holds the power of fire in battle1.
We have: x
SA−→PG(x,y,fire,earth,battle1) y since
Θ(P ∪ {G(john, y, fire, earth, battle1)}) = {y 7→ kim} and
Θ(P ∪ {G(romeo, y, fire, earth, battle1)}) = {}.
Moreover, we have, {x, y} SA−→PG(x,y,r,s,battle1) {r, s} because:
{x, y} SA−→PG(x,y,r,earth,battle1) r (Θ(P ∪ {G(john, kim, r, earth, battle1)}) = {r 7→
fire} and Θ(P ∪ {G(kim, romeo, r, earth, battle1)}) = {})
and
{x, y} SA−→PG(x,y,fire,s,battle1) s (Θ(P ∪ {G(john, kim, fire, s, battle1)}) = {s 7→
earth, s 7→ water} and Θ(P ∪ {G(kim, romeo, fire, s, battle1)}) = {})
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4.6 Non-transitivity of the Flow
Most of the policies of information flow in imperative programming are rep-
resented by a lattice structure, which means that if information flows from a
variable x to a variable y and from y to z, then there is a flow from x to z. In
such contexts, the information flow relation between program variables is transi-
tive. It is interesting to investigate this property on the information flow of logic
programs according to our definitions.
Several counter examples prove that the information flow relation according
to our definitions is not transitive.
Example 4.8 Non transitivity of the information flow for the first defi-
nition of flow based on success and failure
For the following program P4:
C1 : p(a, a, a)←;
C2 : p(x, a, b)←
and the goal G(x, y, z) :← p(x, y, z), we have:
x
SF−→P4G(x,y,z) y (P4 ∪ {G(a, y, a)} succeeds, P4 ∪ {G(b, y, a)} fails),
y
SF−→P4G(x,y,z) z (P4 ∪ {G(a, a, z)} succeeds, P4 ∪ {G(a, b, z)} fails),
but we have not x
SF−→P4G(x,y,z) z ( both P4 ∪ {G(a, a, z)} and P4 ∪ {G(b, a, z)}
succeed).
Example 4.9 Non transitivity of the information flow for the first defi-
nition of flow based on substitution answers
For the following program P5:
C1 : p(x, y, z)← q(x, y), r(y, z);
C2 : q(x, y)←;
C3 : q(a, c)←;
C4 : r(y, c)←;
C5 : r(c, d)←
and the goal G(x, y, z) :← p(x, y, z), we have:
x
SA−→P5G(x,y,z) y (Θ(P5 ∪ {G(a, y, c)}) = {y 7→ c, },Θ(P5 ∪ {G(b, y, c)}) = {}),
y
SA−→P5G(x,y,z) z (Θ(P5 ∪ {G(a, c, z)}) = {z 7→ c, z 7→ d},Θ(P5 ∪ {G(a, b, z)}) =
{z 7→ c}),
but we have not x
SA−→P5G(x,y,z) z (Θ(P5 ∪ {G(a, c, z)}) = {z 7→ c, z 7→ d},Θ(P5 ∪
{G(b, c, z)}) = {z 7→ c, z 7→ d}).
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Example 4.10 Non transitivity of the information flow for the first
definition of flow based on bisimulation between goals
For the same previous program P4 and the goal G(x, y, z) :← p(x, y, z), we
have:
x
BI−→P4G(x,y,z) y (not{tree(P4 ∪ {G(a, y, a)})Zmaxtree(P4 ∪ {G(b, y, a)})}),
y
BI−→P4G(x,y,z) z (not{tree(P4 ∪ {G(a, a, z)})Zmaxtree(P4 ∪ {G(a, b, z)})}),
but we have not x
BI−→P4G(x,y,z) z (tree(P4∪{G(a, a, z)})Zmaxtree(P4∪{G(b, a, z)})).
This non-transitivity of our information flow relation can be explained by the
particular role of variables in logic programming. The truth is that in imperative
programs, the basic instruction is the assignment operation, whereas in logic
programs, the basic instructions are the resolution rule and the unification.
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4.7 Complexity Results
4.7.1 Complexity Classes
In this section, we give a brief overview of complexity concepts that will
be used throughout the thesis. We refer the reader to [43, 56] for a thorough
introduction in the field of complexity.
In this work, we deal most of the times with decision problems, i.e. prob-
lems that admit a boolean answer. Informally, we think of a Turing machine as a
device able to read from and write on a semi-infinite tape, whose contents may be
locally accessed and changed in a computation. Its behavior at a given moment
is determined partially by the current state of the machine. For Deterministic
Turing Machine (DTM), when any of the states halt, yes or no is reached, the
tape (T ) halts. We say that T accepts its input if T halts in yes. Similarly, we
say that T rejects the input in the case of halting in no. Unlike the case of DTM,
the definition of acceptance and rejection by a NonDeterministic Turing Machine
(NDTM) is asymmetric. We say that a NDTM accepts an input if there is at
least one sequence if choices leading to the state yes. A NDTM rejects an input
if no sequence of choices can lead to yes.
Thus, for decision problems, the class P is the set of problems that can be
answered by a DTM in polynomial time. The class of decision problems that can
be solved by a NDTM in polynomial time is denoted by NP . co−NP is the class
of problems whose answer is always the complement of those in NP (Generally,
for a language L, co − L is the class of problems whose answer is always the
complement of those in L). The class P is obviously contained both in NP and
in co−NP . As for the class of decision problems that can be solved by a DTM
in exponential time, it is denoted by EXPTIME. Its corresponding class for
decision problems solved by a NDTM is denoted by NEXPTIME.
In the following, we refer to a particular type of computation called computa-
tion with oracles. Oracles are intuitively subroutines without cost. Given a class
of decision problem C, the class PC (NPC) is the class of decision problems that
can be solved in polynomial time by a DTM (NDTM) that uses an oracle for the
problems in C, i.e. a subroutine for any problem in C that can be called several
times, spending just one time-unit for each call.











and for all k ≥ 0,
Σpk+1 = NP
Σpk ,Πpk+1 = co− Σpk+1,∆pk+1 = PΣ
p
k .
Notice that Σp1 = NP,Π
p
1 = co−NP,∆p1 = P .
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An Alternating Turing Machine (ATM) is a NDTM that allows two modes of
configurations:
1. A first configuration that leads to acceptance iff it is either a final accept-
ing configuration, or (recursively) at least one of its successors leads to
acceptance (called OR configuration).
2. A second configuration that leads to acceptance iff it is either a final accept-
ing configuration, or (recursively) all of its successors leads to acceptance
(called AND configuration).
The machine accepts its input iff its initial configuration with this input does.
The class of decision problems that can be solved by a ATM in polynomial time is
denoted by ATIME, and the class of decision problems that can be solved by a
ATM in polynomial space is denoted by APSPACE. Notice that EXPTIME =
APSPACE [16].
Let L1 and L2 be two languages, and assume that there is a DTM R that
halts in polynomial-time such that: for all input strings x, we have x ∈ L1 iff
R(x) ∈ L2 (where R(x) denotes the output of R on input x). Then R is called a
polynomial reduction from L1 to L2 and we say that L1 is reducible to L2.
Besides this notion of reduction, complexity theory also considers many other
kinds of reductions, for example logarithmic-space reductions or polynomial time
Turing reductions.
Let C be a set of languages. A language L is called C−hard, if any language
L′ ∈ C is reducible to L. If L is C−hard and L ∈ C, then L is called C−complete.
If two decision problems A and B are complete for the same class, then there is
always a way to solve any instance of A by solving a single instance of B and
vice versa.
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Input: A logic program P , a two variables goal G(x, y)






Input: A logic program P , a two variables goal G(x, y)






Input: A logic program P , a two variables goal G(x, y)





In the general setting, our decision problems are undecidable.
Proposition 4.7.1. The three decision problems above are undecidable.




Input: A logic program P , a ground goal q(a)
Output: P ∪ {← q(a)} succeeds
Let (P, q(a)) be an instance of pi1 and let (P
′, G(x, y)) be the instance of piSF
defined by: P ′ = P ∪ {G(a, y) ← q(a)}, where G is a new predicate symbol of





(⇒) Suppose that P ∪ {← q(a)} succeeds. Thus P ′ ∪ {G(a, y)} succeeds and
P ′ ∪ {G(b, y)} fails, consequently x SF−→
P ′
G y.
(⇐) Suppose that x SF−→
P ′
G y, then there exists a
′, b′ ∈ UL(P ) such that P ′ ∪
{G(a′, y)} succeeds and P ′ ∪ {G(b′, y)} fails. Thus, a′ = a and b′ 6= a. Thus,
P ∪ {← q(a)} succeeds.
(piSA) A similar proof applies here.
(piBI) We will reduce the following undecidable decision problem [29] to piBI :
pi2
{
Input: A binary logic program P , a ground goal q(a)
Output: The SLD-tree of P ∪ {← q(a)} contains a failure branch
Let (P, q(a)) be an instance of pi2 and let (P
′, G(x, y)) be the instance of piBI
defined by:
P ′ = P ∪

G(a, y)← q(a)
G(b, y)← G(b, y) for all b in L(P ) such that a 6= b
G(f(x1, · · · , xn), y)← G(f(x1, · · · , xn), y) for all f in L(P )
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Remark that for all a′ ∈ UL(P ), the computation tree of P ′ ∪ {G(a′, y)} consists
of a unique infinite branch. We need to show that the SLD-tree of P ∪ {← q(a)}




(⇒) Suppose that the SLD-tree of P ∪ {← q(a)} contains a failure branch. Thus
the SLD-tree of P ′∪{G(a, y)} will eventually contains this failure branch while the
SLD-tree of P ′ ∪{G(b, y)} will have infinite branche(s). Consequently x BI−→
P ′
G y.
(⇐) Suppose that x BI−→
P ′
G y, then there exists a
′, b′ ∈ UL(P ) such that not
{P ′ ∪ {G(a′, y)}ZmaxP ′ ∪ {G(b′, y)}}. Hence, either a′ or b′ is equal to a. Thus
(in the case of a′ = a) the SLD-tree of P ∪{← q(a)} contains a failure branch.
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4.7.3 Decidability
If one restricts the language to Datalog programs and goals then determining
existence of information flows becomes decidable.
Proposition 4.7.2. piSF is EXPTIME-complete for Datalog programs.
Proof. (Membership) The following algorithm decides the existence of the infor-
mation flow in Datalog programs.
Require: A Datalog program P , a goalG(x, y), finite Herbrand Universe UL(P ) =




G(x,y) y for the Datalog program P and the goal g
1: answer = false
2: i = 0
3: while i < n and not answer do
4: i = i+ 1; j = i
5: while j < n and not answer do
6: j = j + 1
7: if (P ∪ {G(ai, y)} succeeds and P ∪ {G(aj , y)} fails) or (P ∪ {G(ai, y)}
fails and P ∪ {G(aj , y)} succeeds) then





This algorithm is deterministic and using the fact that Datalog is program com-
plete for EXPTIME [41, 71], it follows that it can be executed in EXPTIME.
(Hardness) In order to prove EXPTIME-hardness, we consider the following
decision problem known to be EXPTIME-hard [71]:
pi3
{
Input: A Datalog program P , a ground atom A
Output: P ∪A (A is a logical consequence of P )
Let (P,A) an instance of pi3 and let (P
′, g(x, y)) be the instance of piSF defined





(⇒) Suppose that A is a logical consequence of P , thus P ′∪{← g(a, y)} succeeds
and P ′ ∪ {← g(b, y)} fails. Consequently x SF−→
P ′
g y.
(⇐) Suppose that x SF−→
P ′
g y. Then there exists a, b ∈ UL(P ) such that P ′ ∪ {←
g(a′, y)} succeeds and P ′ ∪ {← g(b′, y)} fails. Hence, it follows that a′ = a and
b′ 6= a. Thus, P ∪A.
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Proposition 4.7.3. piSA is EXPTIME-complete for Datalog programs.
Proof. A proof similar to the previous one applies here.
Concerning piSF , determining existence of flows is even in ∆2P if one considers
binary hierarchical Datalog programs.
Proposition 4.7.4. piSF is in ∆2P for binary hierarchical Datalog programs.
Proof. Let us consider the following deterministic algorithm with oracle:
Algorithm 1: function SF(P,G(x, y))






For all a in UL(P ) do
For all b in UL(P ) do





The oracle SUCCESSES consists in the set of all pairs (P,G) such that G
succeeds in P . Restricting P to binary hierarchical programs, one can show that
SUCCESSES belongs to NP. The oracle FAILURES consists in the set of all pairs
(P,G) such that G fails in P . Restricting P to binary hierarchical programs, one
can show that FAILURES belongs to co-NP. Hence piSF is in ∆2P .
We do not know if piSA is in ∆2P too for binary hierarchical programs.
Now, let us address the complexity of deciding the existence of flows with
respect to our third definition.
Proposition 4.7.5. piBI is in EXPTIME for hierarchical binary Datalog pro-
grams.
Proof. Since EXPTIME = APSPACE, then it suffices to demonstrate that
piBI is in APSPACE for binary hierarchical Datalog programs. In this respect,
we consider the following alternating algorithm:
The subprocedure succ(., .) produces, given an hierarchical Datalog program
P and a goal G a Boolean value. More precisely, succ(P,G) is true iff there exists
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Algorithm 2: function bisim(P,G1,G2)
Require: A hierarchical Datalog program P , two goals G1 and G2.





(∀) choose i, j ∈ {1, 2} such that i 6= j
(∀) choose a successor G′i of Gi in P
(∃) choose a successor G′j of Gj in P
(.) call bisim(P,G′i, G
′
j)
- (true, false): reject
- (false, true): reject
- (false, false):




a goal G′ such that G′ is derived from G and P . Obviously, succ(., .) can be im-
plemented in deterministic linear time. Concerning the procedure bisim, seeing
that P is hierarchical, it accepts its inputs P,G1, G2 iff G1ZmaxG2. Moreover,
seeing that P is binary, bisim can be implemented in polynomial space.
We mention that the different algorithms previously presented for goals of
arity two can be generalized easily to goals with arity higher than two.
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4.8 Information Flow Existence after Program Transfor-
mation
In this section, we focus our attention on the existence of the information
flow after program transformation. We will be interested to check whether trans-
formations on logic programs introduce or eliminate information flows.
Unfold/fold transformations were first proposed by Burstall and Darlington
[14] in the context of a functional language. In the context of logic programming,
Tamaki and Sato [69] formulated unfold/fold transformations for definite logic
programs so as to preserve the equivalence of programs in the sense of the least
Herbrand model semantics.
These transformations are based on a very simple idea: that of replacing
equals by equals. Informally, unfolding refers to the replacement of an atom in
the body of a clause by the appropriate body of some other clause. For example,
given the program:
C1 : p(x, y)← q(x), r(y);
C2 : q(u)← s(u, v);
we can unfold the literal q in the C1, to obtain:
C ′1 : p(x, y)← s(x,w), r(y);
C2 : q(u)← s(u, v);
However, folding refers to the replacement of an/some atom(s) in the body
of a clause by the head of some other clause. For example, given the program:
C1 : p(x)← q(x), s(x, z), r(z);
C2 : t(u, v)← s(u, v), r(v);
we can fold the literals for s and r in C1, to yield:
C ′1 : p(x)← q(x), t(x, z).
Formally,
Definition 4.8.1 (Unfolding). Let C be a clause in P of the form
C : A← A1, · · · , Ai−1, Ai, Ai+1, · · · , An.
and C1, C2, · · · , Cm be all clauses in P , whose heads are unifiable with Ai by
most general unifiers θ1, θ2, · · · , θm. The result of unfolding C at Ai is the set
of clauses {C ′1, · · · , C ′m} such that, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) if
Cj : Bj ← Bj1 , · · · , Bjh (h ≥ 0) and Bj [θj ] = Ai[θj ], then
C ′j : (A← A1, · · · , Ai−1, Bj1 , · · · , Bjh , Ai+1, · · · , An)[θj ].
Then, P ′ = (P − {C}) ∪ {C ′1, · · · , C ′m}. C is called the unfolded clause and
C1, · · · , Cm are called the unfolding clauses. Ai is called the unfolded atom.
Definition 4.8.2 (Folding). Let C be a clause in P of the form
C : A0 ← A1, · · · , An. (n > 0)
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and D be a clause in P ′ (i.e. the resulting program after the folding transforma-
tion). Let D be of the form:
D : B0 ← B1, · · · , Bk. (k > 0)
Suppose that there exists a substitution θ satisfying the following conditions:
1. B1[θ] = Aj1 , B2[θ] = Aj2 , · · · , Bk[θ] = Ajk where j1, j2, · · · , jk are all dif-
ferent natural numbers between 1 and n.
2. For each variable in the body in D, θ substitutes a distinct variable not
appearing in {B0[θ], A0, A1, · · · , An} − {Aj1 , · · · , Ajk}.
Then, the result of folding C using D is the clause C ′ with head A0 and body
{B0[θ]} ∪ {A1, · · · , An} − {Aj1 , · · · , Ajk}. C is called a folded clause, D is called
a folding clause and B0[θ] the atom introduced by folding.
Obviously, since folding or unfolding clauses in logic programs change neither
its successes, nor its failures [69], nor its substitution answers [44], the infor-
mation flows based either on successes and failures or on substitution answers
are preserved after applying the transformations of Tamaki and Sato. The same
cannot be said for information flows based on bisimulation.
Example 4.11 Example of a program transformation that do not pre-
serve information flows based on bisimulation.
let P0 be the logic program containing the following clauses:
C1 : p(a, y)← q(y);
C2 : q(y)← r(y);











and let G be the goal ← p(x, y).
It is easy to verify that x
BI−→P0G y. To see this, we sketch, by omitting the
different substitutions, the SLD-refutation trees corresponding to the two goals
P0 ∪ {← p(a, y)} and P0 ∪ {← p(a′, y)}.
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SLD-tree(P0 ∪ {← p(a, y))} SLD-tree(P0 ∪ {← p(a′, y)})
← p(a, y)
← q(y)
← r(y) ← s(y)
← p(a′, y)
← r′(y) ← s′(y)
Obviously, as not{P0 ∪ {← p(a, y)}ZmaxP0 ∪ {← p(a′, y)}}, x BI−→
P0
G y.
By unfolding C1, the program P1 is obtained from P0 by replacing C1 with
the following clauses:
C10 : p(a, y)← r(y);
C11 : p(a, y)← s(y)
In the new transformed program P1, the two SLD-refutation trees of the goals
P1 ∪ {← p(a, y)} and P1 ∪ {← p(a′, y)} are bisimilar as shown in the next figure.
SLD-tree(P1 ∪ {← p(a, y)}) SLD-tree(P1 ∪ {← p(a′, y)})
← p(a, y)
← r(y) ← s(y)
← p(a′, y)
← r′(y) ← s′(y)
Thus x 6 BI−→P1G y.
A general question concerns the definition of transformations of logic pro-
grams that never introduce or eliminate information flows.
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4.9 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed three definitions of information flow in logic
programs. As proved in section 4.7.2, determining whether there exists an infor-
mation flow is undecidable in the general setting. Hence, a natural question was
to restrict the language of logic programming as done in section 4.7.3. Table 4.1
contains the results we have obtained so far. Much remains to be done.
General setting Datalog programs Binary hierarchical Datalog programs
piSF Undecidable EXPTIME-complete in ∆2P
piSA Undecidable EXPTIME-complete in EXPTIME
piBI Undecidable ? in EXPTIME
Table 4.1: Complexity results
Firstly, in the setting of Datalog programs, the main difficulty concerning
piBI comes from loops or infinite branches in SLD-refutation trees. Therefore, in
order to determine, given a Datalog program P and two Datalog goals G1 and
G2, whether G1ZmaxG2, one can think about using loop checking techniques and
considering either restricted programs, or nvi programs or svo programs.
Secondly, considering the unfold/fold transformations introduced by Tamaki
and Sato [69] within the context of logic programs optimization, we showed that
these transformations can introduce or eliminate information flows, and that
a general question resides concerning the definition of transformations of logic
programs that never introduce or eliminate flows.
Chapter 5
Goals Bisimulation
Within the context of a given programming language, it is essential to asso-
ciate a semantics to programs written in it. This semantics induces an equivalence
relation between programs. Hence, the decision problem ”given two programs,
determine whether they are equivalent” is at the heart of the study of program
semantics.
In logic programming, several ideas of equivalence of logic programs are in
competition. These ideas are based on the various semantics of logic programs.
For example, if one considers the least Herbrand model semantics, then two
given logic programs are said to be equivalent iff their least Herbrand models
are equal. Such equivalence relations between programs have been intensively
studied in the past [38, 39, 55, 57]. Nevertheless, in some cases, they fail to
adequately provide the right tool for comparing logic programs. For instance, in
the case of perpetual processes, most of them are inadequate to offer frameworks
in which to reason about programs. The truth is that two perpetual processes
may have the same declarative semantics (defined in terms of least model) for
example and, still have very different behaviors. And the various equivalence
relations considered in [31, 37, 48, 52] do not take into account the computational
aspects of logic programming. The goal of this chapter is to suggest the use of
equivalence relations between logic programs that take into account the shape of
the SLD-trees that these programs give rise to. This idea is not new: in automata
theory, for instance, many variants of the equivalence relation of bisimilarity have
been defined in order to promote the idea that automata with the same trace-
based semantics should sometimes not be considered as equivalent if they are not
bisimilar [61].
In this chapter, in order to simplify matter, we consider logic programs of a
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very simple kind: Datalog programs. Furthermore, comparing two given Datalog
programs and taking into account the shape of the SLD-trees they give rise to ne-
cessitates the comparison of infinitely many SLD-trees. Thus, in a first approach,
we restrict our study to the comparison of two given Datalog goals. We will say
that, with respect to a fixed Datalog program P , two given goals are equivalent
when their SLD-trees are bisimilar.
In this chapter, we investigate the computability and complexity of the equiv-
alence problem between Datalog goals. In particular, we examine the complexity
of the following decision problems:
• given two Datalog goals F,G and a hierarchical Datalog program P , deter-
mine if the SLD-trees of P ∪ F and P ∪G are bisimilar.
• given two Datalog goals F,G and a restricted Datalog program P , determine
if the SLD-trees of P ∪ F and P ∪G are bisimilar.
An undecidability result concerning Prolog programs will be given on sec-
tion 5.1. In section 5.2, we will address the problem of deciding whether two
given goals are bisimilar with respect to a given hierarchical program. At the
end of the section, computational issues will be studied. Note that for hierar-
chical programs, the SLD-tree for a goal ← G contains only finite branches. In
section 5.3, we will address the same questions as in section 5.2 by considering
here restricted programs. These programs allow a specific kind of recursion in
the clauses. Finally, we will conclude by proposing an open question concerning
to decide whether two given goals are bisimilar with respect to a nonvariable
introducing logic program or a single variable occurrence logic program.
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5.1 Undecidability for Prolog Programs
As is well known, the SLD-resolution principle and the concepts of resolvent,
SLD-derivation, SLD-refutation and SLD-tree have also been considered within
the context of Prolog programs and Prolog goals. In addition to the predicate
symbols, constants and variables composing the alphabet of Datalog, the alphabet
of Prolog also includes function symbols allowing the use of terms inductively
defined as follows:
(i) constants are terms;
(ii) variables are terms;
(iii) expressions of the form f(t1, · · · , th), where t1, · · · , th are terms and f is a
function symbol of arity h, are terms.
As a result, one may also define in Prolog the binary relations between goals
similar to the bisimulation defined in Datalog. Nevertheless,
Proposition 5.1.1. It is undecidable, given a Prolog program P and Prolog goals
F1, G1, to determine whether P ∪ {F1} ZPmax P ∪ {G1}.
Proof. Let us consider the following decision problem:
(pi1) given a Prolog program P with exactly one binary clause (i.e. a clause such
that its body contains at most one atom) and a Prolog goal ← B, determine
whether the SLD-tree for P ∪ {← B} contains an infinite branch.
Let (P,← B) be an instance of pi1. We consider new constants a, b, c and a
new predicate symbol p of arity 2. Let P ′ be the least Prolog program containing
P and the following Horn clauses:
p(a, y)← B,
p(b, y)← B,
p(b, y)← p(c, y),
p(c, y)← p(c, y).
We demonstrate that the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) the SLD-tree for P ∪ {← B} contains an infinite branch;
(ii) P ′ ∪ {← p(a, y)} ZP ′max P ′ ∪ {← p(b, y)}.
(i)⇒ (ii) Suppose the SLD-tree for P ∪{← B} contains an infinite branch. Since
P consists of exactly one binary clause, then the SLD-tree for P ∪{← B} is equal
to a unique infinite branch. Obviously, the SLD-tree for P ′ ∪ {← p(a, y)} is also
equal to a unique infinite branch whereas the SLD-tree for P ′ ∪ {← p(b, y)} is
equal to a pair of infinite branches. Hence, P ′∪{← p(a, y)} ZP ′max P ′∪{← p(b, y)}.
(ii) ⇒ (i) Suppose P ′ ∪ {← p(a, y)} ZP ′max P ′ ∪ {← p(b, y)}. Obviously, the
SLD-tree for P ′ ∪ {← p(b, y)} contains an infinite branch. Hence, the SLD-tree
for P ′ ∪ {← p(a, y)} also contains an infinite branch. Hence, the SLD-tree for
P ∪ {← B} contains an infinite branch.
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Since (pi1) is undecidable [28], then it is undecidable, given a Prolog program P
and Prolog goals F1, G1, to determine whether P ∪ {F1} ZPmax P ∪ {G1}.
A question arises here, how can we restore this decision problem to decidabil-
ity? One can think (as we have done) about considering specific classes of logic
programs, by restricting the language of logic programming. In the setting of
Datalog programs for example, the main difficulty concerning (pi) comes from
loops or infinite branches in SLD trees. We will address this issue in the follow-
ing sections.
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5.2 Decidability for Hierarchical Programs
We now study the computational complexity of the following decision prob-
lem: (pihie) given an hierarchical Datalog program P and Datalog goals F1, G1,
determine whether P∪{F1} ZPmax P∪{G1}. In this respect, let P be a hierarchical
Datalog program.
Algorithm 3: function bisim1(F1,G1)
begin





if SF 6= ∅ and SG 6= ∅ then
SF ′ ←− SF
while SF ′ 6= ∅ do
F2 ←− get-element(SF ′)
found-bisim←− false
SG′ ←− SG
while SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false do
G2 ←− get-element(SG′)
found-bisim←− bisim1(F2, G2)
if found-bisim = false then
return false
SG′ ←− SG
while SG′ 6= ∅ do
G2 ←− get-element(SG′)
found-bisim←− false
SF ′ ←− SF
while SF ′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false do
F2 ←− get-element(SF ′)
found-bisim←− bisim1(G2, F2)





In Algorithm 3, bothempty(F1,G1) is a Boolean function returning true iff
F1 =  and G1 = , whereas bothfail(F1,G1) is a Boolean function returning
true iff F1 6= , successor(F1)=∅, G1 6=  and successor(G1)=∅. Moreover,
successor(.) is a function returning the set of all resolvents of its argument
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with a clause of P whereas get-element(.) is a function removing one element
from the set of elements given as input and returning it.
Example 5.1 Running the algorithm bisim1 on an hierarchical logic
program
Let P be the following hierarchical logic program:
C1 : q(a)←;
C2 : p(a, b)←;
C3 : p(b, c)←;
C4 : p(b, y)← q(y);
and F1(a, b) =← p(a, b), G1(b, c) =← p(b, c) two goals. Its corresponding SLD-
trees is depicted next:





Note that in the SLD-tree of P ∪ {G1(b, c)}, the goal ← q(c) is a failure goal.
The following is the trace execution of the Algorithm 3 over the goals F1(a, b)
and G1(b, c).
bisim1(F1(a, b),G1(b, c))
bothempty(F1(a, b),G1(b, c)) is false
bothfail(F1(a, b),G1(b, c)) is false
SF ←− {}
SG←− {, q(c)}
SF 6= ∅ and SG 6= ∅
SF ′ ←− {}
SF ′ 6= ∅
F2 ←−  , SF ′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− false
SG′ ←− {, q(c)}
SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false




SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = true (quit the while loop)
found-bisim = true (loop on the elements of SF ′)
SF ′ = ∅ (continue in the second part of the algorithm)
SG′ ←− {, q(c)}
SG′ 6= ∅
G2 ←−  , SG′ ←− {q(c)}
found-bisim←− false
SF ′ ←− {}
SF ′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false
F2 ←−  , SF ′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− bisim1(,)
bothempty(,) is true
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return true
SF ′ = ∅ (continue and check the if statement)
found-bisim = true (loop on the elements of SG′)
SG′ 6= ∅
G2 ←− q(c) , SG′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− false
SF ′ ←− {}
SF ′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false




SF ←− ∅, SG←− ∅
return false
SF ′ = ∅ and found-bisim = false (continue and check the if statement)
found-bisim = false
return false
Thus the algorithm bisim1(F1(a, b),G1(b, c)) returns false.
In order to demonstrate the decidability of (pihie), we need to prove the fol-
lowing lemmas for all Datalog goals F1, G1:
Lemma 5.2.1 (Termination). bisim1(F1,G1) terminates.
Lemma 5.2.2 (Completeness). If P∪{F1} ZPmax P∪{G1}, then bisim1(F1,G1)
returns true.
Lemma 5.2.3 (Soundness). If bisim1(F1,G1) returns true, then P∪{F1} ZPmax
P ∪ {G1}.
Let  be the binary relation on the set of all pairs of Datalog goals defined by:
(F2, G2) (F1, G1) iff
• the SLD-tree for F1 is deeper than the SLD-tree for F2,
• the SLD-tree for G1 is deeper than the SLD-tree for G2.
The depth of an SLD-tree is the depth of its longest branch. Remark that in this
section, all SLD-trees are finite.
Obviously,  is a partial order on the set of all pairs of goals. Since P is hierar-
chical, then  is well-founded.
Proof of Lemma 5.2.1. The proof is done by-induction on (F1, G1). Let (F1, G1)
be such that for all (F2, G2), if (F2, G2) (F1, G1) then bisim1(F2,G2) termi-
nates. Since every recursive call to bisim1 that is performed along the execution
of bisim1(F1,G1) is done with respect to a pair (F2, G2) of goals such that
(F2, G2) (F1, G1), then bisim1(F1,G1) terminates.
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Proof of Lemma 5.2.2. Let us consider the following property:
(Prop1(F1, G1)) if F1ZPmaxG1 then bisim1(F1,G1) returns true.
Again, we proceed by-induction. Suppose (F1, G1) is such that for all (F2, G2),
if (F2, G2)  (F1, G1) then Prop1(F2, G2). Let us show that Prop1(F1, G1).
Suppose P ∪{F1} ZPmax P ∪{G1}. Hence, for all successors F2 of F1, there exists
a successor G2 of G1 such that P ∪ {F2} ZPmax P ∪ {G2}, and conversely. Seeing
that the logic program is hierarchical, then (F2, G2)  (F1, G1). By induction
hypothesis, Prop1(F2, G2). Since P ∪{F2} ZPmax P ∪{G2}, then bisim1(F2,G2)
returns true. As a result, one sees that bisim1(F1,G1) returns true.
Proof of Lemma 5.2.3. It suffices to demonstrate that the binary relation Z de-
fined as follows between Datalog goals is a bisimulation: F1 Z G1 iff bisim1(F1,G1)
returns true. Let F1, G1 be Datalog goals such that F1 Z G1. Hence, bisim1(F1,G1)
returns true. Thus, obviously, F1 =  iff G1 = , and the first condition charac-
terizing bisimulations holds for Z. Now, suppose that F2 is a resolvent of F1 and
a clause in P . Since bisim1(F1,G1) returns true, then there exists a resolvent
G2 of G1 and a clause in P such that bisim1(F2,G2) returns true, i.e. F2 Z G2.
As a result, the second condition characterizing bisimulations holds for Z. The
third condition characterizing bisimulations holds for Z too, as the reader can
quickly check. Thus Z is a bisimulation.
As a consequence of lemmas 5.2.1 – 5.2.3, we have:
Theorem 5.2.1. Algorithm 3 is a sound and complete decision procedure for
(pihie).
It follows that (pihie) is decidable. Moreover,
Theorem 5.2.2. (pihie) is in 2EXPTIME.
Proof. Let P be a hierarchical Datalog program and G be a goal. Let n be the
maximal number of atoms in the clauses of P or in G, and t be the number of
level mapping in P .
In fact, the maximal depth of a branch in an SLD-tree is equal to n × (the
maximal depth of a branch at level t−1) which is in turn equal to n×(1+n×(1+
the maximal depth of a branch at level t − 2)). Thus, by iterating the same







i ≤ t× nt.
Let s be the maximal number of clauses that defines a predicate. Hence, the
branching degree of the SLD-tree for P ∪{G} is bounded by s. Remark that our
algorithm uses twice two nested loops. Each loop run through all the successors of
a some goal. In the worst case, the number of successors of a goal will not exceed
the branching degree s. In fact, for a maximal depth D, the time complexity
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of the algorithm is approximately equal to 2 × s2 × (the time complexity of the
algorithm for a depth D−1) which is in turn equal to 4×s4×(the time complexity
of the algorithm for a depth D− 2). Thus, by iterating the same operation until
depth 1, one can show that for a depth D, the time complexity of our algorithm
is about 2D × s2×D ≤ 2t×nt × s2×t×nt .
Note that for a hierarchical program P and a goal G, the number of nodes in
the corresponding SLD-tree is about st×nt .
Concerning the exact complexity of (pihie), we do not know whether (pihie) is
2EXPTIME-hard or (pihie) is in EXPSPACE.
112 CHAPTER 5. GOALS BISIMULATION
5.3 Decidability for Restricted Programs
We now study the computational complexity of the following decision prob-
lem: (pires) given a restricted Datalog program P and Datalog goals F1, G1, deter-
mine whether P ∪{F1} ZPmax P ∪{G1}. In this respect, let P be a restricted Data-
log program. In Algorithm 4, bothempty(Fi,Gi) and bothfail(Fi,Gi) are sim-
ilar to the corresponding functions used in Algorithm 3, whereas occur((F1 ⇒
· · · ⇒ Fi),(G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi)) is a Boolean function returning true iff there exists
substitutions σ, τ such that Fl = Fk[σ], Gl = Gk[τ ] for some 1 ≤ k < l ≤ i. As the
reader can see, Algorithm 4 is very similar to Algorithm 3. The main difference
lies in the introduction of the occur test in the first conditional instruction.
Example 5.2 Running the algorithm bisim2 on a restricted logic pro-
gram
Let P be the following hierarchical logic program:
C1 : q(x)← r(x);
C2 : r(a)← s(a);
C3 : p(x, y)← p(y, x);
and F1(a, b) =← p(a, b), G1(a) =← q(a), H1(b, a) =← p(b, a) three goals. Its
corresponding SLD-trees is depicted next:














Note that in the SLD-tree of P ∪ {G1(a)}, the goal ← s(a) is a failure goal.
The following is the trace execution of the Algorithm 4 over the goals F1(a, b)
and G1(a).
bisim2(F1(a, b),G1(a))
bothempty(F1(a, b),G1(a)) is false
bothfail(F1(a, b),G1(a)) is false
occur((F1(a, b)),(G1(a))) is false
SF ←− {p(b, a)}
SG←− {r(a)}
SF 6= ∅ and SG 6= ∅
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Algorithm 4: function bisim2((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi),(G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi))
begin
if bothempty(Fi, Gi) or bothfail(Fi, Gi) or





if SF 6= ∅ and SG 6= ∅ then
SF ′ ←− SF
while SF ′ 6= ∅ do
F ′ ←− get-element(SF ′)
found-bisim←− false
SG′ ←− SG
while SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false do
G′ ←− get-element(SG′)
found-bisim←− bisim2((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi ⇒ F ′), (G1 ⇒
· · · ⇒ Gi ⇒ G′))
if found-bisim = false then
return false
SG′ ←− SG
while SG′ 6= ∅ do
G′ ←− get-element(SG′)
found-bisim←− false
SF ′ ←− SF
while SF ′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false do
F ′ ←− get-element(SF ′)
found-bisim←− bisim2((G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi ⇒ G′), (F1 ⇒
· · · ⇒ Fi ⇒ F ′))
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SF ′ ←− {p(b, a)}
SF ′ 6= ∅
F ′ ←− p(b, a) , SF ′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− false
SG′ ←− {r(a)}
SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false
G′ ←− r(a) , SG′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− bisim2((p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)),(q(a)⇒ r(a)))
bothempty(p(b, a),r(a)) is false
bothfail(p(b, a),r(a)) is false
occur((p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)),(q(a)⇒ r(a))) is false
SF ←− {p(a, b)}
SG←− {s(a)}
SF 6= ∅ and SG 6= ∅
SF ′ ←− {p(a, b)}
SF ′ 6= ∅
F ′ ←− p(a, b) , SF ′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− false
SG′ ←− {s(a)}
SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false
G′ ←− s(a) , SG′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− bisim2((p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)),
(q(a)⇒ r(a)⇒ s(a)))
bothempty(p(a, b),s(a)) is false
bothfail(p(a, b),s(a)) is false
occur((p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)),(q(a)⇒ r(a)⇒ s(a))) is false
SF ←− {p(b, a)}
SG←− ∅
SF 6= ∅ and SG = ∅
return false
SG′ = ∅ and found-bisim = false (quit the while loop)
found-bisim = false
return false
SG′ = ∅ and found-bisim = false (quit the while loop)
found-bisim = false
return false
Thus the algorithm bisim2(F1(a, b),G1(a)) returns false.
Let us now consider is the trace execution of the Algorithm 4 over the goals
F1(a, b) and H1(b, a).
bisim2(F1(a, b),H1(b, a))
bothempty(F1(a, b),H1(b, a)) is false
bothfail(F1(a, b),H1(b, a)) is false
occur((F1(a, b)),(H1(b, a))) is false
SF ←− {p(b, a)}
SG←− {p(a, b)}
SF 6= ∅ and SG 6= ∅
SF ′ ←− {p(b, a)}
SF ′ 6= ∅
F ′ ←− p(b, a) , SF ′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− false
5.3. DECIDABILITY FOR RESTRICTED PROGRAMS 115
SG′ ←− {p(a, b)}
SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false
G′ ←− p(a, b) , SG′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− bisim2((p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)),(p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)))
bothempty(p(b, a),p(a, b)) is false
bothfail(p(b, a),p(a, b)) is false
occur((p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)),(p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b))) is false
SF ←− {p(a, b)}
SG←− {p(b, a)}
SF 6= ∅ and SG 6= ∅
SF ′ ←− {p(a, b)}
SF ′ 6= ∅
F ′ ←− p(a, b) , SF ′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− false
SG′ ←− {p(b, a)}
SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false
G′ ←− p(b, a) , SG′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− bisim2((p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)),
(p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)))
bothempty(p(a, b),p(b, a)) is false
bothfail(p(a, b),p(b, a)) is false
occur((p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)),
(p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a))) is true
return true
SG′ = ∅ and found-bisim = true (quit the inner while loop)
found-bisim = true
SF ′ = ∅ (continue with the second part of the algorithm)
SG′ ←− {p(b, a)}
SG′ 6= ∅
G′ ←− p(b, a) , SG′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− false
SF ′ ←− {p(a, b)}
SF ′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false
F ′ ←− p(a, b) , SF ′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− bisim2((p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)),
(p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)))
bothempty(p(b, a),p(a, b)) is false
bothfail(p(b, a),p(a, b)) is false
occur((p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)),
(p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b))) is true
return true




SG′ = ∅ and found-bisim = true (quit the while loop)
found-bisim = true
SF ′ = ∅ (continue with the second part of the algorithm)
SG′ ←− {p(a, b)}
SG′ 6= ∅
G′ ←− p(a, b) , SG′ ←− ∅
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found-bisim←− false
SF ′ ←− {p(b, a)}
SF ′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false
F ′ ←− p(b, a) , SF ′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− bisim2((p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)),(p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)))
bothempty(p(a, b),p(b, a)) is false
bothfail(p(a, b),p(b, a)) is false
occur((p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)),(p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a))) is false
SF ←− {p(b, a)}
SG←− {p(a, b)}
SF 6= ∅ and SG 6= ∅
SF ′ ←− {p(b, a)}
SF ′ 6= ∅
F ′ ←− p(b, a) , SF ′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− false
SG′ ←− {p(a, b)}
SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false
G′ ←− p(a, b) , SG′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− bisim2((p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)),
(p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)))
bothempty(p(b, a),p(a, b)) is false
bothfail(p(b, a),p(a, b)) is false
occur((p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)),
(p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b))) is true
return true
SG′ = ∅ and found-bisim = true (quit the while loop)
found-bisim = true
SF ′ = ∅ (continue with the second part of the algorithm)
SG′ ←− {p(a, b)}
SG′ 6= ∅
G′ ←− p(a, b) , SG′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− false
SF ′ ←− {p(b, a)}
SF ′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false
F ′ ←− p(b, a) , SF ′ ←− ∅
found-bisim←− bisim2((p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)),
(p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)))
bothempty(p(a, b),p(b, a)) is false
bothfail(p(a, b),p(b, a)) is false
occur((p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)),
(p(b, a)⇒ p(a, b)⇒ p(b, a))) is true
return true




SF ′ = ∅ and found-bisim = true (quit the inner while loop)
found-bisim = true (continue with the outer while loop)
SG′ = ∅
return true
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Thus the algorithm bisim2(F1(a, b),H1(b, a)) returns true.
In order to demonstrate the decidability of (pires), we need to prove the following
lemmas for all Datalog goals F1, G1.
Lemma 5.3.1 (Termination). bisim2((F1),(G1)) terminates.
Lemma 5.3.2 (Completeness). If P∪{F1} ZPmax P∪{G1}, then bisim2((F1),(G1))
returns true.
Lemma 5.3.3 (Soundness). If bisim2((F1),(G1)) returns true, then P ∪
{F1} ZPmax P ∪ {G1}.
Let ≺ be the binary relation on the set of all pairs of SLD-derivations defined
by: ((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi), (G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi)) ≺ ((F ′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ F ′j), (G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ G′j))
iff i > j, (F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fj) = (F ′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ F ′j), (G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gj) = (G′1 ⇒
· · · ⇒ G′j), there exists no substitutions σ, τ such that F ′l = F ′k[σ], G′l = G′k[τ ]
for some 1 ≤ k < l ≤ i. Obviously, ≺ is a partial order on the set of all pairs
of SLD-derivations. Let us demonstrate that ≺ is well-founded. Suppose ≺ is
not well-founded. Hence, there exists infinite SLD-derivations (F1 ⇒ F2 ⇒ · · · ),
(G1 ⇒ G2 ⇒ · · · ) such that for all substitutions σ, τ , Fl 6= Fk[σ] or Gl 6= Gk[τ ]
for all 1 ≤ k < l. This contradicts the following claim.
Claim 1. Let (F1 ⇒ F2 ⇒ · · · ), (G1 ⇒ G2 ⇒ · · · ) be infinite SLD-derivations.
There exists M ≥ 1 and there exists substitutions σ, τ such that FM = Fk[σ],
GM = Gk[τ ] for some 1 ≤ k < M .
Proof. According to [9, Corollary 4.14], there exists N ≥ 1 such that for all j ≥ 1,
|Fj | ≤ N and |Gj | ≤ N . Let ∼= be the binary relation on the set of all pairs of
goals of size bounded by N defined by: (F,G) ∼= (F ′, G′) iff
• there exists substitutions σ, τ such that F [σ] = F ′, G[τ ] = G′,
• there exists substitutions σ′, τ ′ such that F ′[σ′] = F , G′[τ ′] = G.
Obviously, ∼= is an equivalence relation on the set of all pairs of goals of size
bounded by N . Seeing that our Datalog language has no function symbols and
possesses finitely many predicate symbols and constants, ∼= determines a finite
number of equivalence relations. Thus, one of these equivalence classes is repeated
infinitely often in the sequence (F1, G1), (F2, G2), · · · . Therefore, there exists
M ≥ 1 and there exists substitutions σ, τ such that FM = Fk[σ], GM = Gk[τ ] for
some 1 ≤ k < M .
Proof of Lemma 5.3.1. In order to show the termination of bisim2, it suffices
to repeat the proof of the termination of bisim1, with ≺ instead of .
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Proof of Lemma 5.3.2. Let us consider the following property: (Prop2((F
′
1 ⇒
· · · ⇒ F ′j), (G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ G′j))) if P ∪ {F ′j} ZPmax P ∪ {G′j} then bisim2((F ′1 ⇒
· · · ⇒ F ′j),(G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ G′j)) returns true. Again, we proceed by induction,
this time with ≺ instead of . Suppose ((F ′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ F ′j), (G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ G′j)) is
such that for all ((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi), (G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi)), if ((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi), (G1 ⇒
· · · ⇒ Gi)) ≺ ((F ′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ F ′j), (G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ G′j)) then Prop2((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒
Fi), (G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi)). Let us show that Prop2((F ′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ F ′j), (G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒
G′j)). Suppose P ∪{F ′j} ZPmax P ∪{G′j}. Hence, for all successors F ′ of F ′j , there
exists a successor G′ of G′j such that P ∪ {F ′} ZPmaxP ∪ {G′}, and conversely.
Seeing that ((F ′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ F ′j ⇒ F ′), (G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ G′j ⇒ G′)) ≺ ((F ′1 ⇒
· · · ⇒ F ′j), (G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ G′j)), then by induction hypothesis, Prop2((F ′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒
F ′j ⇒ F ′), (G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ G′j ⇒ G′)). Since P ∪ {F ′} ZPmax P ∪ {G′}, then
bisim2((F ′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ F ′j ⇒ F ′),(G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ G′j ⇒ G′)) returns true. As a
result, one sees that bisim2((F ′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ F ′j),(G′1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ G′j)) returns true.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.3. It suffices to demonstrate that the binary relation Z de-
fined as follows between Datalog goals is a bisimulation: FZG iff there ex-
ists SLD-derivations (F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi), (G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi) such that Fi = F ,
Gi = G and bisim2((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi),(G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi)) returns true. Let
F , G be Datalog goals such that FZG. Hence there exists SLD-derivations
(F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi), (G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi) such that Fi = F , Gi = G and bisim2((F1 ⇒
· · · ⇒ Fi),(G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi)) returns true. Thus, it is easy to verify that the
first condition characterizing bisimulations holds for Z as Fi =  iff Gi = . Let
F ′ be a resolvent of Fi and a clause in P . Since bisim2((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi),(G1 ⇒
· · · ⇒ Gi)) returns true, then there exists a resolvent G′ of Gi and a clause in
P such that bisim2((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi ⇒ F ′),(G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi ⇒ G′)) returns
true, i.e. F ′ZG′. Consequently, the second condition characterizing bisimula-
tions holds for Z. For the third condition characterizing bisimulations, a proof
similar to the one presented for the second condition applies here. Thus Z is a
bisimulation.
As a consequence of lemmas 5.3.1 – 5.3.3, we have:
Theorem 5.3.1. Algorithm 4 is a sound and complete decision procedure for
(pires).
It follows that (pires) is decidable. Moreover,
Theorem 5.3.2. (pires) is in 2EXPTIME.
Proof. Let P be a restricted Datalog program and G be a goal. Let n be the
maximal number of atoms in the clauses of P or inG, p be the number of predicate
symbols in P , a be the maximal arity of the predicate symbols in P , and c be
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the number of constants in P . Thus, the number of variables in P is about n×a,
the number of ground atoms is bounded by p× ca and the total number of atoms
is bounded by p × (c + n × a)a. Moreover, as the number of goals of size n is
bounded by pn× (c+n×a)a×n, the number of pairs of goals of size n is bounded
by p2×n × (c + n × a)2×a×n. Then, according to the claim of page 117. The
maximal length of SLD-derivations that are considered in Algorithm 4 will be
smaller than M = p2×n× (c+ n× a)2×a×n. Now, replacing D by M in the proof
of Theorem 2, one can demonstrate that the time complexity of our algorithm is
about 2M × s2×M ≤ 2p2×n×(c+n×a)2×a×n × s2×p2×n×(c+n×a)2×a×n .
In practice, we can limit the tests performed by occur in such a way that
occur((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi),(G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi)) returns true iff there exists substi-
tutions σ, τ such that Fi = Fk[σ], Gi = Gk[τ ] for some 1 ≤ k < i.
120 CHAPTER 5. GOALS BISIMULATION
5.4 Notes on Bisimilarity for nvi and svo Goals
We tried to prove if we can decide whether two given goals are bisimilar for
nvi programs and svo programs. Unfortunately, applying the techniques of loop
detection developed in [9] does not seem to allow us to determine if two given
goals are bisimilar with respect to an nvi or an svo logic program.
Example 5.3 Example showing that loop detection in SLD-trees for nvi
and svo logic programs do not preserve bisimilarity
Let P be the following nvi program:
C1 : p(x)← p(x), t(x);
C2 : p(x)←;
C3 : q(x)← r(x), q(x);
C4 : q(x)←;
C5 : r(x)←;
C6 : r(x)← s(x);
C7 : s(x)←
and let F,G be respectively the following goals P ∪ {← p(x)} and P ∪ {← q(x)}.
← p(x)
← p(x), t(x)











Obviously, F and G are not bisimilar with respect to P . To see this, it suffices
to verify that, since the goal P ∪{← p(x), t(x)} has an empty successor whereas all
successors of the goal P ∪ {← r(x), q(x)} are non empty, then P ∪ {← p(x), t(x)}
and P ∪ {← r(x), q(x)} are not bisimilar with respect to P .
Nevertheless, if one applies the techniques of loop detection developed in [9],
then one obtains the following bisimilar reduced SLD-trees:
← p(x)
← p(x), t(x) 
← q(x)
← r(x), q(x) 
Note that the previous logic program is not a svo program, since the variable
x is encountered more than once in the body of the clauses C1 and C3. Rewriting
it in the following way leads to a similar result:
C1 : p(a)← p(a), t(x);
C2 : p(x)←;
C3 : q(a)← r(a), q(x);
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C4 : q(x)←;
C5 : r(x)←;
C6 : r(x)← s(x);
C7 : s(x)←
Let F,G be respectively the following goals P ∪ {← p(a)} and P ∪ {← q(a)}.
← p(a)
← p(a), t(x)











Again, F and G are not bisimilar with respect to P . The reduced SLD-trees
obtained by applying the techniques of loop detection developed in [9] are as
follows:
← p(a)
← p(a), t(x) 
← q(a)
← r(a), q(x) 
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have reused the concept of bisimulation, previously pre-
sented in section 4.3.1, between datalog goals: two Datalog goals are bisimilar
with respect to a given program when their SLD-trees are bisimilar. As proved
in Section 5.1, deciding whether two given goals are bisimilar with respect to a
given general logic program is undecidable. Hence, a natural question is to re-
strict the language of logic programming as done in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3.
Thus, when the given logic program is hierarchical or restricted, the problem of
deciding whether two given goals are bisimilar becomes decidable in 2EXPTIME.
The proof of decidability of bisimulation problem for restricted logic program that
we presented in Section 5.3 is based on techniques that were developed in [9] for
detecting loops in logic programming.
Chapter 6
Application
In this chapter, we will aim to provide an application of the previously pre-
sented information flow theory in logic programming in the field of inference
control.
For this, we will begin, in section , by introducing the notion of indistin-
guishability of the flow in logic programming. We will extend this notion and
propose the notion of level of goals in logic programming.
Section 6.2 will be devoted to recall what we mean about inference control,
and talk about preventing inference control for information systems.
In section 6.3, we will formally define, protection mechanisms, secure
mechanisms, mechanisms and confidentiality policies. We will end the
chapter by giving an example of a secure protection mechanism for deductive
databases and this using the previously exposed notions. We will give a formal
proof too of the security of this protection mechanism.
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6.1 Level of indistinguishability of information flow in logic
programming
We will proceed in this section to refine the notion of information flow for
Datalog logic programs. For this, we propose the notion of level of indistinguisha-
bility of the flow.
For a Datalog logic program P and a goal G(x, y) with the variable x consid-
ered as an input variable and y as an output variable, let ≡ be a binary relation
over UL(P ) of cardinality n. Let a, b be two distinct elements of UL(P ).
• For the first definition of information flow (based on success and failure),
we say that a ≡ b iff both P ∪ {← p(a, y)} and P ∪ {← p(b, y)} succeed or
both P ∪{← p(a, y)} and P ∪{← p(b, y)} do not succeed (in the sense that
both goals can fail or not terminate because of the presence of loops).
• For the second definition of information flow (based on substitution an-
swers), we say that a ≡ b iff θ(P ∪ {← p(a, y)}) = θ(P ∪ {← p(b, y)}).
• As for the third definition of information flow (based on bisimulation be-
tween goals), we say that a ≡ b iff Tree(P ∪{← p(a, y)}) ZPmax Tree(P ∪{←
p(b, y)})).
Lemma 6.1.1. The binary relation ≡ is reflexive.
Lemma 6.1.2. The binary relation ≡ is symmetric.
Lemma 6.1.3. The binary relation ≡ is transitive.
Lemma 6.1.4. ≡ is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Proof. By lemmas 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3.
It is worth noting here, that the definitions presented in chapter 4 rely on the
fact that for a logic program P and a goal G(x, y), an information flow passes
from x to y if one can find just two distinguishable equivalence classes. In the
next subsection, we will use this notion of equivalence classes and its cardinality
to define the level of an information flow as one of its characteristics.
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6.1.1 Level of information flows in logic programs
In this section, we will present the definitions of the level of information flow
based on the notion of equivalence classes.
Definition 6.1.1 (Level of a logic goal). For a Datalog logic program P and a
goal G(x, y), the level of the goal G(x, y) is equal to the cardinality of the smallest
equivalence class.
Example 6.1 Example of a level of a goal in logic programming
Let P be the following program:
C1 : p(a, b)←;
C2 : p(a, c)←;
C3 : p(b, c)←;
C4 : p(c, b)←;
The Herbrand Universe UL(P ) is equal to {a, b, c}.
For the definition of the flow based on success and failure, it is easy to see that:
P ∪ {← p(a, y)} succeeds,
P ∪ {← p(b, y)} succeeds, and
P ∪ {← p(c, y)} succeeds.
Thus, a ≡ b ≡ c. Consequently, the cardinality of the equivalence class corre-
sponding to success is equal to 3, while the one corresponding to failure is equal
to 0. Thus, the level based on success and failure which corresponds to cardinality
of the smallest equivalence class is equal to 0.
For the definition of the flow based on substitution answers,we have:
Θ[P ∪ {← p(a, y)}] = {y 7→ b, y 7→ c} ,
Θ[P ∪ {← p(b, y)}] = {y 7→ c}, and
Θ[P ∪ {← p(c, y)}] = {y 7→ b}.
Thus, a ≡ c, and a ≡ b. Consequently, the cardinality of each equivalence class is
equal to 2. Consequently, the level based on substitution answers is equal to 2.
For the definition of the flow based on bisimulation,we have:
Tree(P ∪ {← p(a, y)}) ZPmax Tree(P ∪ {← p(b, y)}) ZPmax Tree(P ∪ {← p(b, y)}).
Thus, a ≡ b ≡ c. Consequently, the cardinality of the equivalence class is equal to
3. Consequently, the level based on bisimulation is equal to 3.
One can see that for an Herbrand universe UL(P ) of cardinality n, if the level
of indistinguishability is n then we have 1 equivalence class which is the class of
cardinality n {a1, · · · , an}.
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Theoretically, this level can be calculated for each of the three definitions of
information flow previously presented. For example, for the first definition of flow
based on success and failure, one can write the following algorithm:
Require: A Datalog logic program P , a goal G(x, y), finite Herbrand
Universe UL(P ) = {a1, · · · , an}
Ensure: Level of G(x, y)
begin
Levelsucc ← 0; counter on the number of successful goals
Levelno−succ ← 0; counter on the number of non-successful goals
i← 1; counter on the set of the Herbrand universe
while i ≤ n do
if P ∪ {← p(ai, y)} succeeds then
Levelsucc ← Levelsucc + 1;
else
Levelno−succ ← Levelno−succ + 1;
i← i+ 1;
return min(Levelsucc, Levelno−succ);
Let us prove this algorithm is correct. In fact, the previous algorithm ter-
minates since starting from i = 1 and after n iterations, the while loop will ter-
minate. Since the Herbrand Universe contains at least one element, the while loop
will be executed at least one. After one iteration, themin(Levelsucc, Levelno−succ)
will be equal to 0, despite the fact that the goal P ∪ {G(a1, y)} succeeds or fails.
Now suppose that the level is equal to min(Levelsucc, Levelno−succ) at the itera-
tion i− 1 ≤ n. Let us prove now that the level calculated at iteration i will still
equal to min(Levelsucc, Levelno−succ). In the while loop, the values of Levelsucc,
Levelno−succ and consequently of min are modified as follows:
If (P ∪ {← p(ai, y)} succeeds) then Levelsucc will be incremented and
min(Levelsucc, Levelno−succ) keeps its old value;
If (P ∪ {← p(ai, y)} does not succeeds) then Levelno−succ will be incremented
and min(Levelsucc, Levelno−succ) keeps also its old value;
Then in both situations, the level will satisfy min(Levelsucc, Levelno−succ). This
proves the correctness of the algorithm.
Example 6.2 Running the algorithm of calculating the level based on
success and failure
Let P be the same program as in example 6.1. We saw that the level is equal
to 0. We will now run the algorithm on the same example and prove the same
result. Recall that the Herbrand Universe is equal to {a, b, c}.
Levelsucc ← 0;
Levelno−succ ← 0;
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i← 1; (initializing the counter)
1 ≤ 3 (checking the while loop condition)
P ∪ {← p(a, y)} succeeds
Levelsucc ← 1; (incrementing the number of successful goals)
i← 2; (incrementing the counter)
2 ≤ 3 (checking the while loop condition)
P ∪ {← p(b, y)} succeeds
Levelsucc ← 2; (incrementing the number of successful goals)
i← 3; (incrementing the counter)
3 ≤ 3 (checking the while loop condition)
P ∪ {← p(c, y)} succeeds
Levelsucc ← 3; (incrementing the number of successful goals)
i← 4; (incrementing the counter)
4 6≤ 3 (quit the while loop)
return min(0, 3);
Thus the level calculated based on success and failure is equal to 0.
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As for the second definition of information flow based on substitution answers,
one can write the following algorithm:
Require: A Datalog logic program P , a goal G(x, y), finite Herbrand
Universe UL(P ) = {a1, · · · , an}, m the total number of possible
substitution answers of the y variable for all the goals
P ∪ {← G(a1, y)}, · · · , P ∪ {← G(an, y)}.
Ensure: Level of G(x, y)
begin
table T [m]; table of counters, all initialized to 0, corresponding to the
m different substitution answers. The indexes of the table T are the m
different substitution answers and the corresponding value represent
the total number of occurrence of that substitution answer
i← 1; counter on the set of the Herbrand Universe
sub← θ[P ∪ {p(a1, y)}];we initialize the sub by the first substitution
answer of y
while i ≤ n do
tmps← Θ[P ∪ {← p(ai, y)}]; as P ∪ {← p(ai, y)} can have multiple
substitution answers, tmps is the table containing these
substitution answers
j ← 1; counter on the set of the substitution answers for the goal
P ∪ {← p(ai, y)}
while j <= count(tmps) do
T [tmps[j]]← T [tmps[j]] + 1;
if T [tmps[j]] < T [sub] then
sub← tmps[j];
j ← j + 1;
i← i+ 1;
return T [sub];
To prove the correctness of this algorithm, remark first that the Herbrand
Universe contains at least one element and thus starting from i = 1 and after
n iterations, the outer while loop will terminate. Seeing that each goal in a
Datalog logic program has a finite number of substitution answers, the inner
while loop will also terminate. After one iteration of the outer and the inner
while loop, T [sub] will be equal to 1 (easy to verify), despite the fact if the goal
P ∪ {G(a1, y)} has one or multiple substitution answers.
Now suppose that the level is equal to T [sub] at the iteration i − 1 ≤ n. Let us
prove now that the level calculated at iteration i will still equal to T [sub].
In the while loops, the value of sub is modified as follows:
If (T [tmps[j]] < T [sub]) then the value of sub is replaced by tmps[j];
If (T [tmps[j]] ≥ T [sub]) then sub keeps its old value;
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Then in both situations, T [sub] ≤ T [tmps[j]]. This proves the correctness of the
algorithm.
Example 6.3 Running the algorithm of calculating the level based on
substitution answers
Let P be the same program as in example 6.1. We saw that the level is equal
to 2. We will now run the algorithm on the same example and prove the same
result. Recall that the Herbrand Universe is equal to {a, b, c}, and that the total
number of possible and different substitution answers for all the possible goals
P ∪ {← p(a, y)}, P ∪ {← p(b, y)} and P ∪ {← p(c, y)} is equal to 2, namely, y 7→ b
and y 7→ c. The execution trace is as follows:
T [y 7→ b] = 0, T [y 7→ c] = 0;
i← 1; (initializing the counter)
sub← y 7→ b; (corresponding to θ[P ∪ {← p(a, y)])
1 ≤ 3 (checking the outer while loop condition)
tmps[1]← y 7→ b, tmps[2]← y 7→ c, (corresponding to Θ[P ∪ {← p(a, y)])
j ← 1; (initializing the counter on the set of substitution answers)
1 ≤ 2 (checking the inner while loop condition)
T [y 7→ b]← 1;
T [y 7→ b] 6< T [y 7→ b]; (skip the if body)
j ← 2; (increment the counter)
2 ≤ 2 (checking the inner while loop condition)
T [y 7→ c]← 1;
T [y 7→ c] 6< T [y 7→ b]; (skip the if body)
j ← 3; (increment the counter)
3 6≤ 2 (quit the inner while loop)
i← 2; (increment the counter)
2 ≤ 3 (checking the outer while loop condition)
tmps[1]← y 7→ c (corresponding to Θ[P ∪ {← p(b, y)])
j ← 1; (initializing the counter on the set of substitution answers)
1 ≤ 1 (checking the inner while loop condition)
T [y 7→ c]← 2;
T [y 7→ c] 6< T [y 7→ b]; (skip the if body)
j ← 2; (increment the counter)
2 6≤ 1 (quit the inner while loop)
i← 3; (increment the counter)
3 ≤ 3 (checking the outer while loop condition)
tmps[1]← y 7→ b (corresponding to Θ[P ∪ {← p(c, y)])
j ← 1; (initializing the counter on the set of substitution answers)
1 ≤ 1 (checking the inner while loop condition)
T [y 7→ b]← 2;
T [y 7→ b] 6< T [y 7→ b]; (skip the if body)
j ← 2; (increment the counter)
2 6≤ 1 (quit the inner while loop)
i← 4; (increment the counter)
4 6≤ 3 (quit the outer while loop)
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return T [y 7→ b] = 2;
Thus the level calculated based on substitution answers is equal to 2.
As for calculating the level based on the definition of bisimulation, one can
use a similar algorithm to the one presented above jointly with the sound and
complete algorithm presented in chapter 5 that decides if two goals are bisimilar
for hierarchical and restricted Datalog logic programs.
6.1.2 Specification of information flows in Datalog logic programs
In order to present the notion of specification, we will motivate it first by
giving an example.
Consider a system composed by a deductive database (represented as facts in
logic programming) and a user who can run queries (in the form of logic goals).
Example 6.4 Example showing the specification of an information flow
in a Datalog logic program - part I
Let P be the following program representing:











The goal is to prevent the user to know exactly for example the existence of
the exact departments on each floor or the exact location of some specific patient.
Definition 6.1.2. For a Datalog logic program P and a two goals F (x, y) and
G(x, y), we say that:
• the goal F (x, y) is critical iff the level of F (x, y) is equal to 1.
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• the goal F (x, y) is weaker than G(x, y) iff the level of F (x, y) is greater than
the level of G(x, y).
• the goal F (x, y) is stronger than G(x, y) iff the level of F (x, y) is smaller
than the level of G(x, y).
Example 6.5 Example showing the specification of an information flow
in a Datalog logic program - part II
It is easy to verify that for the definition of flow of information based on substi-
tution answers, there is three equivalence classes for the goal P∪{← hospital(x, y)}
of cardinalities 1 and 2. Thus the level of P ∪ {← hospital(x, y)} is equal to
1. Whereas, for the goal P ∪ {← location(x, y)}, one can count three equiva-
lence classes too, two of cardinality 2 and one of cardinality 1. So, the level of
P ∪ {← location(x, y)} is equal to 1. Consequently, both goals are critical.
Lemma 6.1.5. For a Datalog logic program P and a goal F (x, y), if F (x, y) is
critical, then the output variable y reveals information about the variable x.
Proof. By definition, if a goal F (x, y) is critical then the level of F (x, y) is equal
to 1. Moreover, when a level of a goal is equal to 1, it means that the cardinality
of the corresponding equivalence class of the goal F (x, y) is equal to 1. Thus, the
variable x will be uniquely identified.
Example 6.6 Example showing the specification of an information flow
in a Datalog logic program - part III
As both goals P ∪ {← hospital(x, y)} and P ∪ {← location(x, y)} are critical,
the output variable y can conveys information as we can see next. Suppose that
a user runs the goal P ∪ {← hospital(floor1, y)}, than the corresponding output
variable y will be unified uniquely with cancerology. Thus the disclosure of this
information will render the identification of the probable disease of the patient
residing on the first floor very easy.
Whereas, if the user runs the goals P ∪ {← location(Ana, y)} and P ∪ {←
location(Bob, y)}, the corresponding output variable y will be unified uniquely
with floor1, and the user will still know that both Ana and Bob are sharing
the same floor but without knowing anything about their diseases. Moreover, let
us suppose that the user runs the goals P ∪ {← location(Carl, y)} or P ∪ {←
location(David, y)}, the y variable will be unified with cardiology and urology.
So Carl and David can be both in the same cardiology or urology department or
each one of them in a different department. A natural question arises here, what
should the system do when it detects that some queries are critical.
As for the other forms of specifications, one can verify that the level of the goal
P ∪{← location(Carl, y)} is greater than the one of P ∪{← location(Elianor, y)}
and thus the last goal is stronger than the former one.
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6.2 Preventive Inference Control for Information Systems
As stated earlier in section 2.3.3, inference control deals with both enabling
and preventing information gain, based on actual inferences from observations.
In this section, we focus on security mechanisms for preventing a participant
from gaining information about hidden parts of an information system from
just observing selected visible parts. Note that, previously, in section 2.3.2, we
examined constructs (assignments, procedure call, sequential and parallel control
structures) of computing systems regarding their potential for information gain.
Preventive inference control for information systems must ensure a trade-off
between availability and confidentiality: for any particular user, on the one hand,
the system should return useful answers to queries issued by the user according
to that user’s legitimate purposes and needs, and on the other hand, the system
should hide any further information that it keeps available for other users.
As stated in section 2.3.3, preventing inference control can be achieved either
by dynamic monitoring or static verification. In figure 6.1, we outline a
generic framework for dynamic monitoring of query sequences, based on a logic-
oriented, model-theoretic approach to complete information systems.
Figure 6.1: Inference control by dynamic monitoring of query sequences, based
on a logic-oriented model of information systems.
• The information system maintains data in form of instances. An in-
stance is an interpretation (noted δ) which assigns a truth value to every
query/goal q of some logic (for this, we assume the existence of a Boolean
operator model− of defined in such a way that δ model− of q denotes the
pertinent truth value).
• A query/goal q is a sentence in the pertinent logic.
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• Given an instance δ and a query q, the ordinary query evaluation of the
information system returns the pertinent truth value false or true, i.e.,
eval(δ, q) := δ model − of q, or confirms the queried sentence or returns
its negation, i.e.,
eval∗(δ, q) := if δ model − of q then q else ¬q.
• An observer might be a single user or a group of users expected to collab-
orate. An observer can issue any query sequence Q =< q1, q2, · · · , qi, · · · >.
Given an instance δ, the systems query evaluation returns the corresponding
sequence < eval∗(δ, q1), eval∗(δ, q2), · · · , eval∗(δ, qi), · · · >.
• A security policy is specified as a set of potential secrets: pot− sec =
{ps1, · · · , psk}. To declare a sentence as a potential secret requires that the
observer should not be able to infer that the sentence is true in the stored
instance δ, even if this is actually the case.
• We assume also that the observer have some a priori knowledge, and when
issuing a query sequence, he retains all previously returned answers. Ac-
cordingly, the system maintains a log file that reflects the system’s view
of the observer’s knowledge: log is initialized with the a priori knowledge
prior and suitably updated after each of the observer’s queries is processed.
• The decision to permit an observation is taken in two steps:
1. A censor inspects whether the ordinary answer would be harmful with
respect to the security policy.
2. The ordinary answer is distorted (by refusing to answer or by lying or
by using a combination of these two methods) if it is requested by the
censor. It is shown that the refusal method, the lying method and the
combined method always preserve confidentiality under the respective
precondition.
The following example summarizes all these concepts and shows that different















































Example 6.7 Example for an inference control prevention for a propositional information system
Universe of discourse: propositional atoms {p, q, s1, s2, s3}
information system instance: interpretation δ := {p,¬q, s1, s2,¬s3}
security policy: potential secrets pot-sec := {s1, s2, s3}
true potential secrets {s1, s2}
a priori knowledge: prior := {p⇒ s1 ∨ s2, p ∧ q ⇒ s3}
query ordinary answer refusal method lying method combined method
p p p ¬p p
correct answer lie protects disjunction correct answer
of potential secrets
q ¬q - ¬q ¬q
refusal protects correct answer correct answer
false potential secret s3, since false answer does
due to false answer not have to be considered
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6.3 Secure and Precise Security Mechanisms
We have presented in chapter 2 definitions of security in terms of states of
systems. A question arises here: is it possible to devise a generic procedure
for developing a mechanism that is both secure and precise using the notion of
information flow for logic programs?
For this, we will consider here logic programs as a set of clauses, having all the
same predicate definition. The atoms in this logic programs have several input
positions but one single output position. Recall that data is brought in to a clause
through the input positions, and sent out through the output positions, review
Definitions 3.3.1, 3.3.3 for a formal explanation of argument positions, input and
output positions.
Example 6.8 Example of a transformation of logic program having
multiple predicate definitions into an equivalent logic program with
just one predicate definition
Let P be the following Datalog logic program:
C1 : q(a, b)←;
C2 : r(b, a)←;
C3 : p(x, y)← q(x, z), r(z, y);
Let α, β, γ, δ, ζ and κ be following argument positions of all the variables in
the clause C3: α =< C3, 0, p, 1 >, β =< C3, 0, p, 2 >, γ =< C3, 1, q, 1 >, δ =<
C3, 1, q, 2 >, ζ =< C3, 2, r, 1 > and κ =< C3, 2, r, 2 >. Let α, γ and ζ be in I(C3),
β, δ and κ in O(C3). Recall that I(C3) denotes the input positions of the clause
C3 and O(C3) denotes the output positions of the clause C3.
Seeing that the program P have three different predicate definitions, namely,
q, r and p, we can rewrite the program in such a way to have only one predicate
definition:
Let P ′ be P ’s equivalent program:
C′1 : t(q, a, b)←;
C′2 : t(r, b, a)←;
C′3 : t(p, x, y)← t(q, x, z), t(r, z, y)
P ′ has now one predicate definition, namely t. t has 3 arguments. The first two
are input arguments and the last one is an output argument. It is easy to see
that P and P ′ are equivalent according to the least fixpoint semantics. Thus, one
can rewrite any logic program like P into an equivalent logic program having one
predicate definition. In the next, we will only consider logic program composed
simply of facts, and we will denote a program P by its predicate definition.
We will represent logic programs as abstract functions:
Definition 6.3.1. (Logic programs as abstract functions) For a logic program
P denoted by its predicate definition t(I1, · · · , In, O), where I1, · · · , In are input
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positions and O one output position, let p be the function p : I1 × · · · × In ×
O → R. Then p is the function with n inputs positions ik ∈ Ik, 1 ≤ k ≤
n, and one output position o ∈ O, and one result r ∈ R. O is the set
of substitution answers associated to the output position o. Depending on each
definition of information flow, R can be equal to {success, failure}, or to the set
of substitution answers corresponding to the output position o, or to the SLD-tree
of the goal P ∪ {← t(i1, · · · , in, o)}.
With respect to the Lemma 6.1.5, we assume that the result r ∈ R of the
function p(i1, · · · , in, o) conveys information about the input variables i1, · · · , in.
Dealing with confidentiality, a natural question arises here, whether if the re-
sult of p(i1, · · · , in, o) contains any information that could violate the policy. For
this, protection mechanisms are proposed. A protection mechanism produces
for every input, that do not violate the policy, the same value as for p, and for
inputs that would impart confidential information an error message. For this, let
E be the set of results from a program p that indicate errors.
Definition 6.3.2. (Protection mechanism) Let p be a function p : I1×· · ·× In×
O → R. A protection mechanism m is a function m : I1 × · · · × In → R ∪ E for
which, when ik ∈ Ik, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, o ∈ O, either
• m(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o) or
• m(i1, · · · , in) ∈ E
Example 6.9 Protection mechanism, confidentiality policy, secure mechanism-
Part I
We consider here a logic program P , with one input position and one output




The program P is represented by the function: age : I,O → R. Queries would
be of the form P ∪ {← age(ann,A)} for example.
A protection mechanism would be for example to answer correctly (in the
terms of the different information flow definitions) every query whenever its input
position variable corresponds to one of the Herbrand Universe constants. More
formally, let m be the following function:
m : I → R ∪ E for which:
• m(i) = age(i, o) when i ∈ UL(P ), (o ∈ O)
• m(i) = Error, otherwise.
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Now we define a confidentiality policy.
Definition 6.3.3. (Confidentiality policy) A confidentiality policy for the logic
program p : I1 × · · · × In ×O → R is a function c : I1 × · · · × In → J1 × · · · × Jn,
where J1 ⊆ I1, · · · , Jn ⊆ In.
Informally, the sets Ji, 1 ≤ i ≤ n corresponds to sets of inputs that may be
revealed. The function c acts as a filter by bearing leakage of confidential inputs
by seeing that the complements of Ji with respect to Ii represent the sets of
inputs that must be kept confidential.
Example 6.10 Protection mechanism, confidentiality policy, secure mechanism-
Part II
Let c be the confidentiality policy that bears leaking information about ann
for example; thus, for c : I → J , where I = {ann, billy, carl} and J = {billy, carl},
c(billy) = billy, c(carl) = carl and c(ann) is undefined.
Now we define what we hear about a secure mechanism.
Definition 6.3.4. (Secure mechanism) Let c : I1 × · · · × In → J1 × · · · × Jn be
a confidentiality policy for a program p. Let m : I1 × · · · × In → R ∪ E be a
security mechanism for the same program p. Then the mechanism m is secure
(i.e. confidential) if and only if there is a function m′ : J1 × · · · × Jn → R ∪ E
such that, for all ik ∈ Ik, 1 ≤ k ≤ n,m(i1, · · · , in) = m′(c(i1, · · · , in)).
Example 6.11 Protection mechanism, confidentiality policy, secure mechanism-
Part III
Let us check if this security mechanism is secure and this for the first two
definitions of information flow previously presented:
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Information flow Information flow
Success/ Substitution
failure answers
Query: P ∪ {← age(billy, A)} success θ = {A 7→ 27}
Protection mec: m(billy) success θ = {A 7→ 27}
Sec. mec: m(c(billy)) success θ = {A 7→ 27}
Query: P ∪ {← age(diana,A)} failure θ = {}
Protection mec: m(diana) error error
Sec. mec: m(c(diana)) error error
Query: P ∪ {← age(ann,A)} success θ = {56}
Protection mec: m(ann) success θ = {56}
Sec. mec: m(c(ann)) error error
In this example, we have showed for three queries the result of the protection
mechanism, and checked if it is secure. Even if for the first two queries, the results
show that this is case, the third query reported a discordance. Thus, the protection
mechanism presented in this example is not secure. We will present later in this
section a mechanism that is secure.
Despite the fact that a secure mechanism ensures that the policy is obeyed, it
may disallow actions that do not violate it and thus be overly restrictive. Next we
define the notion of precision which measures the degree of overrestrictiveness.
Definition 6.3.5. Let m1 and m2 be two distinct protection mechanisms for the
logic program p under the policy c. In the rest, o is an output position.
Then m1 is as precise as m2 (m1  m2) provided that, for all inputs (i1, · · · , in),
if m2(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o), then m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o).
We say that m1 is more precise than m2 (m1  m2) if (m1  m2) and there is
an input (i′1, · · · , i′n) such that m1(i′1, · · · , i′n) = p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o) and m2(i′1, · · · , i′n) 6=
p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o).
m1  m2 implies that m1 never gives a violation notice when m2 does not.
This implies that the utility of m1 is at least as high as of m2.
Lemma 6.3.1. 1. The relation  is reflexive and transitive on the protection
mechanisms for a given p and c.
2. The relation is a strict ordering on the protection mechanisms for a given
p and c.
Proof. 1.  is reflexive and transitive on the protection mechanisms for a given
p and c since,
•  is reflexive: let m1 be a protection mechanism for p and c, then
m1  m1 because for all the inputs (i1, · · · , in), if m1(i1, · · · , in) =
p(i1, · · · , in, o), then obviously m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o).
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•  is transitive: let m1, m2 and m3 be three protection mechanisms
for p and c such that m1  m2 and m2  m3. m2  m3 means
that for all inputs (i1, · · · , in), if m3(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o), then
m2(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o) andm1  m2 means that for all inputs
(i1, · · · , in), if m2(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o), then m1(i1, · · · , in) =
p(i1, · · · , in, o). Thus, for all inputs (i1, · · · , in), if m3(i1, · · · , in) =
p(i1, · · · , in, o), then m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o). This establishes
that m1  m3.
2.  is a strict ordering on the protection mechanisms for a given p and c
since,
•  is irreflexive: let m1 be a protection mechanism for p and c, then
m1 6 m1 since there is no an input (i′1, · · · , i′n) such thatm1(i′1, · · · , i′n) =
p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o) and m1(i′1, · · · , i′n) 6= p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o).
•  is asymmetric: let m1 and m2 be two protection mechanisms for p
and c such that m1  m2. m1  m2 implies that m1  m2 and there
is an input (i′1, · · · , i′n) such that m1(i′1, · · · , i′n) = p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o) and
m2(i
′
1, · · · , i′n) 6= p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o). Thus, m2 6 m1, since there will be
the input (i′1, · · · , i′n) for which m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o), but
m2(i1, · · · , in) 6= p(i1, · · · , in, o). Thus  is asymmetric.
•  is transitive: let m1, m2 and m3 be three protection mechanisms
for p and c such that m1  m2 and m2  m3. m2  m3 im-
plies that (m2  m3) and there is an input (i′1, · · · , i′n) such that
m2(i
′
1, · · · , i′n) = p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o) and m3(i′1, · · · , i′n) 6= p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o).
m1  m2 means that (m1  m2) and there is an input (i”1, · · · , i”n)
such that m2(i”1, · · · , i”n) = p(i”1, · · · , i”n, o) and m3(i”1, · · · , i”n) 6=
p(i”1, · · · , i”n, o). Thus, there is an input (i′1, · · · , i′n) such thatm1(i′1, · · · , i′n) =
p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o) and m3(i′1, · · · , i′n) 6= p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o). Seeing the fact
that the relation  is transitive, the relation  is thus transitive.
Example 6.12 Comparison of protection mechanisms
For the same previous example, let m1 : I → R∪E be the following protection
mechanism
• m1(i) = p(i, o) when i ∈ UL(P ),
• m1(i) = Error, otherwise.
and m2 : I → R∪E a protection mechanism that uses a counter cn on the number
of queries already asked. cn is initialized to 1, and incremented by 1 on every
query ran against the program.
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• m2(i) = p(i, o) when cn%2 = 0,
• m2(i) = Error, otherwise.
Suppose that the user asks the following set of queries : {P∪{← age(billy, A), P∪
{← age(ann,A), P ∪{← age(david,A)}. Next, we will be interested only with the
second definition of flow, i.e. based on substitution answers, as it could be easily
generalized to the other definitions.
The corresponding answers are as follows: θ = {A 7→ 27}, θ = {A 7→ 56} and
θ = {}.
For the first protection mechanism, the answers would be respectively, θ = {A 7→
27}, θ = {A 7→ 56} and error, while for the second protection mechanism, the
answers would be θ = {A 7→ 27}, error and θ = {} respectively.
In this example, m2 is not as precise as m1, because m1(ann) = p(ann, o) and
m2(ann) 6= p(ann, o). m1 is not as precise as m2, because m2(david) = p(david, o)
and m1(david) 6= p(david, o). Thus, one cannot establish that m1  m2 or m2 
m1. A question arises here, what about combining two protection mechanisms?
Combining two protection mechanisms form a new mechanism that is as pre-
cise as the two original ones.
Definition 6.3.6 (Union of protection mechanisms). Let m1 and m2 be protec-
tion mechanisms for the program p. Then their union m3 = m1 ∪m2 is defined
as
m3(i1, · · · , in)

= p(i1, · · · , in) when m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o) or
m2(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o)
= m1(i1, · · · , in) otherwise.
One can see that the previous definition is not symmetric, since m1 ∪m2 6=
m2 ∪m1.
Example 6.13 Union of protection mechanisms
For the same logic program in example 6.9, let m1 : I → R∪E be the following
protection mechanism
• m1(i) = p(i, o) when i ∈ UL(P )\{ann},
• m1(i) = Error, otherwise.
and m2 : I → R ∪ E the following one:
• m2(i) = p(i, o) when i ∈ UL(P ),
• m2(i) = Error, otherwise.
Then,
m3(ann) = m1(ann) ∪m2(ann) = m2(ann) = p(ann, o)
m3(billy) = m1(billy) ∪m2(billy) = m1(billy) = p(billy, o)
m3(carl) = m1(carl) ∪m2(carl) = m1(carl) = p(carl, o)
Note that here m2  m1.
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From this definition and the definitions of secure and precise, we have:
Theorem 6.3.1 (Union of secure protection mechanisms). Let m1 and m2 be
secure protection mechanisms for a program p and policy c. Then m1∪m2 is also
a secure protection mechanism for p and c. Furthermore, m1 ∪ m2  m1 and
m1 ∪m2  m2.
From secure protection mechanisms m1,m2 · · · , one can define the secure
protection mechanism m∗ = m1 ∪ m2 ∪ · · · such that m∗  m1,m∗  m2, · · · .
Thus, we have the following generalization of the previous Theorem:
Theorem 6.3.2. For any program p and security policy c, there exists a precise,
secure mechanism m∗ such that, for all secure mechanisms m associated with p
and c, m∗  m.
Proof. Let m = {m′|m′ is a secure protection mechanism for p and c}. Let m∗
be ∪n∈mn. Then by Theorem 6.3.1, m∗  n for any secure protection mechanism
m∗; hence, m∗ is maximal.
m∗ is the mechanism that ensures security while minimizing error messages.
Example 6.14 Secure protection mechanism
We consider here a logic program P , with one input position and one output




The program P is represented by the function: salary : I,O → R.
Let c be the confidentiality policy that bears leaking information about all
input variables, namely abby, bob and carla. Thus, for c : I → J , where I =
{abby, bob, carla} and J = {}, c(abby) is undefined, c(bob) is undefined and c(carla)
is undefined.
A trivial protection mechanism for example, would be in this case to not
answer any query. Formally, let m be the following function:
m : I → R ∪ E for which:
• m(i) = no answer, where i ∈ UL(P ).
Obviously, this protection mechanism is secure, but what about the existence
of mechanisms that are both secure and precise in the sense that the mechanism
ensures security while minimizing the number of denials of legitimate actions. For
this, we will use the notion of level of a flow, previously presented in section 6.1,
and the context exposed in section 6.2, to define our secure protection mechanism.
In this example, we allow the observer to see the query sequences issued by the
users and to have some a priori knowledge by retaining all previously returned
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answers. Note that in the query sequences visualized by the observer,
the input parameters are kept hidden.
Recall that for every query ← p(i, o} in a program p, we associate an equiv-
alence class, denoted o¯, and thus a cardinality. In the program p above, abby ≡
bob, since Θ(P ∪ {← p(abby, o}) = Θ(P ∪ {← p(bob, o}) = {o 7→ 2500}, and conse-
quently the card(2500) = 2. One can see that card(2400) = 1.
For our protection mechanism, we associate to each equivalent class of cardi-
nality higher or equal than 1, a random number α > 1.
As long as the queries are asked, the system counts the number of queries
asked in each equivalence class. If the level associated to the query is equal to
1, the protection mechanism will respond by no answer. Also, when the number
of queries corresponding to an equivalence class is equal to its associated random
number α, the protection mechanism will respond by no answer. Otherwise, the
protection mechanism will answer the query by giving its substitution answer sets.
Formally, let m be the following protection mechanism:
m : I → R ∪ E for which:
• m(i) = no answer, if for P ∪ {← p(i, o)}, card(o¯) = 1,
• m(i) = no answer, if for P ∪ {← p(i, o)}, nco¯ = αo¯,
• m(i) = p(i, o), otherwise.
Above, nco¯ is a counter corresponding to the number of queries already asked as-
sociated to the equivalence class of the goal P ∪ {← p(i, o)}.
Let the random numbers associated be as follows:
α2500 = 1, and
α2400 = 1.
As stated earlier, the observer can visualize query sequences with the input pa-
rameter hidden (in the next shown in red) and can have some a priori knowledge.
An a priori knowledge that should not contain any information about the random
numbers α, because an omniscient observer can easily violate the confidentiality
policy, as shown next:
Suppose that the observer sees the following query sequences: {P∪{← salary(abby, o)},
P ∪ {← salary(abby, o)}, P ∪ {← salary(bob, o)}, P ∪ {← salary(carla, o)}}.
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No answer {o 7→ 2500} {o 7→ 2500} No answer
Why Since α2500 = 1,
the protection mech-
anism will not answer
the first query of
this equivalence class
2500.
This is the second
query in the class
2500, the protection
mechanism will reply
by giving the substi-
tution answer.
The is the third
query in the class
2500, the protection
mechanism will re-
ply by giving the
substitution answer.
Since α2400 = 1, the protec-
tion mechanism will not an-




As it is the first
query, the observer
cannot deduce any-
thing about the input
parameter. In fact,
the input parameter
could be any element
of {abby, bob, carla}.
By giving the sub-
stitution answer of a
query belonging to
the equivalence class
2500, the observer is
now sure that the
first query concerns




As the observer knew that a
previously asked query con-
cerned the equivalence class
2500 and returned no an-
swer, the current returned
result no answer necessar-
ily concerns the equivalence
class 2400, and thus, the
observer is able to state
that the hidden input
parameter for this query
is carla .
Thus, the random numbers α associated to each equivalence class should not
be disclosed to the observer.
Let us now show that the protection mechanism is secure. For this, we need
to define what is meant by ’the observer can infer the exact value of the
hidden input parameter’. For this, we associate to the query sequences is-
sued by the user, a vector of the observed substitution answers. Formally, for the
query sequence Q = {P ∪ {← p(a1, o1}, P ∪ {← p(a2, o2}, · · · , P ∪ {← p(an, on}},
we associate the observed returned results in terms of substitution answers Θ =
(θ1, θ2, · · · , θn).
We say that the observer can guess the exact value of a hidden input pa-
rameter ai, if for the corresponding θi, and in all the query vectors {P ∪ {←
p(a1, o1}, P ∪ {← p(a2, o2}, · · · , P ∪ {← p(an, on}}, ai have the same value.
Let us show now that our mechanism is secure.
Suppose that the logic program is composed by at least two facts (the case where
the logic program is composed by 1 fact is trivial, as the hidden input parameter is
unique). Suppose that there exists a substitution answer θi for which ai have the
same value in all the query vectors {P∪{← p(a1, o1}, P∪{← p(a2, o2}, · · · , P∪{←
p(an, on}}, that is θ(p(ai, oi)) = θi.
Thus, for this θi, there is a unique associated input parameter ai. Furthermore,
there is a unique fact of the form p(ai, b)← with θ(p(ai, oi)) = {oi 7→ b}.
But, according to the protection mechanism; for each equivalence class of cardinal
1, the associated returned answer by the mechanism is no answer. So, in this case,
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θi =  ( is used to note the no answer returned value).
Thus, seeing that for θi = , there is one associated input parameter ai, this means
that the logic program is composed by one fact only, because according to
the mechanism, a no answer should be returned to one of the queries in each
equivalence class (or to all the queries for equivalence classes with cardinality
equal to 1). Note that for θi = , there should be a number of distinct ai equal to
the number of different equivalence classes in the program. This contradicts the
fact that the logic program is composed by at least two facts.
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6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we refined the notion of information flow for Datalog logic
programs, by proposing the notion of level of indistinguishability of the flow. We
proposed an equivalence relation between the elements of the Herbrand universe
relatively for a Datalog logic program P . We showed that the notion of indistin-
guishability proposed, coincides with the one presented earlier in chapter 4 since
practically it suffices to find two indistinguishable classes to state that an infor-
mation flow passes from x to y in the goal P ∪{G(x, y)}. Based on the notion of
equivalence classes, we proposed also the definition of the level of an information
flow. Algorithms were proposed to calculate this level, and this for the first two
definitions of information flow, namely, based on success/failure and substitution
answers. We then discussed the specifications of the flow and give an example to
emphasize the fact that the result returned by the query can convey confidential
information.
To control this, we focused on the notion of inference control and we proposed
definitions of protection mechanisms, secure mechanisms, precise mechanisms and
confidentiality policies. We ended by giving an example of a secure and precise
protection mechanism that prohibits any undesirable inferences meanwhile and
minimizes the number of denials of legitimate actions.
Chapter 7
Evaluation and Future Work
In the final chapter, we summarize the work presented in this thesis, and
outline possible directions for further research.
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7.1 Summary of the Thesis and Conclusion
Our main objective in this thesis was to provide a model of interaction in
deductive databases that preserves the database security while minimizing the
number of denials answers. We went on building a secure and precise mechanism
for such databases. Obviously, as the role of a deductive database is to make
deductions based on rules and facts stored in it, we headed toward the use of
first-order logic programming, typically a language like Datalog, that is used to
specify facts, rules and queries.
We started by presenting, in chapter 2, the basic components for data security.
As we are mostly interested in confidentiality, it was natural to explore security
policies that deal with this aspect. We reviewed two extensions of confidentiality
policies, namely, the noninterference and the nondeducibility policies because
they tackle the confidentiality issue by observing execution traces in the system.
We then turned on how to implement security in systems. We mentioned three
main methods, namely, access control, information flow and inference control,
skipping willingly cryptography (as it is out of the scope of this thesis). While
access control mechanism describes the conditions under which a system is secure,
information flow checking mechanisms ensure that information flows in the system
comply with its security policy.
In chapter 3, we looked at the relevant background material needed in our
thesis, the first-order logic programming. We reviewed the notions of substi-
tutions, unification, SLD-refutation and SLD-trees, and showed the limitations
of such resolutions since searching for a proof of a goal can be incomplete. To
remedy this problem, we reviewed loop checking techniques which modifies the
computation mechanism by adding a capability of pruning. A pruning based on
an occurrence of some similar subgoal in the SLD-derivation. We ended by an
overview of control flow and dependence analysis in logic programming, high-
lighting the fact that these analyzes do not substitute the notion of information
flow in security systems.
To fulfill our aim, and as the notion of information flow in security systems was
never addressed in logic programming, we proposed, in chapter 4, three defini-
tions of what could possibly be an information flow in logic programming. These
definitions, based on traces, correspond to what can be observed by a user when
she runs a query on a logic program. These definitions were based respectively,
on success/failure, substitution answers and bisimulation. We explored the links
between these definitions and prove the non-transitivity of the flow. To decide of
the existence of a flow relatively for a logic program and a goal, we gave complex-
ity results and showed undecidability of the flow for general logic programs and
decidability for other restricted types of logic programs. The problem of deciding
of the existence of the flow in Datalog programs relatively for the definitions of
flow based on success/failure and substitutions answers is EXPTIME-complete.
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The problem became in ∆2P for binary hierarchical Datalog programs and this
relatively for the first definition of flow based on success/failure. We devoted
chapter 5 to goals bisimulation. We showed that deciding if two goals are bisimi-
lar is undecidable in the general setting, and it became decidable in 2EXPTIME
for hierarchical and restricted logic programs.
Finally in chapter 6, using all the results obtained, we tackled our objective.
We first extended the notion of flow to the notion of indistinguishability. Defi-
nition of the level of logic goals was proposed. We reformulated the concepts of
protection mechanisms, secure mechanisms, precise mechanisms and confidential-
ity policies in the logic setting. We finally ended by giving (we proved it formally
too) a secure protection mechanism for deductive databases using the previously
exposed notions.
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7.2 Future Work
Future works can be directed in three main research directions. First toward
deciding of the existence of the flow in other types of logic programs and deciding
of bisimulation in pure Datalog programs, second toward the implementation
of the information flow in a logic programming framework, and third toward
embedding our security mechanism framework in real-time databases.
7.2.1 On more and more Formal Works
Following the results already obtained in this thesis, one can think about
finding and exploring other types of logic programs for which the question of the
existence of the flow could be decidable too. Meanwhile, we are still investigating
the decidability and the complexity of the existence of the flow relatively to
bisimulation in Datalog programs without considering loop checking techniques.
7.2.2 On Implementation
We have presented in chapters 4 and 5 several definitions of what could be an
information flow in logic programs. We have presented algorithms too on how to
decide of this flows and this in different settings. Implementing these algorithms
constitutes a way to justify our results. Although this implementation is relatively
easy for the first two proposed definitions of the flow, it is more difficult in the case
of bisimulation. Recall that to decide if two goals are bisimilar, we need to keep
track in the memory of all the encountered resolvents in the SLD-derivation,
even if the branches contained in the SLD-tree are not infinite. Even if the
implementation is quite possible, it is not too interesting seeing the amount of
space required to decide of the existence of the flow. We think that a better
implementation could be achieved using the techniques exposed in section 3.2.9
or by first conducting a deep investigation on how to relax the conditions on
how to decide the bisimulation of two goals while maintaining the soundness and
completeness of the algorithms.
7.2.3 On Real-Time Databases
In chapter 6, we gave a secure and precise security mechanism for deductive
databases. However, as real-time databases are gaining more and more attention,
it is tempting to see if we can embed our security mechanism framework in these
databases, and how using our framework can enforce its security policies, or more
to bring changes on our framework in order to balance real-time requirements with
security.
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Re´sume´ en Franc¸ais
Chapitre 1: Objectifs et re´sultats
Dans ce chapitre, nous commenc¸ons par situer notre travail de recherche puis nous re´sumons le
contenu de cette the`se en pre´sentant la me´thodologie adopte´e consistant a` appliquer la notion
du flux de l’information pour les syste`mes de se´curite´ en programmation logique.
Motivation
La the´orie des BD de´ductives a largement e´te´ aborde´e par la communaute´ scientifique qui sy est
inte´resse´, notamment graˆce a` lexistence de nombreux syste`mes supportant la notion de requeˆte,
de raisonnement et, au de´veloppement dapplications base de langages logiques. Dans les anne´es
70, les travaux se sont penche´s sur l’e´tablissement des fondements the´oriques de ces bases de
donne´es. C’est dans les anne´es 80 que les recherches se sont axe´es sur le de´veloppement de deux
syste`mes tre`s proches des bases de donne´es de´ductives, a` savoir les bases de donne´es relationnelles
et la programmation logique. Plusieurs travaux ont mis le point sur le couplage de syste`mes
logiques tels que Prolog avec des bases de donne´es relationnelles. Ce progre`s est de´montre´ par
la re´alisation de prototypes de syste`mes offrant un niveau de ge´ne´ralite´, de performance et de
robustesse permettant le de´veloppement d’applications complexes. Ainsi, plusieurs domaines
dapplication inte´grant efficacement ces syste`mes et de´passant celui des BD traditionnelles ont
e´te´ identifie´s. Une de ces applications est la ne´cessite´ de maintenir la se´curite´ dans ces bases de
donne´es. Dans les bases de donne´es ou` diffe´rents utilisateurs sont autorise´s a` acce´der a` diffe´rents
e´le´ments de donne´es, des me´canismes doivent eˆtre mis en place pour que tous les utilisateurs
puissent acce´der aux donne´es auxquelles ils posse`dent une autorisation dacce`s sans pour autant
violer la politique de se´curite´. Par exemple, des mode`les d’interaction entre les utilisateurs et
la base de donne´es, propose´s dans la litte´rature, permettent a` la base de donne´es de mentir a`
l’utilisateur. Ainsi, notre objectif dans cette the`se est de fournir un mode`le d’interaction dans
les bases de donne´es de´ductives qui pre´serve la se´curite´ des base de donne´es tout en minimisant
le nombre de refus de re´ponses.
Me´thodologie
Dans le but d’atteindre notre but, nous avons utilise´ la programmation logique pour repre´senter
les bases de donne´es de´ductives. Nous avons adapte´ la notion du flux de linformation bien con-
nue en programmation impe´rative a` la programmation logique. Une difficulte´ provient du fait
que les variables dans les programmes logiques repre´sentent une entite´ et non un emplacement de
stockage dans la me´moire. Pour cela, nous e´tions oblige´ de proposer de nouvelles de´finitions qui
s’adaptent a` la programmation logique. Une fois ces de´finitions propose´es, nous nous sommes
pose´ le proble`me de la de´cidabilite´ de lexistence de ces flux. Malheureusement, cette question
est inde´cidable dans le cas ge´ne´ral. Ceci nous a pousse´ a` prendre en conside´ration dautres types
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de langages logiques pour lesquels la question de lexistence de flux est de´cidable bien que, dans
certains cas, nous soyons dans lincapacite´ daffirmer si deux buts logiques sont bisimilaires du fait
que les arbres de re´solution correspondants sont infinis. Nous nous sommes servi des techniques
de de´tection de boucles pour de´cider si deux buts sont bisimilaires. Nous avons e´galement e´tudie´
cette question pour plusieurs types de programmes logiques, partant du fait que le proble`me
est inde´cidable en ge´ne´ral. Finalement, nous e´tions capable de pre´senter un me´canisme suˆr et
certain pour prote´ger les bases de donne´es de´ductives, tout en proposant des de´finitions de ce
qu’est une politique de confidentialite´ et un me´canisme suˆr et certain.
Re´sultat
Dans ce qui suit, nous dressons un re´capitulatif des principales contributions de cette the`se :
• Flux de l’information en programmation logique : nous proposeons trois de´finitions
du flux de l’information. Ces de´finitions correspondent a` ce qui peut eˆtre observe´ par
l’utilisateur quand un but ← G(x, y) est pose´ a` un programme logique P . Nous con-
side`rons tout d’abord que l’utilisateur peut voir si ses requeˆtes re´ussissent ou e´chouent.
Nous dirons que l’information passe de x vers y dans G s’il existe deux constantes a, b
telles que P ∪ {← G(a, y)} re´ussit alors que P ∪ {← G(b, y)} e´choue. Ensuite, nous sup-
posons que l’utilisateur a acce`s a` l’ensemble des substitutions re´ponses des requeˆtes. Dans
ce cas, un flux existe de x vers y dans G s’il existe deux constantes a, b tel que les substi-
tutions re´ponses de P ∪ {← G(a, y)} et P ∪ {← G(b, y)} sont diffe´rentes. Dernie`rement,
nous supposons que l’utilisateur observe les arbres de re´solution des buts. Si les deux
arbres de re´solution de P ∪ {← G(a, y)} et P ∪ {← G(a, y)} peuvent eˆtre distingue´s par
l’utilisateur, alors nous dirons que l’information passe de x vers y dans G.
• Non de´cidabilite´/de´cidabilite´ du flux en programmation logique : Pour un
programme logique P et un but a` deux variables← G(x, y), il est inde´cidable, dans le cas
ge´ne´ral, de dire si un flux passe de x vers y et ceci pour les trois de´finitions du flux. Le
proble`me devient dans EXPTIME pour les programmes Datalog (pour la de´finition du
flux base´e sur re´ussite/e´chec et substitutions re´ponses) et dans ∆2P pour les programmes
Datalog hie´rarchiques (pour la de´finition du flux base´e sur re´ussite/e´chec).
• Bisimulation de buts : Nous avons prouve´ que de´cider si deux buts sont bisimilaires
est inde´cidable pour les programmes Prolog et que ce proble`me devient de´cidable en
2EXPTIME pour les programmes Datalog hie´rarchiques et restricted.
• Controˆle d’infe´rence pre´ventive pour les bases de donne´es de´ductives : nous
proposons un me´canisme suˆr et certain pour les bases de donne´es de´ductives base´ sur la
notion du flux de l’information et des niveaux.
Certains documents de cette the`se ont e´te´ publie´s dans des confe´rences et des revues. La
notion de flux d’informations dans la programmation logique a e´te´ de´crite dans [JIAF 2011], et
le re´sultat sur la bisimulation a e´te´ publie´ dans [JeLIA 2012].
Organisation de la the`se
Le reste de la the`se est organise´ comme suit:
Dans le chapitre 2, nous pre´sentons les fondements de la se´curite´ des donne´es. Nous explorons
les politiques de se´curite´ en e´voquant des politiques de confidentialite´, non-interfe´rence, non-
de´ducibilite´ et d’inte´grite´. Nous de´crivons quelques imple´mentations de me´canismes de se´curite´
a` savoir le controˆle d’acce`s, le flux de l’information et le controˆle d’infe´rence.
Dans le chapitre 3, nous passons en revue la programmation logique du premier ordre. Nous
pre´sentons le me´canisme de de´tection de boucles ainsi que quelques techniques correctes et
comple`tes de ce me´canisme. Nous terminons ce chapitre en introduisant le controˆle de flux et
lanalyse de dpendance en programmation logique.
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Dans le chapitre 4, nous donnons trois de´finitions du flux en programmation logique base´es re-
spectivement sur la re´ussite/e´chec, les substitutions re´ponses et la bisimulation. Nous explorons
les liens entre les diffe´rentes de´finitions et nous prouvons que le fux est non transitif. Nous
de´montrons l’inde´cidabilite´ de l’exitence du flux pour le cas ge´ne´ral des programmes logiques et
donnons des re´sultats de complexite´ et de de´cidabilite´ pour d’autres types de programmes.
Dans le chapitre 5, nous prouvons l’inde´cidabilite´ de la bisimulation des buts logiques pour les
programmes Prolog. Ensuite, nous montrons la de´cidabilite´ de la bisimulation des buts pour les
programmes Datalog hie´rarchiques et restricted.
Dans le chapitre 6, nous proposons la notion de niveaux du flux. Nous appliquons cette no-
tion pour pre´venir les infe´rences illicites dans les syste`mes d’information tout en pre´sentant un
me´canisme de se´curite´ suˆr et certain.
Dans le chapitre 7, nous concluons avec un re´sume´ de cette the`se et nous pre´sentons quelques
travaux futurs.
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Chapitre 2: Se´curite´ des donne´es
La se´curite´ des donne´es est la science et l’e´tude des me´thodes de protection des donne´es
dans les syste`mes informatiques contre la divulgation non autorise´e et la modification. L’un des
aspects de la se´curite´ des donne´es est le controˆle du flux de l’information dans le syste`me. Une
politique de controˆle de flux d’information devrait de´crire les re`gles qui re´gissent la diffusion de
l’information. Ces re`gles sont ne´cessaires pour empeˆcher les programmes de divulguer de donne´es
confidentielles. Nous introduirons tout d’abord, les notions de bases des se´curite´ des donne´es, a`
savoir les conditions de confidentialite´, d’inte´grite´ et de disponibilite´. Nous discutons ensuite des
politiques de se´curite´ (les politiques de confidentialite´ et d’inte´grite´) qui identifient les menaces
et de´finissent les exigences pour maintenir un syste`me se´curise´. L’imple´mentation de la se´curite´
peut eˆtre re´alise´e par cryptographie et/ou par partage de droits et d’informations. Nous nous
inte´ressons plutoˆt au deuxie`me aspect en pre´sentant les me´canismes de controˆle d’acce`s et de
controˆle d’infe´rence. Nous consacrons une partie pour les me´canismes de ve´rification du flux
de l’information dans la programmation impe´rative. Nous discutons ainsi des me´canismes qui
sont base´s sur la compilation et l’exe´cution pour de´terminer si un flux d’information dans un
programme impe´ratif peut violer une politique donne´e.
Composants de base
La se´curite´ des donne´es est base´e sur trois aspects principaux: la confidentialite´, l’inte´grite´ et
la disponibilite´:
• Confidentialite´ repre´sente la dissimulation de l’information. L’importance de cet aspect
de´coule de la ne´cessite´ de garder le secret des informations dans des domaines sensibles
tels que le gouvernement et l’industrie. Par exemple, tous les e´tablissements gardent les
dossiers personnels secrets.
Diffe´rents me´canismes supportent la confidentialite´:
– Me´canismes de controˆle d’acce`s comme la cryptographie.
– Me´canismes de´pendants du syste`me: Ces me´canismes empeˆchent les processus
d’acce´der illicitement a` l’information.
• Inte´grite´ empeˆche toute modification non autorise´e des donne´es ou des ressources.
Principalement, deux me´canismes soutiennent l’inte´grite´:
– Me´canismes de pre´vention: ils cherchent a` maintenir l’inte´grite´ des donne´es en:
∗ bloquant toute tentative non autorise´e de modifier les donne´es ou
∗ bloquant toute tentative de modifier les donne´es d’une manie`re non
autorise´e.
– Me´canismes de de´tection: ils signalent simplement que l’inte´grite´ des donne´es
n’est plus digne de confiance.
• Disponibilite´ renvoie a` la capacite´ d’utiliser l’information ou la ressource de´sire´e.
Formellement, pour dire ce qui est et ce qui n’est pas autorise´ en se´curite´ des donne´es, les poli-
tiques de se´curite´ ont e´te´ introduites.
Politiques de se´curite´
Une politique de se´curite´ de´finit ce que signifie suˆr pour un syste`me. Les politiques de se´curite´
peuvent eˆtre informelles ou tre`s mathe´matiques. En fait, les politiques peuvent eˆtre pre´sente´es
mathe´matiquement, comme une liste d’e´tats permis (suˆrs) et d’e´tats interdits (non suˆrs). En
pratique, les politiques sont rarement aussi pre´cises, elles sont de´crites en langage naturel.
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Fondements des politiques de se´curite´
Nous conside`rons un syste`me informatique comme un automate a` e´tats finis avec un ensemble
de fonctions de transition qui permettent de changer d’e´tat. Alors:
Politique de se´curite´: Une politique de se´curite´ est une de´claration (ge´ne´ralement e´crite en
langage naturel) qui partitionne les e´tats du syste`me en un ensemble d’e´tats suˆrs / autorise´s
et un ensemble d’e´tats non suˆrs / non autorise´s.
Une politique de se´curite´ de´finit le contexte dans lequel nous pouvons de´finir un syste`me
se´curise´. Plus pre´cise´ment:
Syste`me suˆr: Un syste`me suˆr est un syste`me qui est au de´part dans un e´tat autorise´ et qui ne
peut pas se retrouver dans un e´tat non autorise´ au bout d’une ou plusieurs transitions.
Violation de la se´curite´: Une violation de la se´curite´ se produit lorsqu’un syste`me entre
dans un e´tat non autorise´.
Une politique de se´curite´ prend en compte tous les aspects pertinents de la confidentialite´,
l’inte´grite´ et la disponibilite´. Quant a` la confidentialite´, elle recense les e´tats dans lesquels des
informations confidentielles sont divulgue´es. Cela inclut la transmission illicite de l’information,
appele´ flux d’informations. En ce qui concerne l’inte´grite´, une politique de se´curite´ identifie les
moyens autorise´s dans lesquels les informations peuvent eˆtre modifie´es, et les entite´s autorise´es
a` les modifier. En ce qui concerne la disponibilite´, une politique de se´curite´ de´crit les services
qui doivent eˆtre disponibles.
Une politique de se´curite´ de´finit les informations qui doivent eˆtre prote´ge´es. Elle a en fait une
forme non proce´durale. Par exemple, une politique de se´curite´ peut indiquer que l’utilisateur
n’a pas a` obtenir des informations ”top secret”. En revanche, un me´canisme de protection
de´finit comment l’information doit eˆtre prote´ge´e, il a une forme proce´durale. Par exemple, un
me´canisme de protection peut ve´rifier chaque ope´ration effectue´e par l’utilisateur.
Dans le reste de cette section, nous allons pre´senter brie`vement les politiques de confiden-
tialite´, d’inte´grite´, de la non-interfe´rence et de non-de´ducibilite´.
Politiques de confidentialite´
L’objectif principal d’une politique de confidentialite´ est d’empeˆcher la divulgation non
autorise´e d’informations confidentielles. Les politiques de confidentialite´ sont aussi appele´es
politiques du flux de l’information. Parmi la multitude de politiques de confidentialite´,
nous notons:
• Le mode`le de Bell-LaPadula: Le type le plus simple de classification de confidentialite´
est un ensemble de classes de securite´ dispose´es suivant un ordre line´aire total. Ces
niveaux repre´sentent des niveaux de sensibilite´. Plus le niveau est haut, plus l’information
est sensible. Le but du mode`le de Bell-LaPadula [4, 46] est d’empeˆcher l’acce`s en lecture
par des utilisateurs aux objets d’un niveau de se´curite´ plus e´leve´.
• Non-interfe´rence: Un syste`me est se´curise´ si des groupes de sujets ne peuvent pas
interfe´rer les uns avec les autres. Goguen et Meseguer [35] ont utilise´ cette approche pour
de´finir les politiques de se´curite´. Une politique de se´curite´, fonde´e sur la non-interfe´rence,
de´crira les e´tats dans lesquels des interfe´rences interdites ne se produisent pas.
• Nonde´ducibilite´: Goguen et Meseguer [35] ont caracte´rise´ la se´curite´ en termes de
transitions d’e´tats. Si les transitions d’e´tat cause´es par des commandes de haut niveau
interfe`rent avec une se´quence de transitions cause´es par des commandes de bas niveau, le
syste`me n’est pas non-interfe´rence-suˆr. Notons que, e´tant donne´ un ensemble de sorties
de bas niveau, aucun sujet de bas niveau ne devrait eˆtre en mesure de de´duire quoi que
ce soit sur les sorties de haut niveau. Sutherland [68] a re´examine´ cette question de la
fac¸on suivante: il conside`re un syste`me comme une ”boˆıte noire” avec deux ensembles
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d’entre´es, un classifie´ haut et l’autre classifie´ bas. La boˆıte dispose e´galement de deux
sorties, une fois encore, une classifie´e haute et l’autre basse. Si un observateur, autorise´
uniquement comme bas, peut observer une se´quence d’entre´es basses et de sorties basses,
et de de´duire des informations sur les entre´es ou les sorties classifie´es hautes, l’information
a fui alors de haut vers bas.
Politiques d’inte´grite´
Comme la plupart des socie´te´s et des entreprises se pre´occupent davantage de la pre´cision des
donne´es que de la divulgation, les politiques d’inte´grite´ se penchent polutoˆt sur l’inte´grite´ de
l’information que sur la confidentialite´. Trois politiques d’inte´grite´ ont e´te´ propose´es dans la
litte´rature, a` savoir les mode`les d’inte´grite´ de Biba [6], de Lipner [49] et de Clark-Wilson [19].
Les politiques d’inte´grite´ tiennent compte des concepts tels que la se´paration des taˆches, la
se´paration des fonctions et d’audit, de concepts qui sont au-dela` des fonctions des politiques de
confidentialite´.
Imple´mentation
L’imple´menation de la se´curite´ peut eˆtre re´alise´e par plusieurs moyens: me´canismes base´s sur
la cryptographie, et me´canismes base´s sur le partage des droits et d’information. Dans le reste
de cette section, nous nous inte´ressons uniquement aux second me´canisme. Nous parlons ainsi
brie`vement des me´canismes de controˆle d’acce`s, du flux de l’information et des me´canismes de
controˆle d’infe´rence.
Controˆle d’acce`s
La matrice de controˆle d’acce`s [26, 36, 45] est l’outil le plus pre´cis qui peut de´crire l’e´tat actuel
de protection d’un syste`me. Elle caracte´rise les droits de chaque sujet (entite´ active, comme un
processus) par rapport a` toute autre entite´.
En bref, l’ensemble des entite´s prote´ge´es est appele´ l’ensemble d’objets O. L’ensemble de
sujets S est l’ensemble des objets actifs, tels que les processus et les utilisateurs. Dans le mode`le
de matrice de controˆle d’acce`s, la relation entre ces entite´s est capture´e par une matrice A avec
des droits tire´s d’un ensemble de droits R dans chaque entre´e a[s, o], ou` s ∈ S, o ∈ O, et
a[s, o] ⊆ R.
Le sujet s a l’ensemble des droits a[s, o] sur l’objet o. L’ensemble d’e´tats de protection du
syste`me est re´pre´sente´ par le triplet (S,O,A). Il convient de noter que l’outil de la matrice de
controˆle d’acce`s en se´curite´ informatique n’est pas utilise´ dans la pratique, en raison des exi-
gences d’espace (la plupart des syste`mes ont des milliers d’objets et pourrait avoir des milliers
de sujets aussi).
Flux de l’information
Une politique de se´curite´ re´gule les flux d’information dans un syste`me. C’est l’une des taˆches
du syste`me de s’assurer que ces flux d’information ne violent pas les contraintes de la politique
de se´curite´. Dans cette section, nous passerons en revue les principaux me´canismes propose´s
dans la litte´rature pour la programmation impe´rative afin de ve´rifier les flux d’information, a`
savoir les me´canismes de compilation et les me´canismes d’exe´cution.
Dans ce qui suit, pour un objet dans le syste`me, nous e´crirons x a` la fois pour le nom et
pour la valeur de x, et x pour sa classe de se´curite´. Nous allons utiliser la notation x y pour
dire que l’information peut passer d’un e´le´ment de la classe x a` un e´le´ment de la classe y. Une
politique est repre´sente´e par un ensemble de tels e´nonce´s.
Me´canismes base´s sur la compilation [24, 25]
Le but d’un me´canisme base´ sur la compilation consiste a` ve´rifier que les flux d’informations a`
travers un programme sont autorise´s, en de´terminant si les flux pourraient violer une politique
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d’information donne´e.
Certification des instructions: Un ensemble d’instructions est certifie´ par rapport a` une
politique de flux d’informations si le flux d’information dans cet ensemble d’instructions ne vi-
ole pas la politique.
Par exemple, conside´rons l’instruction if then else, ou` x, y, a et b sont des variables:
if x = 1 then .... y := a;.... else .... y := b;
De toute e´vidence, l’information passe de x et a a` y ou de x et b a` y.
Supposons maintenant que la politique stipule que: a  y, b  y, et x  y, alors le flux
d’information est suˆr.
Me´canismes base´s sur l’exe´cution
En ce qui concerne les me´canismes base´s sur l’exe´cution, le but est d’empeˆcher les flux d’informations
qui violent la politique. Pour les flux explicites, et avant l’exe´cution de l’instruction y =
f(x1, · · · , xn), le me´canisme base´ sur l’exe´cution ve´rifie que lub(x1, · · · , xn) y. Ainsi, dans le
cas ou` la condition est vraie, l’affectation se poursuit, sinon elle e´choue. En ce qui concerne la
ve´rification des flux implicites, c’est un peu plus complique´ parce que parfois, les instructions
peuvent eˆtre incorrectement certifie´es comme conforme a` la politique de confidentialite´.
Controˆle d’infe´rence
Nous disons qu’un observateur peut atteindre un gain d’information si l’observateur, en
observant un message, peut convertir sa connaissance a priori en une connaissance a pos-
teriori strictement augmente´e. Les capacite´s de calcul et les ressources de calcul disponibles de
l’observateur de´cident si ce gain peut eˆtre atteint ou non.
Il est du devoir du controˆle d’infe´rence d’assurer que les observations accessibles ne sont
pas nuisibles. Ceci peut eˆtre re´alise´ par une surveillance dynamique ou une ve´rification
statique.
• La surveillance dynamique inspecte chaque e´ve´nement et ve´rifie si des infe´rences no-
cives peuvent eˆtre observe´es par le participant. La surveillance dynamique conserve une
trace des observations ante´rieures afin de bloquer toute observation critique.
• La ve´rification statique analyse globalement et a` l’avance, tous les e´ve´nements pos-
sibles et observables par le participant. La ve´rification statique inspecte donc tous les
e´ve´nements possibles afin de ve´rifier s’il existe des infe´rences nocives et ainsi de bloquer
ces observations critiques.
Notons que la surveillance dynamique et la ve´rification statique ont besoin d’une spe´cification
des exigences de la se´curite´, c’est a` dire d’une politique de se´curite´ qui capte la notion per-
tinente de nocivite´.
Notez que lorsque l’observateur est informe´ d’un blocage, que ce soit explicitement ou
implicitement par un raisonnement, la reconnaissance d’un blocage peut constituer aussi une
information nuisible.
Pour les refus explicitement notifie´s, l’observateur peut, dans certains cas, de´terminer la
raison de ce refus, et, par conse´quent, trouver l’e´ve´nement cache´.
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Chapitre 3: Programmation logique
Dans ce chapitre, nous examinerons la logique du premier ordre et nous passerons en revue
des notions de substitutions, unification, SLD-resolution, SLD-trees. Les proble`mes des
SLD-resolutions sont expose´s re´ve´lant parfois que la recherche d’une SLD-re´futation peut en-
traˆıner la non-terminaison. Une non-terminaison due a` la pre´sence de boucles. Nous exposerons
des techniques de de´tection de boucles en programmation logique. Apre`s avoir pre´sente´
les concepts de base des de´tections des boucles, diffe´rentes techniques seront expose´es. Des
remarques sur des de´tecteurs de boucles plus efficaces seront aussi aborde´es. Apre`s avoir expose´
la notion du flux de l’information en programmation impe´rative, il e´tait inte´ressant de ve´rifier
si ce type de flux existe en programmation logique. Nous exposerons tre`s brie`vement les notions
d’analyse du controˆle du flux et de de´pendance de donne´es soulignant le fait que la
notion de flux d’information pre´ce´demment pre´sente´e n’est pas couverte par ces analyses dans
la programmation logique.
Programmation logique du premier ordre
Dans cette section, nous examinerons les aspects de la programmation logique du premier ordre
a` savoir: les termes, substitutions, unification et SLD-re´solution.
Termes, programmes, buts, et substitutions
Termes et litte´raux: Soit X un ensemble de variables et Ω un ensemble de constantes. Les
Termes et litte´raux du langage de programmation sont de´finis inductivement par la grammaire
TΩ(X) = x|f(t1, · · · , tn) ou` x ∈ X, f ∈ Ω, et t1, · · · , tn ∈ TΩ(X) pour n ≥ 0. Un terme ground
est un terme ne contenant pas de variables.
Univers d’Herbrand: Soit L un langage du premier ordre. L’Univers d’Herbrand UL de L
est l’ensemble de tous les grounds termes qui peuvent eˆtre forme´s a` partir des constantes et des
symboles de fonction apparaissant dans L.
Programmes de´finis: Une clause est une formule A← B1, · · · , Bn, pour n ≥ 0. Le litte´ral A
est la teˆte de la clause et la constante la plus a` gauche dans A est nomme´ symbole de pre´dicat.
Quand le litte´ral A est e´gal a` p(t1, · · · , tn), ou` p est un symbole de pre´dicat et t1, · · · , tn des
termes, A est appele´ un p-lite´ral. Une clause avec un p-lite´ral en sa teˆte est appele´e p-clause.
Le sous-ensemble de toutes les p-clauses d’un programme est appele´ proce´dure / de´finition
de pre´dicat de p. Les litte´raux B1, · · · , Bn forment le corps de la clause. Quand n = 0, on
e´crira A← pour dire que c’est un fait. Finallement, un programme logique est un esnemble de
clauses.
But: Un but est une formule ← B1, · · · , Bn ou` B1, · · · , Bn sont des litte´raux, pour n ≥ 0.
Quand n = 0, nous le noterons par  pour dire que c’est la clause vide.
Le cadre ope´rationnel d’un langage logique du premier ordre ne´cessite une proce´dure pour
de´terminer si un but re´ussit ou pas. La proce´dure de preuve qui en re´sulte doit faire correspon-
dre des litte´raux dans un but a` des clauses du programme. Ainsi, les substitutions lient les
variables aux termes:
Substitutions: Soit X et Y deux ensembles de variables. Une substitution φ : X → TΩ(Y )
est une fonction totale faisant correspondre les variables aux termes. Pour X = {x1, · · · , xn}
et n ≥ 0, nous repres´entons φ en utilisant la notation {x1 7→ s1, · · · , xn 7→ sn} ou` les variables
xi correspondent aux termes si, pour 1 ≤ i ≤ n. L’ensemble Y est donne´ par ∪ni=1 vars si, ou`
la fonction vars : TΩ(Y ) → PY prend un terme et retourne l’ensemble de variables contenues
dans ce terme.
Le re´sultat d’un calcul dans un langage logique est une substitution ge´ne´re´e par le proce´de´
sus-mentionne´. L’instance d’un terme dans le cadre d’une substitution est obtenu selon cette
de´finition:
Application de substitutions: Soit φ = {x1 7→ s1, · · · , xn 7→ sn} : X → TΩ(Y ), nous
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φx if t = x ∈ X
f(t1[φ], · · · , tn[φ]) if t = f(t1, · · · , tn)
Unification
L’appariement des litte´raux dans un but avec les clauses d’un programme est connu sous le nom
d’unification [58]. La substitution cre´e´e par l’algorithme d’unification est la plus ge´ne´rale que
possible dans le sens que tous les autres unificateurs sont une instance de celui-ci.
mgu: Soit D = {(s1, t1), · · · , (sn, tn)} un ensemble de couple de termes de TΩ(X), pour n ≥ 1,
et soit φ : X → TΩ(Y ) une substitution. On dit que φ est un unifieur de D si si[φ] = ti[φ], pour
tout 1 ≤ i ≤ n. En plus, φ est un mgu si, pour tout autre unifieur ψ : X → TΩ(Y ) de D, il
existe une substitution σ : Y → TΩ(Y ), telel que ψ = σ ◦ φ.
Nous nous demandons alors, comment ve´rifier si un but est une conse´quence logique d’un pro-
gramme. La recherche syste´matique de la preuve d’un but est centre´e autour du processus de
la re´solution.
SLD-Re´solution
La re´solution est appele´e re`gle d’infe´rence car elle permet de de´duire des informations concernant
un but et un programme. La re´solution line´aire implique la re´solution d’un litte´ral dans un but
avec une clause du programme, produisant un nouveau but que nous continuons a` re´soudre de la
meˆme manie`re. La me´thode de se´lection des clauses du programme est appele´e search strategy
et la me´thode de se´lection du litte´ral dans le but est appele´e la computation rule. La preuve
d’un but peut eˆtre visualise´e sous la forme d’une structure arborescente dans laquelle chaque
noeud marque´ avec un but et chaque branche repre´sente le re´sultat d’une e´tape de re´solution.
Une me´thode de re´solution base´e sur la recherche de preuves qui limite la taille d’un arbre de
recherche est appele´e SLD-re´solution.
SLD-re´solution: Soient C = A← B1, · · · , Bm, pour m ≥ 0, une clause, et G =← A1, · · · , An,
pour n ≥ 1, un but tel que A1 et A sont unifiables avec un mgu φ. Alors le SLD-resolvant de
C et G est le but G0 = (← B1, · · · , Bm, A2, · · · , An)[φ].
Une se´quence de SLD-re´solution constitue une SLD-de´rivation.
SLD-de´rivation: Pour un programme P et un but G, une SLD-de´rivation de P ∪ {G} est
une se´quence de triplets (G1, C1, φ1), · · · , (Gn, Cn, φn), pour n ≥ 1 (note´ aussi G1 ⇒C1,φ1⇒
· · · ⇒Cn,φn Gn), tels que Cn repre´sente une ’variante’ d’une clause dans P , Gn est un but, et φn
est une substitution. De plus, pour 1 ≤ i < n, Gi+1 est de´rive´ du Gi et de Ci via substitution
φi par une SLD-re´solution.
La me´thode basique pour rechercher une preuve d’un but G =← A1, · · · , An est de re´soudre
sans cesse les litte´raux dans G avec des clause de P jusqu’a` ce que ce processus e´choue ou de´rive
le but vide . La de´finition de ce processus, appele´ SLD-re´futation, est comme suit:
SLD-re´futation: Pour un programme P et un butl G, une SLD-re´futation de G est une
SLD-de´rivation de P ∪ {G} commenc¸ant apr G et terminant par Gn = , pour n ≥ 1. Si
les substitutions des SLD-re´solutions dans la de´rivation sont φ1, · · · , φn alors la substitution
re´ponse de la re´futation est φ = φn ◦ · · · ◦ φ1.
L’arbre de recherche forme´ a` partir d’une SLD-re´solution est connu sous le nom de SLD-
tree, et nous la de´finissons de la fac¸on suivante:
SLD-tree: Soient P un programme et G un but. Un SLD-tree pour P ∪ {G} est un arbre
dont les noeuds sont e´tiquete´s par des buts et les branches sont e´tiquete´es par une substitution
de telle fac¸on que les conditions suivantes sont satisfaites:
1. Le noeud racine de l’arbre est G.
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2. Soit G′ =← A1, · · · , An, pour n ≥ 1, un noeud dans l’arbre.Pour chaque clause A ←
B1, · · · , Bm, ou` m ≥ 0, telle que A1 et A sont unifiables avec un mgu φ, le noeud fils
← (B1, · · · , Bm, A2, · · · , An)[φ]. Nous e´tiquetons l’arc connectant G′ a` un fils avec la
substitution de la SLD-re´solution.
3. Les noeuds libelle´s avec le but vide  n’ont pas de fils.
Chaque se´quence de noeuds dans un SLD-tree est soit une SLD-re´futation ou une SLD-de´rivation.
Dans cette the`se, nous allons nous inte´resser aux types de programmes logiques suivants:
Datalog, hie´rarchique, restricted, nvi and svo.
Datalog est une version simplifie´e de Prolog. Tout programme Datalog doit satisfaire la con-
dition suivante: chaque variable qui se produit dans la teˆte d’une clause doit e´galement se
produire dans le corps de la meˆme clause. Clark [20] et Shepherdson [64] ont introduit la notion
des programmes hie´rarchiques. Un programme Datalog P est dit hie´rarchique ssi il existe une
correspondance l associant un entier positive l(p) a` chaque symbole de pre´dicat p dans P et tel
que pour toutes les clauses A0 ← A1, · · · , An dans P , si chaque Ai est un lite´ral de la forme
pi(t1, · · · , tki) alors l(p0) > l(p1), · · · , l(pn). Le graphe de de´pendance d’un programme Datalog
P est un graphe (N,E) tel que N est l’ensemble de tous les symboles de pre´dicat dans P et E
est la relation d’adjacence de´finue sur N : pEq ssi P contient une clause A0 ← A1, · · · , An tel
que A0 est un lite´ral de la forme p(· · · ) et pour un 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai est un lite´ral de la forme q(· · · ).
Soit E∗ la cloˆture re´flexive et transitive de E. Un programme Datalog P est dit restricted ssi
pour toutes les clauses A0 ← A1, · · · , An dans P et pour tout 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1, si A0 est de la forme
p(· · · ) et Ai est de la forme q(· · · ), alors not qE∗p. Un programme P est nonvariable intro-
ducing (nvi) si pour chaque clause A← B1, · · · , Bn dans P , chaque variable qui apparaˆıt dans
B1, · · · , Bn apparaˆıt aussi dans A. Un programme P est single variable occurrence (svo) si
pour chaque clause A ← B1, · · · , Bn dans P , aucune variable dans B1, · · · , Bn n’apparaˆıt plus
qu’une fois.
Le proble`me de la SLD-Re´solution
La recherche d’une SLD-re´futation peut parfois eˆtre beaucoup plus difficile, entrainant souvent
une non-terminaison. L’exemple suivant montre ce phe´nome`ne.
Conside´rons le programme logique P suivant:
C1 : p(x, z)← q(x, y), p(y, z);
C2 : p(x, y)← r(x, y);
C3 : r(b, b)←;
C4 : q(a, a)←;
C5 : p(a, b)←
et le but G: ← p(a, u).
← p(a, u)




C4, {v 7→ a}
C1, {x 7→ a, z 7→ u}
← r(a, u)
e´chec
C2, {x 7→ a, y 7→ u}

re´ussite
C5, {u 7→ b}
En fait, la SLD-re´solution peut eˆtre incomple`te lors de la recherche d’une preuve pour un
but. Ainsi, nous pouvons tenter de de´tecter toute branche infinie dans un SLD-tree. Mal-
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heureusement, ce proble`me est inde´cidable. Cependant, plusieurs heuristiques ont e´te´ propose´es
dans la litte´rature pour e´viter cette non-terminaison:
• Poole & Goebel [59] ont propose´ d’appliquer certaines techniques de reformulation sur la
spe´cification initiale du programme. Cependant, le programme qui en re´sulte peut eˆtre
diffe´rent de celui d’origine.
• Apt et al. [1], Bol et al. [9], Bol [8], Smith et al. [65], Van Gelder [33], Vieille [72],
Besnard [5], Convington [21], Sahlin [60], Brough & Walker [12], Shen [62] ont propose´
de modifier le me´canisme de calcul en ajoutant une capacite´ de coupure. Ainsi, a` un
certain moment, l’interpre´teur est oblige´ d’arreˆter sa recherche. Ces me´canismes sont
appele´s des me´canismes de de´tection de boucle, car ils sont fonde´s sur l’exclusion de
certains types de re´pe´titions dans les SLD-de´rivations.
De´tection de boucles
Le but principal d’un de´tecteur de boucles est de re´duire l’espace de recherche pour les in-
terpre´teurs afin d’obtenir un espace de recherche fini.
Concepts de base
Le but d’un de´tecteur en boucle est de tailler chaque SLD-tree infini en un sous-arbre fini con-
tenant la racine. Les de´finitions suivantes ont e´te´ introduites par Bol et al. [9].
Sous-de´rivation: Soit P un programme logique, G un but, et L un ensemble de SLD-de´rivations
de P ∪ {G}. De´finir: RemSub(L) = {D ∈ L|L ne contient pas une sous-de´rivation de D}.
L est sous-de´rivation libre si L = RemSub(L).
De´tecteur de boucle simple: Un de´tecteur de boucle simple est un ensemble calculable L de
SLD-de´rivations finies tel que L est ferme´ sous des variantes et est sous-de´rivation libre.
Pruned SLD-tree: Soient P un programme, G un but, T le SLD-tree de P ∪ {G}, et L un
de´tecteur en boucle. En appliquant L a` T , nous obtenons un nouveau SLD-tree fL(P ∪{G}) qui
consiste en T avec tous les noeuds dans {G’ | la SLD-de´rivation du but G a` G’ est dans L} coupe´s.
Une des proprie´te´s les plus importantes lors de l’utilisation des de´tecteurs de boucle est de
ne pas perdre des re´sultats de re´ussite ou toute autre solution individuelle. De plus, vu que le
but d’un de´tecteur de boucle est de re´duire un espace infini de recherche a` un ensemble fini, la
seconde proprie´te´ importante est donc de tailler toute de´rivation infinie:
Un de´tecteur de boucle L est faiblement correct si: pour tout programme P , but G, et SLD-
tree T de P ∪{G}, si T contient une branche de re´ussite, alors fL(P ∪{G}) contient une branche
de re´ussite.
Un de´tecteur de boucle L est correct si pour tout programme P et but G, et SLD-tree T de
P∪{G}: si T contient une branche de re´ussite avec une substitution re´ponse σ, alors fL(P∪{G})
contient une branche de re´ussite avec une substitution re´ponse σ′ telle que G[σ′] 6 G[σ].
Un de´tecteur de boucle L est complete si toute SLD-de´rivation infinie est coupe´e par L.
Un de´tecteur de boucle ide´al serait a` la fois faiblement correct et complet. Malheureuse-
ment, vu que les programmes logiques ont la pleine puissance de la the´orie re´cursive, il n’y a
pas de de´tecteurs de boucle qui sont a` la fois faiblement correct et complet, meˆme pour les
programmes logiques sans fonctions [9].
De´tection de boucles base´e sur l’application re´pe´te´e des clauses
Brough & Walker [12] ont propose´ de couper les SLD-de´rivations chaque fois qu’une clause est
utilise´e plus d’une fois pour re´soudre un but.
Loop check 1=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk) tel que, il existe i, 0 ≤ i < k,
Ci = Ck}).
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Loop check 1, base´e sur une condition tre`s simple, est trop restrictive, car elle peut e´liminer
toutes les branches de re´ussite. En ce sens, nous de´montrons que:
1. Loop check 1 est non correct par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a`
gauche pour les programmes Datalog, restricted, nvi, svo et les programmes logiques en
ge´ne´ral.
2. Loop check 1 est complet par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a` gauche
pour les programmes Datalog, restricted, nvi, svo et les programmes logiques en ge´ne´ral.
De´tection de boucles base´e sur des buts re´pe´te´s
Brough & Walker [12] ont propose´ de couper les SLD-de´rivations chaque fois qu’un sous-but est
e´gal a` l’un des buts anceˆtres.
Loop check 2=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk) tel que il existe i, 0 ≤ i < k,
Gk = Gi}).
Loop check 2 n’est pas tre`s satisfaisante car elle ne taille pas toutes les branches infinies. Nous
de´montrons que:
1. Loop check 2 est correct par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a` gauche
pour les programmes Datalog, restricted, nvi, svo et les programmes logiques en ge´ne´ral.
2. Loop check 2 est incomplet par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a` gauche
pour les programmes Datalog, restricted, nvi, svo et les programmes logiques en ge´ne´ral.
De´tection de boucles base´e sur l’application re´pe´te´e des clauses
et des buts re´pe´te´s
Brough & Walker [12] ont propose´ de couper les SLD-de´rivations a` chaque fois qu’un sous-but
est e´gal a` l’un des buts anceˆtres et les clauses utilise´es pour re´soudre les sous-buts sont les meˆmes
que celles utilise´es pour re´soudre les buts anceˆtres.
Loop check 3=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk) tel que il existe i, 0 ≤ i < k,
• Gk = Gi
• Ck = Ci
}).
Voyant que Loop check 3 est moins restrictive que Loop check 2, le proble`me majeur de son
incomple´tude reste insoluble.
1. Loop check 3 est correct par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a` gauche
pour les programmes Datalog, restricted, nvi, svo et les programmes logiques en ge´ne´ral.
2. Loop check 3 est incomplet par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a` gauche
pour les programmes Datalog, restricted, nvi, svo et les programmes logiques en ge´ne´ral.
De´tection de boucles base´e sur des atomes re´pe´te´s a` travers
des variantes syntaxiques
Convington [21] a propose´ de couper les SLD-de´rivations a` chaque fois qu’un atome dans un
sous-but est une variante d’un atome dans un de ses buts anceˆtres.
Loop check 4=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk) tel que il existe i, 0 ≤ i < k, ou`
Gi = Ai1 , · · · , Ain et Gk = Ak1 , · · · , Akm , il existe 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ l ≤ m et une substitution τ ,
tel que: Akl = Aij [τ ]}).
Le champ d’application de Loop check 4 est plutoˆt limite´. Nous de´montrons que:
1. Loop check 4 est non correct par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a`
gauche pour les programmes Datalog, restricted, nvi, svo et les programmes logiques en
ge´ne´ral.
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2. Loop check 4 est complet par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a` gauche
pour les programmes Datalog, restricted, nvi, svo.
3. Loop check 4 est incomplet par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a` gauche
pour les programmes logiques en ge´ne´ral.
De´tection de boucles base´e sur des buts e´gaux
Bol et al. [9] ont propose´ de couper les SLD-de´rivations de la forme (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ) quand il
apparaˆıt deux buts Gi et Gj (0 ≤ i < j) tels que Gj est une variante de Gi.
Loop check 5=RemSub({D|D = (G0 ⇒C1,θ1⇒ · · · ⇒Ck,θk Gk), tel que, pour i, 0 ≤ i < k, il
existe une substitution τ , tel que: Gk = Gi[τ ]}).
Nous de´montrons que:
1. Loop check 5 est non correct par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a`
gauche pour les programmes Datalog, nvi, svo et les programmes logiques en ge´ne´ral.
2. Loop check 5 est correct par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a` gauche
pour les programmes restricted.
3. Loop check 5 est complet par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a` gauche
pour les programmes restricted.
4. Loop check 5 est incomplet par rapport a` la re`gle de se´lection de l’atome le plus a` gauche
pour les programmes Datalog, nvi, svo et les programmes logiques en ge´ne´ral.
Remarques sur des de´tecteurs de boucles efficaces
Tous les de´tecteurs de boucles pre´sente´s comparent les buts de´rive´s dans la de´rivation et coupent
la de´rivation quand un but suffisamment similaire est rencontre´. The´oriquement, un sous-but
est compare´ a` tous les buts qui le pre´ce`de dans la de´rivation. En pratique, ces de´tecteurs de
boucles sont trop couˆteux vu qu’un de´tetceur de boucle peut effectuer 1
2
|D||D−1| comparaisons
pour une SLD-de´rivation D finie.
Deux approches ont e´te´ propose´es dans la litte´rature pour re´duire le nombre de comparaisons
effectue´es par un de´tecteur de boucle:
1. La technique de tortoise-and-hare: Van Gelder [33] a propose´ de comparer tous les
buts Gk a` un seul but, a` savoir le but a` mi-chemin de la de´rivation Gk/2. Il montre que
cette technique pre´serve la correction mais pas la comple´tude du de´tecteur de boucle.
2. La technique de se´lection: Bol [8] a propose´ non seulement de se´lectionner le but qui
est a` mi-chemin de la de´rivation pour le comparer a` Gk, mais de se´lectionner un nombre
infini de buts et de comparer chacun a` Gk. Il montre que cette technique pre´serve la
correction du de´tecteur de boucle ainsi que sa comple´tude (pour des de´tecteurs de boucle
et de programmes logiques bien spe´cifiques).
”Flux” en programmation logique
En ge´ne´ral, dans les programmes logiques, les concepts d’arguments d’entre´e et de sor-
tie n’existent pas. On dit aussi que les programmes logiques ne sont pas dirige´s. En outre,
les unifications de sous-buts dans les programmes logiques peuvent proce´der en deux direc-
tions: continuer apre`s un succe`s et chainage en arrie`re apre`s un e´chec. Ainsi, afin de ge´ne´rer
un code exe´cutable des programmes logiques qui soit aussi efficace, les chercheurs ont e´tudie´
diffe´rentes de´pendances dans les programmes logiques comme l’information sur le mode
[23, 53, 70, 73], l’infe´rence du mode [13, 22, 54] et les de´pendances de donne´es [17, 18, 27].
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Nous pre´senterons l’analyse de flux de donne´es et de controˆle du flux pour la programmation
logique, soulignant le fait que la notion du flux de l’information dans les syste`mes de se´curite´ de´ja`
pre´sente´e dans le chapitre 2 n’est pas couverte par ces analyses pour les programmes logiques.
Analyse du controˆle du flux
Le controˆle du flux dans les programmes logiques se re´fe`re a` l’ordre dans lequel le but est e´value´.
Ces controˆles du flux ne sont pas si e´vidents que dans les programmes impe´ratifs. Ceci est duˆ
au fait que les flux de controˆle sont cache´s dans les programmes logiques. La se´mantique de
Prolog implique plusieurs types de chainage arrie`re, et de recherche d’un sous-but pour lequel
le controˆle est transfe´re´ apre`s chainage arrie`re.
Analyse de de´pendance de donne´es
Une de´pendance de donne´es dans les programmes logiques existe lorsqu’une clause se re´fe`re a`
une variable / argument dans la de´finition de la meˆme clause ou dans la teˆte de la de´finition
d’une autre clause.
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Chapitre 4: Flux de l’information en
programmation logique
La the´orie du flux de l’information est bien de´finie pour les programmes impe´ratifs. Diffe´rents
mode`les du flux sont propose´s, a` savoir le mode`le du Bell-Lapadula [3], le mode`le de non-
de´ducibilite´ et de non-interfe´rence [34]. Cependant aucune e´tude ne s’est penche´e sur ce
que pourrait eˆtre un flux de l’information (dans le sens de´ja` pre´sente´) en programmation
logique. Dans ce cahpitre, nous proposons trois de´finitions du flux de l’information pour les
programmes Datalog. Ces de´finitions correspondent a` ce qui peut eˆtre observe´ par l’utilisateur
lorsqu’une requeˆte ← G(x, y) est pose´e pour un programme logique P . Dans la premie`re
de´finition, l’utilisateur ne voit que si les buts re´ussissent ou e´chouent. Dans la seconde de´finition,
l’utilisateur a acce`s a` l’ensemble des substitutions-re´ponses calcule´es par le programme. Dans la
troisie`me de´finition, l’utilisateur obtient la forme des arbres de calcul produits par le programme.
Flux de l’information base´e sur re´ussite/e´chec
Soit P un programme Datalog, et G(x, y) un but a` deux variables. Nous dirons qu’il y a un flux
de x vers y dans G(x, y) par rapport a` la re´ussite et l’e´chec dans P (en symbole x
SF−→PG y) ssi
il existe a, b ∈ UL(P ) tel que P ∪ {G(a, y)} re´ussit et P ∪ {G(b, y)} e´choue.
Flux de l’information base´e sur les substitutions
re´ponses
Soit P un programme Datalog, et G(x, y) un but a` deux variables. Nous dirons qu’il y a un flux
de x vers y dans G(x, y) par rapport aux substitutions re´ponses dans P (en symbole x
SA−→PG y)
ssi il existe a, b ∈ UL(P ) tel que Θ(P ∪ {G(a, y)}) 6= Θ(P ∪ {G(b, y)}).
Flux de l’information base´e sur la bisimulation
Une bisimulation est une relation binaire entre les buts de telle sorte que les buts relie´s ont des
arbres de re´solution ”e´quivalents”.
De´finition de la bisimulation
Soit P un programme Datalog. Une relation binaire Z entre les buts est une P-bisimulation ssi
elle satisfait les conditions suivantes; pour tous les buts Datalog F1, G1 tel que F1ZG1:
• F1 =  ssi G1 =  ,
• Pour chaque SLD-re´solvant F2 de F1 (c-a`-d F2 ∈ succP (F1)) et une clause dans P , il
existe un re´solvant G2 de G1 (c-a`-d G2 ∈ succP (G1)) et une clause dans P telle que
F2ZG2,
• Pour chaque SLD-re´solvant G2 de G1 (c-a`-d G2 ∈ succP (G1)) et une clause dans P ,
il existe un re´solvant F2 de F1 (c-a`-d F2 ∈ succP (F1)) et une clause dans P telle que
F2ZG2.
succP (G) de´note l’ensemble de tous les buts obtenus depuis le but G moyennant une e´tape de
re´solution dans le programme P .
Nous de´montrons qu’il existe une P-bisimulation maximale ZPmax entre les buts de´finie comme
suit: F1ZPmaxG1 ssi il existe une P-bisimulation Z telle que F1ZG1. Il en re´sulte que ZPmax est
une relation d’e´quivalence sur l’ensemble des buts.
Comme exemple, soit P le programme suivant:
C1 : p(a, y)← q(y);
C2 : p(b, y)← r(y);
C3 : p(b, y)← s(y)
et soient G,H respectivement les buts ← p(a, y) et ← p(b, y)
180 RE´SUME´ EN FRANC¸AIS









Soit P un programme Datalog, et G(x, y) un but a` deux variables. Nous dirons qu’il y a un
flux de x vers y dans G(x, y) par rapport aux bisimulations dans P (en symbole x
BI−→PG y) ssi
il existe a, b ∈ UL(P ) tel que not{P ∪ {G(a, y)}ZPmaxP ∪ {G(b, y)}}.
Liens entre les diffe´rentes de´finitions du flux de
l’information
L’existence d’un flux par rapport a` la subtitution re´ponse n’implique pas l’existence d’un flux
par rapport a` la re´ussite/e´chec. Cependant nous pouvons de´montrer que pour un programme
logique P et un but G(x, y) a` deux variables, si x
SF−→PG y alors x SA−→
P
G y.
Paralle`lement, l’existence d’un flux par rapport a` la bisimulation n’implique pas l’existence d’un
flux par rapport a` la re´ussite/e´chec. Cependant nous pouvons de´montrer que pour un pro-
gramme logique P et un but G(x, y) a` deux variables, si x




La plupart des politiques de controˆle du flux de l’information dans la programmation impe´rative
sont repre´sente´es par une structure en treillis, ce qui signifie que s’il y a un flux d’information
de la variable x a` la variable y et de la variable y a` z, alors il existe un flux de x vers z. Dans
de tels contextes, la relation du flux de l’information entre les variables du programme est dite
transitive. Dans notre cas et selon les de´finitions propose´es, la relation du flux de l’information
en programmation logique n’est pas transitive.
Re´sultats de complexite´




Entre´e: Un programme logique P , un but a` deux variables G(x, y)




Entre´e: Un programme logique P , un but a` deux variables G(x, y)




Entre´e: Un programme logique P , un but a` deux variables G(x, y)
Sortie: De´cider si x
BI−→PG y
Inde´cidabilite´
Dans le cas ge´ne´ral, les trois proble`mes de de´cision sont inde´cidables.
Ide´e de la preuve:
(piSF ) Re´duire pi1 qui est inde´cidable [28] a` piSF :
pi1
{
Entre´e: Un programme logique P , un but sans variable q(a)
Sortie: P ∪ {← q(a)} re´ussit
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(piSA) Preuve similaire s’applique ici.
(piBI) Re´duire pi2 qui est inde´cidable [29] a` piBI :
pi2
{
Entre´e: Un programme logique binaire P , un but sans variable q(a)
Sortie: L’arbre de re´solution de P ∪ {← q(a)} contient une branche d’e´chec
De´cidabilite´
Pour Datalog, nous de´montrons que piSF est EXPTIME-complet.
Ide´e de la preuve:
(Appartenance) Algorithme qui de´cide de l’existence du flux dans les programmes Datalog.
Require: Un programme Datalog P , un butG(x, y), Univers d’Herbrand fini UL(P ) = {a1, · · · , an}
Ensure: x
SF−→PG(x,y) y pour le programme Datalog P et le but G
1: answer = faux
2: i = 0
3: while i < n et non answer do
4: i = i+ 1; j = i
5: while j < n et non answer do
6: j = j + 1
7: if (P ∪ {G(ai, y)} re´ussit et P ∪ {G(aj , y)} e´choue) ou (P ∪ {G(ai, y)} e´choue et
P ∪ {G(aj , y)} re´ussit) then





Cet algorithme est deterministe et, sachant que les programmes Datalog sont complets pour
EXPTIME [41, 71], il en re´sulte que cet algorithme peut eˆtre exe´cute´ en EXPTIME.
(Hardness) Re´duire pi3 qui est EXPTIME-hard [71] a` piSF :
pi3
{
Entre´e: Un programme Datalog P , un atome ground A
Sortie: P ∪A (A est une conse´quence logique de P )
Pour Datalog aussi, nous de´montrons que piSA est EXPTIME-complet.
Pour les programmes Datalog binaires hie´rarchiques, piSF est dans ∆2P .
Ide´e de la preuve:
Conside´rons l’algorithme de´terministe avec oracle:
Require: Un programme Datalog binaires hie´rarchiques P , un but G(x, y).
Ensure: x
SF−→PG y.
1: Pour chaque a dans UL(P ) faire
2: Pour chaque b dans UL(P ) faire





182 RE´SUME´ EN FRANC¸AIS
Les oracles SUCCESSES repre´sentent l’ensemble des couples de buts (P,G) telles que G re´ussit
dans P . En restreignant P aux programmes Datalog binaires hie´rarchiques, nous de´montrons
que SUCCESSES appartient a` NP. Les oracles FAILURES repre´sentent l’ensemble des couples
de buts (P,G) telles que G e´choue dans P . En restreignant P aux programmes Datalog binaires
hie´rarchiques, nous de´montrons que SUCCESSES appartient a` co-NP. Alors piSF est dans ∆2P .
piBI est dans EXPTIME pour les programmes Datalog binaires hie´rarchiques.
Ide´e de la preuve:
nous de´montrons que piBI est dans APSPACE, vu que EXPTIME = APSPACE. Soit
l’algorithme alternant suivant qui peut eˆtre imple´mente´ en espace polynomial:
Require: Un programme Datalog binaire hie´rarchique P , deux buts G1 et G2.
Ensure: De´cider si P ∪ {G1} ZPmax P ∪ {G2}.
1: case (succ(P,G1), succ(P,G2))
2: - (true, true):
3: (∀) choisir i, j ∈ {1, 2} tel que i 6= j
4: (∀) choisir un successeur G′i de Gi dans P
5: (∃) choisir un successeur G′j de Gj dans P
6: (.) call bisim(P,G′i, G
′
j)
7: - (true, false): reject
8: - (false, true): reject
9: - (false, false):





Existence du flux apre`s transformation du
programme
Nous nous inte´ressons a` ve´rifier si les transformations (unfold/fold propose´es tout d’adord par
Burstall et Darlington [14] dans le contexte des langages functionels et puis par Tamaki et Sato
[69] pour la programmation logique) sur les programmes logiques peuvent introduire ou e´liminer
des flux.
Sachant que le fait d’appliquer une transformation de fold ou de unfold sur une clause ne modifie
ni la re´ussite, ni l’e´chec [69], ni les substitutions re´ponses [44] dans un programme logique, les
flux d’information base´s soit sur re´ussite/e´chec ou sur les substitutions re´ponses seront conserve´s
apre`s application de ces transformations. Cependant, nous ne pouvons pas en dire autant des flux
de l’information base´s sur la bisimulation. Des exemples montrent qu’un flux peut apparaˆıtre
pour ensuite disparaˆıtre.
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Chapitre 5: Bisimulation de buts
Dans le contexte d’un langage de programmation donne´, il est indispensable d’associer une
se´mantique aux programmes. Cette se´mantique induit une relation d’e´quivalence entre les pro-
grammes. Par conse´quent, le proble`me de de´cision consistant a` de´terminer si deux programmes
donns sont e´quivalents est au coeur de l’e´tude de la se´mantique des programmes. Notre but
est de proposer une utilisation des relations d’e´quivalence entre les programmes logiques qui
tiennent en compte la forme des SLD-tree.
Dans ce chapitre, nous conside´rons tout d’abord les programmes Datalog. Nous dirons que,
par rapport a` un programme Datalog P , deux buts sont e´quivalents si leurs SLD-trees sont
bisimilaires.
Dans ce chapitre, nous examinerons la complexite´ des proble`mes de de´cision suivants:
• Etant donne´ deux buts Datalog F,G et un programme Datalog hie´rarchique P , dire si
les arbres SLD de P ∪ F et de P ∪G sont bisimilaires.
• Etant donne´ deux buts Datalog F,G et un programme Datalog restricted P , dire si les
arbres SLD de P ∪ F et de P ∪G sont bisimilaires.
Inde´cidabilite´ pour les programmes Prolog
Il est inde´cidabile, e´tant donne´ un programme Prolog P et des buts Prolog F1, G1, de de´cider
si P ∪ {F1} ZPmax P ∪ {G1}.
Ide´e de la preuve:
Re´duire pi4 qui est inde´cidable [28] a` notre proble`me de de´cision:
pi4
{
Entre´e: Un programme binaire Prolog P , un but Prolog A
Sortie: L’arbre de re´solution de P ∪A contient une branche infinie
Une question se pose ici, comment pouvons-nous re´tablir la de´cidabilite´ de ce proble`me de
de´cision? Nous pouvons penser a` restreindre le langage du programme logique. Ainsi, dans le
cadre des programmes Datalog par exemple, la principale difficulte´ vient des branches infinies
dans les arbres de re´solution. Nous aborderons cette question dans les sections suivantes.
De´cidabilite´ pour les programmes hie´rarchiques
(pihie): Soit P un programme Datalog hie´rarchique et F1, G1 deux buts Datalog, de´cider si
P ∪ {F1} ZPmax P ∪ {G1}.
Ide´e de la preuve:
function bisim1(F1,G1)
1: if bothempty(F1, G1) or bothfail(F1, G1) then
2: return true
3: else
4: SF ←− successor(F1)
5: SG←− successor(G1)
6: if SF 6= ∅ and SG 6= ∅ then
7: SF ′ ←− SF
8: while SF ′ 6= ∅ do
9: F2 ←− get-element(SF ′)
10: found-bisim←− false
11: SG′ ←− SG
12: while SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false do
13: G2 ←− get-element(SG′)
14: found-bisim←− bisim1(F2, G2)
15: end while
184 RE´SUME´ EN FRANC¸AIS




20: SG′ ←− SG
21: while SG′ 6= ∅ do
22: G2 ←− get-element(SG′)
23: found-bisim←− false
24: SF ′ ←− SF
25: while SF ′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false do
26: F2 ←− get-element(SF ′)
27: found-bisim←− bisim1(G2, F2)
28: end while









Nous de´montrons que l’algorithme bisim1(F1,G1) se termine et que si P ∪{F1} ZPmax P ∪
{G1}, alors bisim1(F1,G1) retourne true, et que si bisim1(F1,G1) retourne true, alors
P ∪ {F1} ZPmax P ∪ {G1}. Il en re´sulte que (pihie) est de´cidable. Nous de´montrons de meˆme
que (pihie) est dans 2EXPTIME.
De´cidabilite´ pour les programmes restricted
(pires): Soit P un programme Datalog restricted et F1, G1 deux buts Datalog, de´cider si P ∪
{F1} ZPmax P ∪ {G1}.
Ide´e de la preuve:
function bisim2((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi),(G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi))




4: SF ←− successor(Fi)
5: SG←− successor(Gi)
6: if SF 6= ∅ and SG 6= ∅ then
7: SF ′ ←− SF
8: while SF ′ 6= ∅ do
9: F ′ ←− get-element(SF ′)
10: found-bisim←− false
11: SG′ ←− SG
12: while SG′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false do
13: G′ ←− get-element(SG′)
14: found-bisim←− bisim2((F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi ⇒ F ′), (G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi ⇒ G′))
15: end while





20: SG′ ←− SG
21: while SG′ 6= ∅ do
22: G′ ←− get-element(SG′)
23: found-bisim←− false
24: SF ′ ←− SF
25: while SF ′ 6= ∅ and found-bisim = false do
26: F ′ ←− get-element(SF ′)
27: found-bisim←− bisim2((G1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Gi ⇒ G′), (F1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ Fi ⇒ F ′))
28: end while









Nous de´montrons que l’algorithme bisim2((F1),(G1)) se termine et que si P∪{F1} ZPmax P∪
{G1}, alors bisim2((F1),(G1)) retourne true, et que si bisim2((F1),(G1)) retourne true,
alors P ∪ {F1} ZPmax P ∪ {G1}. Il en re´sulte que (pires) est de´cidable. Nous de´montrons de
meˆme que (pires) est dans 2EXPTIME.
Notes sur la bisimilarite´ pour les buts nvi et svo
Nous avons essaye´ de prouver la de´cidabilite´ de la bisimilarite´ de deux buts donne´s pour les
programmes nvi et svo. Malheureusement, l’application des techniques de de´tection de boucles
de´veloppe´es dans [9] ne semble pas nous permettre de de´terminer si deux buts sont bisimilaires
par rapport a` un programme logique nvi et svo.
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Chapitre 6: Application
Dans ce chapitre, nous allons fournir une application dans le domaine du controˆle de l’infe´rence
en nous basant sur la the´orie du flux de l’information dans la programmation logique de´ja`
pre´sente´. Nous introduisons la notion de niveau du flux et nous de´finirons formellement les
notions de me´canisme, me´canisme suˆr, me´canisme certain et politique de se´curite´ pour les bases
de donne´es de´ductives et ceci en se basant sur les notions de´ja` e´voque´es.
Niveau d’indiscernabilite´ du flux de l’information en
programmation logique
Pour un programme Datalog P et un but G(x, y) avec la variable x conside´re´e comme une
variable d’entre´e et y comme une variable de sortie, soit ≡ une relation binaire sur UL(P ) de
cardinalite´ n. Soient a, b deux e´le´ments distincts de UL(P ).
• Pour la premie`re de´finition du flux (base´e sur re´ussite/e´chec), on dit que a ≡ b ssi les
deux buts P ∪{← p(a, y)} et P ∪{← p(b, y)} re´ussissent ou les deux buts P ∪{← p(a, y)}
et P ∪ {← p(b, y)} ne re´ussissent pas.
• Pour la deuxie`me de´finition du flux (base´e sur les substitutions re´ponses), on dit que
a ≡ b ssi θ(P ∪ {← p(a, y)}) = θ(P ∪ {← p(b, y)}).
• Pour la troisie`me de´finition du flux (base´e sur la bisimulation entre les buts), on dit que
a ≡ b ssi Tree(P ∪ {← p(a, y)}) ZPmax Tree(P ∪ {← p(b, y)})).
Nous de´montrons que ≡ est une relation d’e´quivalence.
Pour un programme Datalog P et un but G(x, y), le niveau du but G(x, y) est e´gal au
cardinal de la plus petite classe d’e´quivalence.
The´oriquement, ce niveau peut eˆtre calcule´ pour chacune des trois de´finitions du flux de l’information
pre´sente´es pre´ce´demment. Par exemple, pour la premie`re de´finition de flux base´e sur re´ussite/e´chec,
nous pouvons e´crire l’algorithme suivant:
Require: Un programme Datalog P , un but G(x, y), un Univers d’Herbrand fini UL(P ) =
{a1, · · · , an}
Ensure: Niveau de G(x, y)
1: Levelsucc ← 0; compteur sur le nombre des buts qui re´ussissent
2: Levelno−succ ← 0; compteur sur le nombre des buts qui ne re´ussissent pas
3: i← 1; compteur sur l’ensemble de l’Univers d’Herbrand
4: while i ≤ n do
5: if P ∪ {← p(ai, y)} re´ussit then
6: Levelsucc ← Levelsucc + 1;
7: else
8: Levelno−succ ← Levelno−succ + 1;
9: end if
10: i← i+ 1;
11: end while
12: return min(Levelsucc, Levelno−succ);
Quant a` la seconde de´finition du flux de l’information base´e sur les substitutions re´ponses,
nous pouvons e´crire l’algorithme suivant:
Require: Un programme Datalog P , un but G(x, y), un Univers d’Herbrand fini UL(P ) =
{a1, · · · , an}, m le nombre total de substitutions re´ponses possible de la variable y et ceci
pour tous les buts P ∪ {← G(a1, y)}, · · · , P ∪ {← G(an, y)}.
Ensure: Niveau de G(x, y)
1: table T [m]; table de compteurs, tous initialise´s a` 0, correspondant aux m substitutions
re´ponses diffe´rentes. Les index dans la table T sont les m diffe´rentes substitutions re´ponses et
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les valeurs correspondantes repre´sentent le nombre total d’occurrences de cette substitution
re´ponse
2: i← 1; compteur sur l’ensemble de l’Univers d’Herbrand
3: sub← θ[P ∪ {p(a1, y)}];nous initialisons sub par la premie`re substitution re´ponse de y
4: while i ≤ n do
5: tmps ← Θ[P ∪ {← p(ai, y)}]; comme P ∪ {← p(ai, y)} peut avoir plusieurs substitution
re´ponses, tmps est la table contenant ses substitutions re´ponses
6: j ← 1; Compteur sur l’ensemble des substitutions re´ponses pour le but P ∪ {← p(ai, y)}
7: while j <= count(tmps) do
8: T [tmps[j]]← T [tmps[j]] + 1;
9: if T [tmps[j]] < T [sub] then
10: sub← tmps[j];
11: end if
12: j ← j + 1;
13: end while
14: i← i+ 1;
15: end while
16: return T [sub];
En ce qui concerne le calcul du niveau base´ sur la de´finition de la bisimulation, nous pouvons
utiliser un algorithme similaire a` celui pre´sente´ ci-dessus conjointement avec un des algorithmes
(correct et complet) pre´sente´s dans le chapitre pre´ce´dent qui de´cide si deux buts sont bisimilaires
pour les prgrammes Datalog hie´rarchiques et restricted.
Pour un programme Datalog P et deux buts F (x, y) et G(x, y), on dit que:
• le but F (x, y) est critique ssi le niveau de F (x, y) est e´gal a` 1.
• le but F (x, y) est plus faible que le but G(x, y) ssi le niveau de F (x, y) est plus grand que
le niveau de G(x, y).
• le but F (x, y) est plus fort que le but G(x, y) ssi le niveau de F (x, y) est plus petit que
le niveau de G(x, y).
Pour un programme Datalog P et un butF (x, y), si F (x, y) est critique alors la variable de
sortie y re´ve`le des informations sur la variable x.
Controˆle d’infe´rence pre´ventive des syste`mes
d’information
Le controˆle d’infe´rence pre´ventive des syste`mes d’information doit assurer un compromis en-
tre la disponibilite´ et la confidentialite´ des informations: pour un utilisateur en particulier, le
syste`me doit retourner des re´ponses utiles aux requeˆtes e´mises et le´gitimes par cet utilisateur
tout en cachant toute information comple´mentaire qu’il garde a` sa disposition pour les autres
utilisateurs.
Me´canismes de se´curite´ suˆrs et pre´cis
Nous nouns inte´ressons a` savoir s’il est possible de mettre au point une proce´dure pour l’e´laboration
d’un me´canisme qui est a` la fois suˆr et pre´cis en utilisant la notion de flux de l’information pour
les programmes logiques.
Pour cela, nous allons repre´senter les programmes logiques comme des fonctions abstraites:
Pour un programme logique P repre´sente´ par sa de´finition de pre´dicat t(I1, · · · , In, O), ou`
I1, · · · , In sont des positions d’entre´e et O une position de sortie, soit p la fonction p : I1 ×
· · · × In × O → R. Alors p est une fonction avec n positions d’entre´e ik ∈ Ik, 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
et une position de sortie o ∈ O, et un re´sultat r ∈ R. O est l’ensemble de substitutions
re´ponses associe´ a` la position de sortie o. Selon chaque de´finition du flux de l’information, R
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peut eˆtre e´gal a` {re´ussite,e´chec}, ou a` l’ensemble des substitutions re´ponses correspondant a` la
position de sortie o, ou a` l’arbre SLD du but P ∪ {← t(i1, · · · , in, o)}.
En tenant compte de la confidentialite´ des informations, une question se pose: est-ce que
le re´sultat de p(i1, · · · , in, o) contient des renseignements qui pourraient violer la politique de
confidentialite´. Pour cela, les me´canismes de protection sont propose´s. Un me´canisme de pro-
tection produit, pour chaque entre´e qui ne viole pas la politique, la meˆme valeur que p, et pour
les entre´es qui laissent fuire des informations confidentielles un message d’erreur. Pour cela, soit
E l’ensemble des re´sultats d’un programme p qui indiquent des erreurs.
Soit p une fonction p : I1 × · · · × In ×O → R. Un me´canisme de protection m est une fonction
m : I1 × · · · × In → R ∪ E pour laquelle, quand ik ∈ Ik, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, o ∈ O, soit
• m(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o) ou
• m(i1, · · · , in) ∈ E
Pour la politique de confidentialite´:
Une politique de confidentialite´ pour un programme logique p : I1 × · · · × In × O → R est une
fonction c : I1 × · · · × In → J1 × · · · × Jn, ou` J1 ⊆ I1, · · · , Jn ⊆ In.
Pour le me´canisme suˆr:
Soit c : I1×· · ·×In → J1×· · ·×Jn une politique de confidentialite´ pour le programme logique p.
Soitm : I1×· · ·×In → R∪E un me´canisme de se´curite´ pour le meˆme programme logique p. Alors
le me´canisme m est suˆr (c-a`-d confidentiel) ssi il existe une fonction m′ : J1× · · ·× Jn → R∪E
tel que, pour tout ik ∈ Ik, 1 ≤ k ≤ n,m(i1, · · · , in) = m′(c(i1, · · · , in)).
Soient m1 et m2 deux me´canismes pour le programme p sous la politique c. Alors m1 est
aussi pre´cis quem2 (m1  m2) sachant que pour toutes les entre´es (i1, · · · , in), sim2(i1, · · · , in) =
p(i1, · · · , in, o), alors m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o).
On dit que m1 est plus pre´cis que m2 (m1  m2) si (m1  m2) et il existe une entre´e (i′1, · · · , i′n)
telle que m1(i
′
1, · · · , i′n) = p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o) et m2(i′1, · · · , i′n) 6= p(i′1, · · · , i′n, o).
Nous de´montrons que la relation  est re´flexive et transitive, et que la relation  est un ordre
strict sur les me´canismes de protection pour un programme donne´ p et une politique de confi-
dentialite´ c.
Soient m1 et m2 des me´canismes de protection pour le programme p, alors leur union
m3 = m1 ∪m2 est de´finie par:
m3(i1, · · · , in)

= p(i1, · · · , in) quand m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o) ou
m2(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in, o)
= m1(i1, · · · , in) autrement.
Nous pouvons voir que la de´finition pre´ce´dente n’est pas syme´trique, vu que m1 ∪ m2 6=
m2 ∪m1.
A partir de cette de´finition et la de´finition de me´canisme suˆr et pre´cis, nous avons: Etant
donne´s m1 et m2 deux me´canismes suˆrs pour le programme p et la politique c, m1∪m2 est aussi
un me´canisme suˆr pour le programme p et c. De plus, m1 ∪m2  m1 et m1 ∪m2  m2.
Pour tout programme p et politique de confidentialite´ c, il exitse un me´canisme suˆr et pre´cis
m∗ tel que, pour tous les me´canismes suˆrs m associe´s a` p et c, m∗  m.
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Chapitre 7: Evaluation et travaux
futurs
Dans le dernier chapitre, nous re´sumons les travaux pre´sente´s dans cette the`se et de´finissons des
orientations possibles pour des recherches plus pousse´es.
Re´sume´ de la the`se et conclusion
Notre principal objectif dans cette the`se e´tait de fournir un mode`le d’interaction dans les bases
de donne´es de´ductives qui pre´serve la se´curite´ de la base de donne´es tout en minimisant le
nombre de refus de re´ponses. Nous nous sommes penche´s sur la construction d’un me´canisme
suˆr et pre´cis pour ces bases de donne´es. Vu que le roˆle d’une base de donne´es de´ductive est de
faire des de´ductions base´es sur des re`gles et des faits qui y sont stocke´s, nous avons utilise´ la
logique du premier ordre, un langage comme Datalog, qui est utilise´ pour de´crire des faits, des
re`gles et des requeˆtes.
Nous avons commence´ par pre´senter, dans le chapitre 2, les e´le´ments de base de la se´curite´.
Comme nous nous sommes principalement inte´resse´s a` la confidentialite´, il e´tait naturel d’e´tudier
les politiques de se´curite´ qui traitent de cet aspect. Nous avons examine´ deux extensions des
politiques de confidentialite´, a` savoir les politiques de non-infe´rence et de non-de´ducibilite´ parce
qu’elles abordent la question de la confidentialite´ en se basant sur les traces d’exe´cution dans
le syste`me. Nous nous sommes ensuite penche´s sur la fac¸on d’imple´menter la se´curite´ dans
les syste`mes. Nous avons mentionne´ trois me´thodes, a` savoir, le controˆle d’acce`s, le flux de
l’information et le controˆle de l’infe´rence, en omettant volontairement la cryptographie. Les
me´canismes de controˆle d’acce`s de´crivent les conditions dans lesquelles un syste`me est se´curise´
alors que les me´canismes de ve´rification des flux de l’information assure que l’information cir-
culant dans le syste`me est conforme a` sa politique de se´curite´.
Dans le chapitre 3, nous avons pre´sente´ la programmation logique du premier ordre. Nous
avons passe´ en revue les notions de substitutions, unification, SLD re´futation et des arbres SLD,
et nous avons montre´ les limites de ces re´solutions vu que la re´futation d’un but peut eˆtre
incomple`te. Pour reme´dier a` ce proble`me, nous avons examine´ les techniques de de´tection de
boucles qui modifient le me´canisme de calcul en y ajoutant une capacite´ de stopper la re´futation
se basant sur une occurrence d’un sous-but similaire dans la SLD-de´rivation. Nous avons termine´
par une vue d’ensemble du controˆle de flux et de l’analyse de de´pendance dans la programmation
logique, tout en soulignant le fait que ces analyses ne peuvent se substituer a` la notion de flux
de l’information connue dans les syste`mes de se´curite´.
Pour atteindre notre objectif, et vu que la notion de flux de l’information connue dans les
syste`mes de se´curite´ n’a jamais e´te´ aborde´e en programmation logique, nous avons propose´, dans
le chapitre 4, trois de´finitions de ce qui pourrait eˆtre un flux de l’information en programmation
logique. Ces de´finitions, base´es sur les traces, correspondent a` ce qui pourrait eˆtre observe´ par
un utilisateur quand il lance une requeˆte sur un programme logique. Ces de´finitions sont base´es
respectivement sur la re´ussite / e´chec, les substitutions re´ponses et la bisimulation.
Nous avons explore´ les liens entre ces de´finitions et nous avons prouve´ la non-transitivite´ du
flux. Pour de´cider de l’existence d’un flux relativement a` un programme logique et un but, nous
avons fourni des re´sultats de complexite´ et nous avons montre´ l’inde´cidabilite´ du flux pour les
programmes logiques en ge´ne´ral et la de´cidabilite´ pour d’autres types de programmes logiques.
Le proble`me de de´cider de l’existence du flux dans les programmes Datalog relativement aux
de´finitions de flux base´es sur re´ussite / e´chec et substitutions re´ponses est EXPTIME-complet.
Le proble`me est devenu dans ∆2P pour les programmes Datalog binaires hie´rarchiques et ceci
relativement a` la premie`re de´finition du flux base´e sur re´ussite / e´chec. Nous avons consacre´
le chapitre 5 aux bisimulation de buts. Nous avons montre´ que de´cider si deux buts sont
bisimilaires est inde´cidable dans le cas ge´ne´ral, et qu’il devient de´cidable en 2EXPTIME pour
les programmes logiques hie´rarchiques et restricted.
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Enfin dans le chapitre 6, en utilisant tous les re´sultats obtenus, nous avons e´tendu la notion
de flux a` la notion d’indiscernabilite´. Une de´finition du niveau des buts logiques a e´te´ pro-
pose´e. Nous avons reformule´ les notions de me´canismes de protection, de me´canismes suˆrs, et
de me´canismes pre´cis et les notions de politiques de confidentialite´ dans le cadre de la program-
mation logique. Nous avons enfin e´tabli (nous l’avons formellement prouve´) un me´canisme suˆr
pour les bases de donne´es de´ductives en utilisant les notions pre´ce´demment expose´es.
Travaux futurs
Les travaux futurs peuvent eˆtre adresse´s en trois principaux axes de recherche: le premier vers le
fait de de´cider de l’existence du flux de l’information dans d’autres types de programmes logiques
et de de´cider de la bisimulation dans les programmes Datalog, le second vers l’imple´mentation du
flux de l’information dans un cadre de programmation logique, et le troisie`me vers l’inte´gration
de notre me´canisme de se´curite´ dans les bases de donne´es en temps re´el.
Travaux formels
A` la suite des re´sultats de´ja` obtenus dans cette the`se, nous pouvons penser a` trouver et a` ex-
plorer d’autres types de programmes logiques pour lesquels la question de l’existence du flux
pourraient eˆtre de´cidable aussi. En attendant, nous enqueˆtons toujours sur la de´cidabilite´ et la
complexite´ de l’existence du flux relativement a` la bisimulation dans les programmes Datalog
et ceci sans tenir en compte des techniques de de´tection de boucles.
Imple´mentation
Nous avons pre´sente´ dans les chapitres 4 et 5, plusieurs de´finitions de ce qui pourrait eˆtre
un flux d’information dans les programmes logiques. Nous avons pre´sente´ des algorithmes sur
la fac¸on de de´cider de ce flux et ceci dans des contextes diffe´rents. L’imple´mentation de ces
algorithmes constitue un moyen de consolider nos re´sultats. Bien que cette imple´mentation soit
relativement facile pour les deux premie`res de´finitions propose´es du flux, elle reste plus difficile
dans le cas de la bisimulation. Rappelons que pour de´cider si deux buts sont bisimilaires, nous
avons besoin de garder une trace dans la me´moire de tous les re´solvants de´ja` rencontre´s dans la
de´rivation, meˆme si les branches contenues dans l’arbre SLD ne sont pas infinies.
Meˆme si l’imple´mentation est tout a` fait possible, celle-ci risque de ne pas eˆtre tre`s inte´ressante
vu la quantite´ d’espace ne´cessaire pour de´cider de l’existence du flux. Nous pensons qu’une
meilleure imple´mentation pourrait eˆtre re´alise´e en utilisant les techniques expose´es dans la sec-
tion 3.2.9 ou bien en menant d’abord une recherche approfondie sur la fac¸on d’assouplir les
conditions pour de´cider de la bisimulation de deux buts tout en conservant le fait que nos algo-
rithmes soient corrects et complets.
Les bases de donne´es en temps re´el
Dans le chapitre 6, nous avons e´labore´ un me´canisme de se´curite´ suˆr et pre´cis pour les bases de
donne´es de´ductives. Cependant, comme les bases de donne´es en temps re´el be´ne´ficient d’une
attention de plus en plus accrue, il serait tentant de s’inte´resser a` la possibilite´ d’inte´grer notre
me´canisme de se´curite´ dans ces bases afin de renforcer leurs politiques de se´curite´. Il serait
e´galement inte´ressant de re´fle´chir aux changements a` apporter a` notre syste`me afin d’ajuster la
se´curite´ aux exigences du temps re´el.
